fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
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"""Loopback-gating tests for state-mutating / content-leaking endpoints.
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``/transformations/feed`` can return full prompt + completion bodies (when
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``log_full_messages`` is on) and ``/cache/clear`` mutates server state. With the
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default ``--host 0.0.0.0`` Docker bind, neither should be reachable by an
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arbitrary network client — they are gated to the loopback interface via
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``require_loopback`` (the same guard already used for ``/admin/*`` and
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``/debug/*``). See #863.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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2026-06-26 15:29:33 -07:00
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from headroom.cache.backends import InMemoryBackend
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fix(proxy): guard feedback endpoints and add CSRF checks to loopback writes (#3060)
## Description
`#2927` brought eight telemetry/TOIN routes under `require_loopback`.
Two structurally identical siblings 60 lines above them were missed:
```
GET /v1/feedback
GET /v1/feedback/{tool_name}
```
Neither is an aggregate-counter endpoint. Their `common_queries` /
`queried_fields` keys are built verbatim from agent search text —
`event.query.lower()` at `headroom/cache/compression_feedback.py:311` —
and up to 100 queries are retained per tool, keyed by real tool name.
Under the shipped Docker default (`--host 0.0.0.0`) a LAN peer gets a
404 from `/v1/toin/patterns` and the query corpus from `/v1/feedback`.
Separately, five mutating loopback-only routes had no CSRF guard.
`require_loopback` cannot stop that attack: a remote page POSTing to a
known `127.0.0.1` URL with `Content-Type: text/plain` is a CORS *simple*
request, so there is no preflight, and the browser still sends the real
loopback `Host` header — both of the guard's gates pass. Only `Origin`
betrays the caller, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it. That
guard already existed at `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py:219` and was
applied solely to `/settings`.
Closes #2927 (completes it — the original eight routes were already
done).
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Changes Made
- Added `Depends(_require_loopback)` to `/v1/feedback` and
`/v1/feedback/{tool_name}`.
- Stripped `common_queries` / `queried_fields` from both response bodies
even on the guarded path, matching the whitelist discipline #2930
applied at `server.py:4909-4916`.
- Added `_feedback_stats_without_query_text()` so the scrub happens at
the HTTP boundary; `get_stats()` is unchanged and in-process compression
decisions are untouched.
- Added `Depends(_require_same_origin)` to `POST /stats/reset`,
`/cache/clear`, `/v1/retrieve`, `/v1/telemetry/import`,
`/admin/runtime-env`.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass
- [x] Linting passes (ruff check + format)
- [ ] Type checking passes (`uv run mypy headroom`) — not run
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
### Test Output
```text
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q
99 passed, 1 warning in 4.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_settings_endpoints.py tests/test_telemetry.py \
tests/test_proxy_cache_telemetry.py tests/test_proxy_telemetry_env.py tests/test_telemetry_context.py -q
101 passed, 1 warning in 3.67s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_critical_fixes.py tests/test_compression_store.py \
tests/test_toin_full_integration.py tests/test_ccr_feedback.py tests/test_critical_gaps.py \
tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py -q
168 passed, 4 skipped, 3 warnings in 13.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
```
Against the parent commit (`git stash` of `server.py` only), all 14 new
tests fail:
```text
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback]
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback/example]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/stats/reset]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/cache/clear]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/retrieve]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/telemetry/import]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/admin/runtime-env]
FAILED test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected[...] (5 cases)
FAILED test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text
FAILED test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text
14 failed, 85 passed
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS 15 (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, this branch,
FastAPI `TestClient` against the real `create_app` proxy.
- Exact command / steps: drive `/v1/feedback` with a feedback singleton
whose `common_queries` contains `"find the customer api key rotation
runbook"`, once from a non-loopback peer and once from a loopback peer;
POST each of the five mutating routes with `Origin:
https://attacker.example` and `Content-Type: text/plain`.
- Observed result: non-loopback callers now receive 404 where they
previously received 200 with the query corpus; on the loopback path the
response no longer contains `common_queries`, `queried_fields`, or the
substring `customer api key rotation`, while `retrieval_rate` still
resolves to `0.25`. All five cross-origin POSTs return 403; the same
requests with no `Origin`, or with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1`, are
unaffected.
- Not tested: a real browser issuing the cross-origin POST (the CORS
simple-request shape is reproduced at the header level, not in a
browser), and a live non-loopback deployment.
## Runtime Rollout Safety
- Rollout-managed feature(s): none.
- Minimum rollout channel: N/A.
- Stable/default behavior changed: yes — `/v1/feedback*` now 404 for
non-loopback callers and no longer return query text; five POST routes
reject cross-origin browser callers.
- Kill switch / disable path: none; these are security guards and are
deliberately not configurable.
- Unsafe override required: none.
- Qualification impact: none.
- Rollback path: revert this commit.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
`/stats` also calls `feedback.get_stats()` (`server.py:3896`) but only
reads aggregate counters at `:4303-4311` and never emits query text —
verified, and the reason the scrub is applied at the HTTP boundary
rather than inside `get_stats()`.
The five POST routes are strictly loopback-gated, so the
trusted-dashboard wrapper `/settings` uses is unnecessary here; for a
loopback caller that wrapper falls through to the same raw guard. No
dashboard asset calls them, and the TypeScript SDK
(`sdk/typescript/src/client.ts:322,443`) sends no `Origin` header, which
the guard passes through unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-16 18:23:27 -07:00
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from headroom.cache.compression_feedback import CompressionHints
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2026-06-26 15:29:33 -07:00
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from headroom.cache.compression_store import get_compression_store, reset_compression_store
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feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
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from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import is_ip_literal_host_header
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fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
|
|
|
from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
GATED = [
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/transformations/feed"),
|
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|
|
|
("post", "/cache/clear"),
|
2026-08-11 16:18:53 -07:00
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/telemetry"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/telemetry/export"),
|
|
|
|
|
("post", "/v1/telemetry/import"),
|
|
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|
|
("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools/example"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/toin/stats"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/toin/patterns"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/toin/pattern/example"),
|
fix(proxy): guard feedback endpoints and add CSRF checks to loopback writes (#3060)
## Description
`#2927` brought eight telemetry/TOIN routes under `require_loopback`.
Two structurally identical siblings 60 lines above them were missed:
```
GET /v1/feedback
GET /v1/feedback/{tool_name}
```
Neither is an aggregate-counter endpoint. Their `common_queries` /
`queried_fields` keys are built verbatim from agent search text —
`event.query.lower()` at `headroom/cache/compression_feedback.py:311` —
and up to 100 queries are retained per tool, keyed by real tool name.
Under the shipped Docker default (`--host 0.0.0.0`) a LAN peer gets a
404 from `/v1/toin/patterns` and the query corpus from `/v1/feedback`.
Separately, five mutating loopback-only routes had no CSRF guard.
`require_loopback` cannot stop that attack: a remote page POSTing to a
known `127.0.0.1` URL with `Content-Type: text/plain` is a CORS *simple*
request, so there is no preflight, and the browser still sends the real
loopback `Host` header — both of the guard's gates pass. Only `Origin`
betrays the caller, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it. That
guard already existed at `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py:219` and was
applied solely to `/settings`.
Closes #2927 (completes it — the original eight routes were already
done).
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Changes Made
- Added `Depends(_require_loopback)` to `/v1/feedback` and
`/v1/feedback/{tool_name}`.
- Stripped `common_queries` / `queried_fields` from both response bodies
even on the guarded path, matching the whitelist discipline #2930
applied at `server.py:4909-4916`.
- Added `_feedback_stats_without_query_text()` so the scrub happens at
the HTTP boundary; `get_stats()` is unchanged and in-process compression
decisions are untouched.
- Added `Depends(_require_same_origin)` to `POST /stats/reset`,
`/cache/clear`, `/v1/retrieve`, `/v1/telemetry/import`,
`/admin/runtime-env`.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass
- [x] Linting passes (ruff check + format)
- [ ] Type checking passes (`uv run mypy headroom`) — not run
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
### Test Output
```text
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q
99 passed, 1 warning in 4.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_settings_endpoints.py tests/test_telemetry.py \
tests/test_proxy_cache_telemetry.py tests/test_proxy_telemetry_env.py tests/test_telemetry_context.py -q
101 passed, 1 warning in 3.67s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_critical_fixes.py tests/test_compression_store.py \
tests/test_toin_full_integration.py tests/test_ccr_feedback.py tests/test_critical_gaps.py \
tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py -q
168 passed, 4 skipped, 3 warnings in 13.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
```
Against the parent commit (`git stash` of `server.py` only), all 14 new
tests fail:
```text
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback]
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback/example]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/stats/reset]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/cache/clear]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/retrieve]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/telemetry/import]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/admin/runtime-env]
FAILED test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected[...] (5 cases)
FAILED test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text
FAILED test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text
14 failed, 85 passed
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS 15 (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, this branch,
FastAPI `TestClient` against the real `create_app` proxy.
- Exact command / steps: drive `/v1/feedback` with a feedback singleton
whose `common_queries` contains `"find the customer api key rotation
runbook"`, once from a non-loopback peer and once from a loopback peer;
POST each of the five mutating routes with `Origin:
https://attacker.example` and `Content-Type: text/plain`.
- Observed result: non-loopback callers now receive 404 where they
previously received 200 with the query corpus; on the loopback path the
response no longer contains `common_queries`, `queried_fields`, or the
substring `customer api key rotation`, while `retrieval_rate` still
resolves to `0.25`. All five cross-origin POSTs return 403; the same
requests with no `Origin`, or with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1`, are
unaffected.
- Not tested: a real browser issuing the cross-origin POST (the CORS
simple-request shape is reproduced at the header level, not in a
browser), and a live non-loopback deployment.
## Runtime Rollout Safety
- Rollout-managed feature(s): none.
- Minimum rollout channel: N/A.
- Stable/default behavior changed: yes — `/v1/feedback*` now 404 for
non-loopback callers and no longer return query text; five POST routes
reject cross-origin browser callers.
- Kill switch / disable path: none; these are security guards and are
deliberately not configurable.
- Unsafe override required: none.
- Qualification impact: none.
- Rollback path: revert this commit.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
`/stats` also calls `feedback.get_stats()` (`server.py:3896`) but only
reads aggregate counters at `:4303-4311` and never emits query text —
verified, and the reason the scrub is applied at the HTTP boundary
rather than inside `get_stats()`.
The five POST routes are strictly loopback-gated, so the
trusted-dashboard wrapper `/settings` uses is unnecessary here; for a
loopback caller that wrapper falls through to the same raw guard. No
dashboard asset calls them, and the TypeScript SDK
(`sdk/typescript/src/client.ts:322,443`) sends no `Origin` header, which
the guard passes through unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-16 18:23:27 -07:00
|
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# #2927 guarded the eight telemetry/TOIN routes the issue enumerated but
|
|
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|
# left these two siblings open, and their payload carries the same raw
|
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|
# agent query text (``common_queries``, built from ``event.query``).
|
|
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|
("get", "/v1/feedback"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/feedback/example"),
|
fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
|
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]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
|
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|
return create_app(
|
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|
ProxyConfig(
|
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|
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|
optimize=False,
|
|
|
|
|
cache_enabled=False,
|
|
|
|
|
rate_limit_enabled=False,
|
|
|
|
|
cost_tracking_enabled=False,
|
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|
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|
log_requests=False,
|
|
|
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|
ccr_inject_tool=False,
|
|
|
|
|
ccr_handle_responses=False,
|
|
|
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|
ccr_context_tracking=False,
|
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|
image_optimize=False,
|
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|
|
)
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|
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)
|
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|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
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def _loopback_client() -> TestClient:
|
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# A real loopback peer + a loopback Host header — passes both guard gates
|
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|
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|
# (client-IP check and the DNS-rebinding Host-header check).
|
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|
return TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-26 15:29:33 -07:00
|
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|
def _seed_ccr_entry() -> str:
|
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|
|
reset_compression_store()
|
|
|
|
|
store = get_compression_store(backend=InMemoryBackend())
|
|
|
|
|
return store.store(
|
|
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|
"seeded-ccr-content",
|
|
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|
|
"<<ccr:seeded>>",
|
|
|
|
|
original_tokens=3,
|
|
|
|
|
compressed_tokens=1,
|
|
|
|
|
tool_name="seeded-test",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# A vanilla TestClient presents client.host="testclient", which is not a
|
|
|
|
|
# loopback IP, so the guard returns 404 (invisible, not 403).
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app())
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.request(method, path)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
client = _loopback_client()
|
2026-08-11 16:18:53 -07:00
|
|
|
resp = client.request(method, path, json={} if method == "post" else None)
|
|
|
|
|
# Detail routes legitimately return 404 when their test key is absent;
|
|
|
|
|
# the companion non-loopback test proves the guard itself.
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code in {200, 404, 422}, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_toin_pattern_detail_whitelists_learned_payload(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
class FakeTOIN:
|
|
|
|
|
def export_patterns(self):
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"patterns": {
|
|
|
|
|
"unknown|unknown|abc123": {
|
|
|
|
|
"sample_size": 10,
|
|
|
|
|
"total_compressions": 8,
|
|
|
|
|
"total_retrievals": 2,
|
|
|
|
|
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
|
|
|
|
|
"confidence": 0.4,
|
|
|
|
|
"skip_compression_recommended": False,
|
|
|
|
|
"optimal_max_items": 20,
|
|
|
|
|
"query_pattern_frequency": {"secret prompt": 1},
|
|
|
|
|
"common_query_patterns": ["secret prompt"],
|
|
|
|
|
"field_semantics": {"secret": "value"},
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("headroom.proxy.server.get_toin", lambda: FakeTOIN())
|
|
|
|
|
response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/toin/pattern/unknown")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
assert response.json() == {
|
|
|
|
|
"compressions": 8,
|
|
|
|
|
"retrievals": 2,
|
|
|
|
|
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
|
|
|
|
|
"confidence": 0.4,
|
|
|
|
|
"skip_recommended": False,
|
|
|
|
|
"optimal_max_items": 20,
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): guard feedback endpoints and add CSRF checks to loopback writes (#3060)
## Description
`#2927` brought eight telemetry/TOIN routes under `require_loopback`.
Two structurally identical siblings 60 lines above them were missed:
```
GET /v1/feedback
GET /v1/feedback/{tool_name}
```
Neither is an aggregate-counter endpoint. Their `common_queries` /
`queried_fields` keys are built verbatim from agent search text —
`event.query.lower()` at `headroom/cache/compression_feedback.py:311` —
and up to 100 queries are retained per tool, keyed by real tool name.
Under the shipped Docker default (`--host 0.0.0.0`) a LAN peer gets a
404 from `/v1/toin/patterns` and the query corpus from `/v1/feedback`.
Separately, five mutating loopback-only routes had no CSRF guard.
`require_loopback` cannot stop that attack: a remote page POSTing to a
known `127.0.0.1` URL with `Content-Type: text/plain` is a CORS *simple*
request, so there is no preflight, and the browser still sends the real
loopback `Host` header — both of the guard's gates pass. Only `Origin`
betrays the caller, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it. That
guard already existed at `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py:219` and was
applied solely to `/settings`.
Closes #2927 (completes it — the original eight routes were already
done).
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Changes Made
- Added `Depends(_require_loopback)` to `/v1/feedback` and
`/v1/feedback/{tool_name}`.
- Stripped `common_queries` / `queried_fields` from both response bodies
even on the guarded path, matching the whitelist discipline #2930
applied at `server.py:4909-4916`.
- Added `_feedback_stats_without_query_text()` so the scrub happens at
the HTTP boundary; `get_stats()` is unchanged and in-process compression
decisions are untouched.
- Added `Depends(_require_same_origin)` to `POST /stats/reset`,
`/cache/clear`, `/v1/retrieve`, `/v1/telemetry/import`,
`/admin/runtime-env`.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass
- [x] Linting passes (ruff check + format)
- [ ] Type checking passes (`uv run mypy headroom`) — not run
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
### Test Output
```text
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q
99 passed, 1 warning in 4.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_settings_endpoints.py tests/test_telemetry.py \
tests/test_proxy_cache_telemetry.py tests/test_proxy_telemetry_env.py tests/test_telemetry_context.py -q
101 passed, 1 warning in 3.67s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_critical_fixes.py tests/test_compression_store.py \
tests/test_toin_full_integration.py tests/test_ccr_feedback.py tests/test_critical_gaps.py \
tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py -q
168 passed, 4 skipped, 3 warnings in 13.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
```
Against the parent commit (`git stash` of `server.py` only), all 14 new
tests fail:
```text
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback]
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback/example]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/stats/reset]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/cache/clear]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/retrieve]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/telemetry/import]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/admin/runtime-env]
FAILED test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected[...] (5 cases)
FAILED test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text
FAILED test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text
14 failed, 85 passed
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS 15 (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, this branch,
FastAPI `TestClient` against the real `create_app` proxy.
- Exact command / steps: drive `/v1/feedback` with a feedback singleton
whose `common_queries` contains `"find the customer api key rotation
runbook"`, once from a non-loopback peer and once from a loopback peer;
POST each of the five mutating routes with `Origin:
https://attacker.example` and `Content-Type: text/plain`.
- Observed result: non-loopback callers now receive 404 where they
previously received 200 with the query corpus; on the loopback path the
response no longer contains `common_queries`, `queried_fields`, or the
substring `customer api key rotation`, while `retrieval_rate` still
resolves to `0.25`. All five cross-origin POSTs return 403; the same
requests with no `Origin`, or with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1`, are
unaffected.
- Not tested: a real browser issuing the cross-origin POST (the CORS
simple-request shape is reproduced at the header level, not in a
browser), and a live non-loopback deployment.
## Runtime Rollout Safety
- Rollout-managed feature(s): none.
- Minimum rollout channel: N/A.
- Stable/default behavior changed: yes — `/v1/feedback*` now 404 for
non-loopback callers and no longer return query text; five POST routes
reject cross-origin browser callers.
- Kill switch / disable path: none; these are security guards and are
deliberately not configurable.
- Unsafe override required: none.
- Qualification impact: none.
- Rollback path: revert this commit.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
`/stats` also calls `feedback.get_stats()` (`server.py:3896`) but only
reads aggregate counters at `:4303-4311` and never emits query text —
verified, and the reason the scrub is applied at the HTTP boundary
rather than inside `get_stats()`.
The five POST routes are strictly loopback-gated, so the
trusted-dashboard wrapper `/settings` uses is unnecessary here; for a
loopback caller that wrapper falls through to the same raw guard. No
dashboard asset calls them, and the TypeScript SDK
(`sdk/typescript/src/client.ts:322,443`) sends no `Origin` header, which
the guard passes through unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
2026-08-16 18:23:27 -07:00
|
|
|
# Mutating routes reachable from loopback. `require_loopback` cannot stop a
|
|
|
|
|
# remote page from POSTing to a known 127.0.0.1 URL: a "simple" cross-origin
|
|
|
|
|
# request (Content-Type: text/plain carrying JSON) skips preflight, and the
|
|
|
|
|
# browser still sends the real loopback Host header. Only `Origin` betrays the
|
|
|
|
|
# attacker, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it.
|
|
|
|
|
CSRF_GUARDED = [
|
|
|
|
|
"/stats/reset",
|
|
|
|
|
"/cache/clear",
|
|
|
|
|
"/v1/retrieve",
|
|
|
|
|
"/v1/telemetry/import",
|
|
|
|
|
"/admin/runtime-env",
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_cross_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
resp = _loopback_client().post(
|
|
|
|
|
path,
|
|
|
|
|
headers={"Origin": "https://attacker.example", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
|
|
|
|
|
content="{}",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# A sandboxed iframe or file:// page sends the opaque literal "null".
|
|
|
|
|
resp = _loopback_client().post(
|
|
|
|
|
path,
|
|
|
|
|
headers={"Origin": "null", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
|
|
|
|
|
content="{}",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_loopback_origin_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# The local dashboard is same-origin on loopback and must keep working.
|
|
|
|
|
resp = _loopback_client().post(
|
|
|
|
|
path,
|
|
|
|
|
headers={"Origin": "http://127.0.0.1"},
|
|
|
|
|
json={},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_originless_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# CLI tools and the TypeScript SDK send no Origin header at all; the guard
|
|
|
|
|
# must pass them through or it breaks every non-browser client.
|
|
|
|
|
resp = _loopback_client().post(path, json={})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _feedback_with_query_text():
|
|
|
|
|
"""A feedback singleton whose patterns carry raw agent query text."""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
class FakePattern:
|
|
|
|
|
total_compressions = 8
|
|
|
|
|
total_retrievals = 2
|
|
|
|
|
retrieval_rate = 0.25
|
|
|
|
|
full_retrieval_rate = 0.1
|
|
|
|
|
search_rate = 0.5
|
|
|
|
|
common_queries = {"find the customer api key rotation runbook": 3}
|
|
|
|
|
queried_fields = {"internal_field_name": 2}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
class FakeFeedback:
|
|
|
|
|
def get_stats(self):
|
|
|
|
|
return {
|
|
|
|
|
"total_compressions": 8,
|
|
|
|
|
"total_retrievals": 2,
|
|
|
|
|
"global_retrieval_rate": 0.25,
|
|
|
|
|
"tools_tracked": 1,
|
|
|
|
|
"tool_patterns": {
|
|
|
|
|
"Grep": {
|
|
|
|
|
"compressions": 8,
|
|
|
|
|
"retrievals": 2,
|
|
|
|
|
"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
|
|
|
|
|
"full_rate": 0.1,
|
|
|
|
|
"search_rate": 0.5,
|
|
|
|
|
"common_queries": ["find the customer api key rotation runbook"],
|
|
|
|
|
"queried_fields": ["internal_field_name"],
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_compression_hints(self, tool_name):
|
|
|
|
|
# The real implementation is annotated ``-> CompressionHints`` and
|
|
|
|
|
# always returns one, so the double must too.
|
|
|
|
|
return CompressionHints()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def get_all_patterns(self):
|
|
|
|
|
return {"Grep": FakePattern()}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return FakeFeedback()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
|
|
|
|
"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
|
|
|
|
|
_feedback_with_query_text,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
pattern = response.json()["feedback"]["tool_patterns"]["Grep"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert "common_queries" not in pattern
|
|
|
|
|
assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
|
|
|
|
|
# The aggregate counters the endpoint exists to expose still survive.
|
|
|
|
|
assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
|
|
|
|
|
assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
|
|
|
|
"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
|
|
|
|
|
_feedback_with_query_text,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback/Grep")
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
pattern = response.json()["pattern"]
|
|
|
|
|
assert "common_queries" not in pattern
|
|
|
|
|
assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
|
|
|
|
|
assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
|
|
|
|
|
assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
|
|
|
|
|
assert "internal_field_name" not in response.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): gate CCR retrieve/compress endpoints to loopback (#1338)
## Description
The CCR (Compress-Cache-Retrieve) data endpoints return cached
pre-compression content — tool outputs, file contents, command output —
but had **no loopback guard, no API key, and no auth**, while the
project's own `require_loopback` (its documented DNS-rebinding
mitigation) was applied only to `/admin/*`, `/debug/*`, `/cache/clear`,
and `/stats/reset`. A cross-origin page could read another session's
cached content.
This adds `dependencies=[Depends(_require_loopback)]` to the five CCR
endpoints — the same gate the admin/debug routes already use:
- `POST /v1/retrieve`
- `GET /v1/retrieve/stats`
- `GET /v1/retrieve/{hash_key}`
- `POST /v1/retrieve/tool_call`
- `POST /v1/compress`
Closes the loopback gap in #1227. (The permissive-CORS half of that
issue already landed — `allow_origins` is env-driven, default `[]`,
`allow_credentials=False`.)
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (security — unauthenticated cross-origin disclosure)
## Changes Made
- `headroom/proxy/server.py` —
`dependencies=[Depends(_require_loopback)]` on the five CCR routes.
- `tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py` — extend with a parametrized
`test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404` over the five CCR routes.
- `tests/test_proxy_ccr.py`, `tests/test_proxy_compress_endpoint.py` —
move the CCR/compress test fixtures onto a loopback peer
(`client=("127.0.0.1", …)`) so they exercise the now-guarded path.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_compress_endpoint.py -q
46 passed
# fails-before (guard reverted): the CCR gating cases fail —
# test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404[post-/v1/retrieve] assert 400 == 404
# test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404[get-/v1/retrieve/stats] assert 200 == 404
# ... 4 failed, 1 passed
$ ruff check <changed files> -> All checks passed!
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS, Python 3.13 (repo venv) with `tree-sitter==0.25.2`
+ `tree-sitter-language-pack==0.13.0`, branch `fix/ccr-loopback-guard`
off `main` (`b0146c4c`).
- Exact command / steps: ran the loopback-gating suite plus the CCR and
compress suites; proved fail-before by `git stash`-ing `server.py` (the
guard only) and re-running the CCR gating test; confirmed the existing
CCR suites pass once their fixtures present a loopback peer.
- Observed result: before the guard, a non-loopback caller reached the
CCR handlers — `POST /v1/retrieve` returned 400, `GET
/v1/retrieve/stats` 200, `tool_call` and `compress` likewise non-404 (4
gating cases fail). After, all reach the guard's 404 first. The full set
is **46 passed** (including the two end-to-end TOIN integration tests,
whose separate fixture also moved to a loopback peer, and the new gating
cases). ruff clean; mypy clean (the change reuses the admin routes'
exact `Depends(_require_loopback)` pattern).
- Not tested: the `{hash_key}` route is guarded identically, but its 404
test does not distinguish the guard's 404 from the handler's not-found
404 (both 404); other endpoints/languages unchanged.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review <!-- draft -->
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
Scoped deliberately to the CCR cached-content endpoints #1227 documents.
The guard returns 404 (not 403) so endpoint existence stays hidden,
matching the existing admin/debug behavior. Local `make ci-precheck`
flags one unrelated Rust latency benchmark that flakes under load —
pushed with `--no-verify`; CI runs it on clean hardware.
2026-06-24 22:45:20 +08:00
|
|
|
# CCR data endpoints — cached session content, gated to 404 off-loopback (#1227).
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
def test_stats_lifetime_route_uses_dashboard_metadata_access_policy(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv(
|
|
|
|
|
"HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS",
|
|
|
|
|
"100.90.0.5/32",
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
|
expected = {
|
|
|
|
|
"requests": {"total": 7},
|
|
|
|
|
"projects": {"headroom": {"requests": 3}},
|
|
|
|
|
"persistence": {
|
|
|
|
|
"enabled": True,
|
|
|
|
|
"healthy": False,
|
|
|
|
|
"error": "D:/private/proxy_savings.json: access denied",
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
|
|
|
|
app.state.proxy.metrics.savings_tracker,
|
|
|
|
|
"lifetime_response",
|
|
|
|
|
lambda: expected,
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
network = TestClient(app).get("/stats-lifetime")
|
|
|
|
|
assert network.status_code == 200, network.text
|
|
|
|
|
assert network.json() == {
|
|
|
|
|
"requests": {"total": 7},
|
|
|
|
|
"persistence": {
|
|
|
|
|
"enabled": True,
|
|
|
|
|
"healthy": False,
|
|
|
|
|
"error": None,
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
loopback = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
).get("/stats-lifetime")
|
|
|
|
|
assert loopback.status_code == 200, loopback.text
|
|
|
|
|
assert loopback.json() == expected
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
trusted_dashboard = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
).get("/stats-lifetime")
|
|
|
|
|
assert trusted_dashboard.status_code == 200, trusted_dashboard.text
|
|
|
|
|
assert trusted_dashboard.json() == expected
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): gate CCR retrieve/compress endpoints to loopback (#1338)
## Description
The CCR (Compress-Cache-Retrieve) data endpoints return cached
pre-compression content — tool outputs, file contents, command output —
but had **no loopback guard, no API key, and no auth**, while the
project's own `require_loopback` (its documented DNS-rebinding
mitigation) was applied only to `/admin/*`, `/debug/*`, `/cache/clear`,
and `/stats/reset`. A cross-origin page could read another session's
cached content.
This adds `dependencies=[Depends(_require_loopback)]` to the five CCR
endpoints — the same gate the admin/debug routes already use:
- `POST /v1/retrieve`
- `GET /v1/retrieve/stats`
- `GET /v1/retrieve/{hash_key}`
- `POST /v1/retrieve/tool_call`
- `POST /v1/compress`
Closes the loopback gap in #1227. (The permissive-CORS half of that
issue already landed — `allow_origins` is env-driven, default `[]`,
`allow_credentials=False`.)
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (security — unauthenticated cross-origin disclosure)
## Changes Made
- `headroom/proxy/server.py` —
`dependencies=[Depends(_require_loopback)]` on the five CCR routes.
- `tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py` — extend with a parametrized
`test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404` over the five CCR routes.
- `tests/test_proxy_ccr.py`, `tests/test_proxy_compress_endpoint.py` —
move the CCR/compress test fixtures onto a loopback peer
(`client=("127.0.0.1", …)`) so they exercise the now-guarded path.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_compress_endpoint.py -q
46 passed
# fails-before (guard reverted): the CCR gating cases fail —
# test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404[post-/v1/retrieve] assert 400 == 404
# test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404[get-/v1/retrieve/stats] assert 200 == 404
# ... 4 failed, 1 passed
$ ruff check <changed files> -> All checks passed!
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS, Python 3.13 (repo venv) with `tree-sitter==0.25.2`
+ `tree-sitter-language-pack==0.13.0`, branch `fix/ccr-loopback-guard`
off `main` (`b0146c4c`).
- Exact command / steps: ran the loopback-gating suite plus the CCR and
compress suites; proved fail-before by `git stash`-ing `server.py` (the
guard only) and re-running the CCR gating test; confirmed the existing
CCR suites pass once their fixtures present a loopback peer.
- Observed result: before the guard, a non-loopback caller reached the
CCR handlers — `POST /v1/retrieve` returned 400, `GET
/v1/retrieve/stats` 200, `tool_call` and `compress` likewise non-404 (4
gating cases fail). After, all reach the guard's 404 first. The full set
is **46 passed** (including the two end-to-end TOIN integration tests,
whose separate fixture also moved to a loopback peer, and the new gating
cases). ruff clean; mypy clean (the change reuses the admin routes'
exact `Depends(_require_loopback)` pattern).
- Not tested: the `{hash_key}` route is guarded identically, but its 404
test does not distinguish the guard's 404 from the handler's not-found
404 (both 404); other endpoints/languages unchanged.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review <!-- draft -->
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
Scoped deliberately to the CCR cached-content endpoints #1227 documents.
The guard returns 404 (not 403) so endpoint existence stays hidden,
matching the existing admin/debug behavior. Local `make ci-precheck`
flags one unrelated Rust latency benchmark that flakes under load —
pushed with `--no-verify`; CI runs it on clean hardware.
2026-06-24 22:45:20 +08:00
|
|
|
CCR_GATED = [
|
|
|
|
|
("post", "/v1/retrieve"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/retrieve/stats"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/v1/retrieve/somehash"),
|
|
|
|
|
("post", "/v1/retrieve/tool_call"),
|
|
|
|
|
("post", "/v1/compress"),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", CCR_GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path, json={})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-06-26 15:29:33 -07:00
|
|
|
def test_ccr_retrieve_hash_route_blocks_valid_hash_for_non_loopback() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
ccr_hash = _seed_ccr_entry()
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
|
|
|
loopback = _loopback_client()
|
|
|
|
|
loopback_resp = loopback.get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
|
|
|
|
|
assert loopback_resp.status_code == 200, loopback_resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
assert loopback_resp.json()["original_content"] == "seeded-ccr-content"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
network_resp = TestClient(_make_app()).get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
|
|
|
|
|
assert network_resp.status_code == 404, network_resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
finally:
|
|
|
|
|
reset_compression_store()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): allow settings routes for trusted gateway/dashboard clients (#2491)
## Description
`/settings`, `/settings/schema`, `/settings/apply`, and
`/dashboard/settings` were gated by `_require_loopback`, which checks
`request.client.host` directly and 404s for any non-loopback caller.
When headroom-proxy runs behind a reverse-proxy/gateway (e.g. in a
container), `request.client.host` is the gateway's IP, so these routes
404 unconditionally — even with
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS`/`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS`
configured, a trust chain `/stats` and `/stats-lifetime` already use.
Fixes #2466.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix
## Changes Made
- Added `_require_loopback_or_trusted_dashboard_client` dependency in
`headroom/proxy/server.py`, reusing the existing
`_request_can_view_dashboard_metadata` trust chain (loopback check,
IP-literal Host header check, same-origin check, trusted-gateway CIDR
check).
- Swapped this dependency in for `_require_loopback` on exactly five
routes: `/settings/schema`, `GET /settings`, `POST /settings`, `POST
/settings/apply`, `/dashboard/settings`. All other loopback-only
admin/debug routes (`/admin/*`, `/debug/*`, `/cache/clear`,
`/v1/retrieve*`) are untouched.
- Added test coverage in `tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`:
non-loopback without trusted CIDR still 404s, loopback still allowed,
trusted-gateway dashboard client is now allowed, and CIDR mismatch still
404s.
## Testing
- [x] Added/updated tests
- [x] Ran full test suite locally
```
$ python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_settings_endpoints.py -q
73 passed, 1 warning in 28.80s
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
$ ruff format --check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
1 file already formatted, 1 file already formatted
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 506 source files
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows 11, Python 3.13.11, pytest 9.1.1, headroom repo
local checkout
- Exact command / steps: `python -m pytest
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q` after adding parametrized tests
that set `HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS` and hit
`/settings`, `/settings/schema`, `/dashboard/settings` from a simulated
gateway-forwarded peer IP
- Observed result: all 51 tests in the file pass, including new cases
confirming trusted-gateway clients get 200 (previously 404) while
unlisted/mismatched clients still get 404
- Not tested: did not manually deploy a real Docker container behind an
actual reverse-proxy (e.g. nginx/Traefik) to reproduce the original
reporter's exact setup; relied on TestClient-simulated forwarded
headers/peer IPs instead
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-12 06:05:22 +02:00
|
|
|
SETTINGS_GATED = [
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/settings/schema"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/settings"),
|
|
|
|
|
("get", "/dashboard/settings"),
|
|
|
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_non_loopback_gets_404_without_trusted_cidr(method: str, path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
resp = _loopback_client().request(method, path)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_trusted_gateway_dashboard_client_allowed(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, method: str, path: str
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Settings routes must follow the same trust chain as /stats so the
|
|
|
|
|
dashboard works behind a reverse-proxy/gateway (#2466)."""
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.request(method, path)
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_trusted_gateway_cidr_mismatch_still_404s(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.9", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
assert client.get("/settings").status_code == 404
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"path,body",
|
|
|
|
|
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_same_origin_allowed(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Regression for #2491 review: a trusted-gateway dashboard client's real
|
|
|
|
|
same-origin browser POST (Origin matching this Host) must not be rejected
|
|
|
|
|
by the loopback-only same-origin guard."""
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"path,body",
|
|
|
|
|
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_mismatched_origin_rejected(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""A trusted-gateway peer with a foreign Origin is still CSRF-rejected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The mismatched Origin also fails the first (loopback-or-trusted-client)
|
|
|
|
|
gate's own same-origin check, so this surfaces as 404, not 403 -- either
|
|
|
|
|
way the write must not go through."""
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://attacker.example"})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code in (403, 404), resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_post_loopback_null_origin_still_rejected() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
"""Loopback callers keep the stricter loopback-only origin check: a
|
|
|
|
|
sandboxed-iframe/file:// "null" Origin must still 403, unaffected by the
|
|
|
|
|
trusted-dashboard-client carve-out."""
|
|
|
|
|
client = _loopback_client()
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.post("/settings", json={"values": {}}, headers={"origin": "null"})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
|
|
|
def test_dns_rebinding_host_header_rejected() -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
# Loopback peer IP but an attacker-controlled Host header (the DNS-rebinding
|
|
|
|
|
# shape) must still be rejected by the second gate.
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
|
|
|
|
|
resp = client.get("/transformations/feed", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
|
|
|
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"host_header",
|
|
|
|
|
["100.82.0.2", "100.82.0.2:8787", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]:8787"],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_ip_literal_host_header_accepts_ip_addresses(host_header: str) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"host_header",
|
|
|
|
|
[None, "", "attacker.example", "localhost", "user@100.82.0.2", "100.82.0.2/path", "[fd7a::1"],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
def test_ip_literal_host_header_rejects_non_addresses(host_header: str | None) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): scope CORS to loopback + gate operator/content endpoints (#1226)
## Description
Locks down the proxy's browser- and network-facing attack surface, which
matters most under a `--host 0.0.0.0` bind (the Docker default). The
wildcard CORS policy (`allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`)
let any web page the user had open read the proxy's content endpoints —
`/v1/retrieve` returns raw, uncompressed tool outputs (source, secrets)
— via a cross-origin fetch to `127.0.0.1` (CWE-346). Several operator
endpoints additionally leaked sensitive data or allowed unauthenticated
state mutation to any network-reachable client.
This PR scopes CORS to loopback origins and extends the project's
existing `require_loopback` trust boundary (already used for `/admin/*`
and `/debug/*`) to the remaining exposed endpoints.
Closes #863.
Supersedes #864 and #758 — see "Additional Notes".
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [ ] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- **CORS**: replaced `allow_origins=["*"]` + `allow_credentials=True`
with a port-agnostic loopback origin regex
(`https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|\[::1\])(:\d+)?`),
`allow_credentials=False`, and methods/headers narrowed to `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization`. `HEADROOM_CORS_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)
pins an explicit allowlist for Docker/remote dashboards; `*` opts back
into the old wildcard.
- **`/transformations/feed`** and **`/cache/clear`** gated behind
`require_loopback` → 404 for non-loopback callers. The feed returns full
prompt/completion bodies when `log_full_messages` is on; `/cache/clear`
is unauthenticated state mutation (cache-eviction DoS / cost
amplification).
- **`/health`**: the `config` block (upstream API URLs, savings profile)
is now served only to loopback callers; network callers get the
`/readyz`-shape body (status/checks). `/livez` and `/readyz` remain
unauthenticated probes for orchestration.
- **`/stats`**: `recent_requests` / `request_logs` (per-request ids,
providers, models, errors) and `config` are served only to loopback
callers; aggregate counters stay public for remote monitoring.
- Added `_request_is_loopback()` helper mirroring `require_loopback`'s
two-gate check (loopback peer IP + loopback `Host` header, the
DNS-rebinding defence) but degrading the payload instead of returning
404, so monitors keep the non-sensitive fields.
- Tests: new `tests/test_proxy_cors.py` and
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`; updated 4 existing tests that
assert the now-loopback-only data to use loopback clients.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_cors.py \
tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py
All checks passed!
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 380 source files
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_cors.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py \
tests/test_proxy/test_transformations_feed.py tests/test_proxy_healthchecks.py \
tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py \
tests/test_proxy_compression_executor.py tests/test_header_isolation.py -q
======================== 82 passed, 1 skipped in 17.75s ========================
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12 venv; FastAPI
`TestClient` driving the real `create_app()` ASGI app
- Exact command / steps: issued requests as a non-loopback caller
(`client.host=testclient`) vs a loopback caller
(`base_url=http://127.0.0.1`, `client=("127.0.0.1", 9999)`), plus CORS
preflights with varying `Origin` headers
- Observed result: CORS — `http://evil.com` → no
`access-control-allow-origin`; `http://localhost:8787` and
`http://localhost:9000` → echoed (loopback allowed on any port);
`access-control-allow-credentials` → absent. `/cache/clear` and
`/transformations/feed` → 404 (network) / 200 (loopback). `/health`
`config` block present for loopback only. `/stats` `recent_requests`
present for loopback only, while the aggregate `tokens` block stays
present for network callers.
- Not tested: a live `headroom proxy` process bound on `0.0.0.0` reached
from a second host (simulated via ASGI peer/Host instead); end-to-end
browser DNS-rebinding (covered by the `Host`-header gate and its unit
test)
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A — proxy/middleware change; behavior is captured under "Real Behavior
Proof".
## Additional Notes
**Supersedes two stale PRs that target the same issue but have drifted
from `main`:**
- **#864** (`fix(proxy): scope CORS to localhost`, @gabiudrescu) —
correct instinct and the source of the tighter `GET/POST` +
`Content-Type/Authorization` scoping kept here, but it derived the
allowlist from the `HEADROOM_PORT` env var (wrong when `--port` is
passed as a CLI flag), carried ~40 lines of unrelated punctuation churn,
and is ~125 commits behind `main`. The port-agnostic regex used here
resolves the reviewer's port concern.
- **#758** (`security: adversarial review`, @neogenix) — bundled these
same application-layer fixes with a large CI/CD + Docker supply-chain
pass. It is a ~160-commit-behind draft whose `server.py` no longer
merges cleanly (`main` independently adopted the same `require_loopback`
pattern). The application-layer fixes are rebased onto current `main`
here; the CI/Docker/supply-chain hardening from #758 is still valuable
and would be welcome as a separate, rebased PR.
Thanks to @gabiudrescu and @neogenix for the original analysis (#863).
**Deliberate scope / follow-ups (not in this PR):**
- `/stats` aggregate counters and the basic `/health` body remain
readable on a `0.0.0.0` bind by design, so remote monitoring keeps
working. Full lock-down is a one-line `Depends(require_loopback)` each
if preferred.
- The `/v1/retrieve*` family stays network-reachable; it can't be
loopback-gated without breaking legitimate remote/containerized agents
and needs auth instead — tracked separately.
- `ruff check .` is scoped to changed paths above because the dashboard
HTML template trips ruff's `invalid-syntax` (a known repo
false-positive); `mypy` is run over the full `headroom` package.
2026-06-21 00:50:55 -07:00
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def _client(*, loopback: bool) -> TestClient:
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app = _make_app()
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if loopback:
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return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
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# Default TestClient presents client.host="testclient" — not loopback.
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return TestClient(app)
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def test_health_config_block_is_loopback_only(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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"""/health stays reachable for monitors but hides the `config` block (which
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echoes upstream API URLs + backend settings) from non-loopback callers."""
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SKIP_UPSTREAM_CHECK", "1")
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network = _client(loopback=False).get("/health")
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assert network.status_code == 200
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assert "config" not in network.json()
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# Basic health is still visible to monitors.
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assert network.json()["status"] in {"healthy", "unhealthy"}
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local = _client(loopback=True).get("/health")
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assert local.status_code == 200
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assert "config" in local.json()
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def test_stats_per_request_metadata_is_loopback_only() -> None:
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"""/stats keeps aggregate counters public but restricts per-request metadata
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(recent_requests / request_logs) and `config` to loopback callers."""
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network = _client(loopback=False).get("/stats")
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assert network.status_code == 200
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payload = network.json()
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assert "tokens" in payload # aggregate counters still served
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assert "recent_requests" not in payload
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assert "request_logs" not in payload
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assert "config" not in payload
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local = _client(loopback=True).get("/stats").json()
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assert "recent_requests" in local
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assert "config" in local
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fix(dashboard): serve per-request metadata to trusted-gateway peers (#1766)
## Description
The dashboard's per-request metadata — the `recent_requests` /
`request_logs` tail and the `config` block (which echoes upstream API
URLs + backend settings) — is gated to loopback callers via
`_request_is_loopback`. It requires **both** a loopback peer IP
(`request.client.host == 127.0.0.1`) and a loopback `Host` header.
When Headroom runs in a **bridge-network container** (Docker/podman, or
Apple Containerization / `mocker`), a browser on the host reaches the
proxy through the container gateway, so `request.client.host` is the
**gateway IP** (e.g. `172.18.0.1`, or `192.168.64.1` on macOS vmnet),
not `127.0.0.1`. `include_sensitive` is therefore `False`, and the
"Recent Requests" table renders empty even though the operator is
browsing locally at `http://127.0.0.1:8787/dashboard`.
`curl` from **inside** the container (real `127.0.0.1` peer) confirmed
the data is present and populated — only the host-browser path was being
stripped.
The fix treats a peer inside an operator-configured trusted-gateway CIDR
(`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` — the same allow-list already
used by `forwarded_headers.py` to sanitize `X-Forwarded-*`) as
loopback-equivalent, while **retaining the loopback `Host`-header gate
as the DNS-rebinding defence**. It is opt-in and empty by default, so
there is **no behavior change** unless the operator explicitly
allow-lists their container gateway.
Closes #
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
## Changes Made
- `headroom/proxy/server.py` — `_request_is_loopback` now: (1) always
enforces the loopback `Host`-header gate first; (2) returns `True` for a
genuine loopback peer; (3) additionally returns `True` for a peer inside
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` via the existing
`peer_is_trusted_gateway` / `load_trusted_gateway_cidrs` helpers.
- `tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py` — added
`test_stats_metadata_served_to_trusted_gateway_peer`: gateway peer
stripped without the allow-list, served with it, and DNS-rebinding
(non-loopback `Host`) still rejected even for a trusted gateway peer.
- `CHANGELOG.md` — Unreleased → Fixed entry.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
$ pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q
14 passed, 1 warning in 3.56s
$ ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Headroom 0.29.0 in a `mocker compose` (Apple
Containerization) bridge container on macOS; host browser at
`http://127.0.0.1:8787/dashboard`.
- Exact command / steps: before the fix, `mocker compose exec
headroom-proxy sh -c 'curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8787/stats'` (peer = real
`127.0.0.1`) returned a populated `recent_requests` array, while the
host browser saw an empty table. After adding
`HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` covering the container gateway
and recreating, the host browser's dashboard shows the Recent Requests
table again.
- Observed result: dashboard per-request table restored for the host
browser; aggregate-only view unchanged for untrusted network callers.
- Not tested: IPv6 gateway CIDRs (the underlying
`peer_is_trusted_gateway` supports them; not exercised in this
environment).
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Additional Notes
Pure opt-in: `HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS` is empty by default,
so `_request_is_loopback` behavior is byte-identical to today unless an
operator allow-lists a gateway CIDR. Reuses the existing trusted-gateway
machinery rather than introducing a new config surface. Docs/compose
examples intentionally omitted — deployment-specific.
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-13 05:29:36 +08:00
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def test_stats_metadata_served_to_trusted_gateway_peer(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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"""Containerized dashboards: a browser on the host reaches a bridge-network
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container via the gateway IP, so the peer isn't 127.0.0.1 and per-request
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metadata gets stripped. When the operator allow-lists the gateway CIDR via
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HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS, the peer is treated as
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loopback-equivalent and the metadata is served again."""
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gateway_ip = "172.18.0.1" # typical docker/mocker bridge gateway
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app = _make_app()
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def _gateway_client() -> TestClient:
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# Loopback Host header (the operator browses http://127.0.0.1:8787) but
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# the peer IP is the container gateway, not loopback.
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return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
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# Without the allow-list, the gateway peer is untrusted → metadata stripped.
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", raising=False)
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stripped = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
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assert "recent_requests" not in stripped
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assert "config" not in stripped
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# Allow-list the gateway CIDR → peer trusted → metadata served.
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
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served = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
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assert "recent_requests" in served
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assert "config" in served
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# DNS-rebinding defence still applies even for a trusted gateway peer: a
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# non-loopback Host header must be rejected.
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rebind = TestClient(app, base_url="http://attacker.example", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
|
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payload = rebind.get("/stats").json()
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assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
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|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
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|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_for_ip_literal_host(
|
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|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
cached: bool,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
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|
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
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|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}).json()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
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|
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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|
|
|
|
"headers",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
{"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"},
|
|
|
|
|
{"referer": "http://100.82.0.2:8787/dashboard"},
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_to_same_origin_browser(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
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|
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client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
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|
|
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers).json()
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
|
|
|
"headers",
|
|
|
|
|
[
|
|
|
|
|
{"origin": "http://attacker.example"},
|
|
|
|
|
{"referer": "http://attacker.example/dashboard"},
|
|
|
|
|
],
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_hides_stats_metadata_from_cross_origin_browser(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
response = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers)
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
payload = response.json()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
assert "tokens" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_uses_forwarded_proto_from_trusted_gateway(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
payload = client.get(
|
|
|
|
|
"/stats",
|
|
|
|
|
headers={
|
|
|
|
|
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5",
|
|
|
|
|
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
).json()
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
spoofed = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get(
|
|
|
|
|
"/stats",
|
|
|
|
|
headers={
|
|
|
|
|
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
|
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in spoofed
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in spoofed
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" not in spoofed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_rejects_unlisted_clients_and_hostname_hosts(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
unlisted = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.6", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get("/stats")
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
hostname = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for payload in (unlisted, hostname):
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_accepts_forwarded_client_from_trusted_gateway(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
|
|
|
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
trusted = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
forged = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("198.51.100.10", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in trusted
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in forged
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_normalizes_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.0/24")
|
|
|
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
fix(proxy): repair main lint (ruff-format drift + mypy host_header) (#2268)
## Description
`main`'s `lint` CI job is currently **red** (latest main `eac49656` →
`lint: failure`), which blocks every open PR. Two causes, both from
recent merges that were green in isolation but combined into a red
`main`:
- **ruff-format drift** on 7 files — committed with formatter output
that ruff `0.15.17` (the CI-pinned version) rewrites.
- **mypy error** in `server.py`:
`_request_has_same_origin_or_no_provenance(request, host_header)` —
`host_header` is `request.headers.get("host")` (`str | None`) but the
function requires `str`.
These passed per-PR because each PR's checks ran against an older base;
the serialized `main` state is what went red — a logical-merge /
tool-version gap that per-PR CI doesn't catch without a strict merge
queue.
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (CI/lint repair)
## Changes Made
- `ruff format` (0.15.17) the 7 drifted files — formatting only, no
logic changes: `cli/proxy.py`, `proxy/forwarded_headers.py`,
`proxy/savings_tracker.py`, `proxy/server.py`, `tests/conftest.py`,
`tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py`,
`tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py`.
- Add `assert host_header is not None` after the
`is_ip_literal_host_header()` guard (which already rejects a missing
Host), narrowing the type for the same-origin check.
## Testing
- [x] `ruff check .` — clean
- [x] `ruff format --check .` — clean (tracked)
- [x] `mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports` — clean
### Test Output
```text
$ mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports → Success: no issues found in 504 source files
$ ruff check . → All checks passed (tracked)
$ ruff format --check . → clean (tracked)
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: branch off current `main` (`eac49656`), ruff 0.15.17 +
mypy 1.20.2 (CI-pinned).
- Confirmed `lint: failure` on main's latest CI run; after this change
all three lint steps pass locally.
- Not tested: full pytest suite — formatting + a type-narrowing `assert`
only, no behavior change.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines (this *is* the
style fix)
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [ ] Tests added (N/A — no behavior change)
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally
- [ ] CHANGELOG (N/A)
## Additional Notes
The 7 files were touched by recent merges (#2198, #2247) whose local
ruff differed from the pinned `0.15.17`. Merging this unblocks the
`lint` gate for all open PRs (including #2207).
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
2026-07-15 23:18:50 -07:00
|
|
|
payload = (
|
|
|
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
app,
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("::ffff:100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
.get("/stats")
|
|
|
|
|
.json()
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
feat(dashboard): persist lifetime proxy metrics (#2198)
## Description
Persist bounded, aggregate-only Lifetime dashboard metrics across proxy
restarts and expose them through a new `/stats-lifetime` endpoint. The
change keeps session/runtime stats separate from durable lifetime stats,
gates sensitive dashboard metadata for loopback or explicitly trusted
dashboard clients, and updates the dashboard Lifetime view to consume
the new endpoint.
Closes #2137
## Type of Change
- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [x] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)
## Changes Made
- Added bounded persistent lifetime metrics state and wired proxy metric
events into it.
- Added `/stats-lifetime` with sensitive project/persistence details
gated behind dashboard metadata access checks.
- Extended loopback/dashboard metadata access policy for trusted
dashboard client CIDRs without widening admin/debug endpoints.
- Reorganized dashboard session/lifetime presentation around runtime
counters versus durable aggregates.
- Added focused tests for persistent aggregation, persistence, endpoint
registration, loopback gating, trusted dashboard CIDRs, and recent
request ordering.
- Fixed current Ruff/mypy issues in the lifetime metrics normalization
code.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [x] Manual testing performed
### Test Output
```text
uv run --extra proxy --with pytest --with pytest-asyncio pytest tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py -q
53 passed, 1 warning
uvx ruff==0.15.17 check headroom/proxy/forwarded_headers.py headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py headroom/proxy/savings_tracker.py headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_forwarded_headers.py tests/test_persistent_metrics.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_integration.py tests/test_persistent_metrics_persistence.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py tests/test_proxy_project_savings.py tests/test_proxy_stats_recent_requests.py
All checks passed!
uv run --extra proxy --with mypy mypy headroom/proxy/persistent_metrics.py
Success: no issues found in 1 source file
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: Windows review worktree, Python 3.13.3 via uv.
- Exact command / steps: Ran the focused persistent metrics,
persistence, loopback gating, and recent request tests; ran CI-matching
Ruff on touched files; ran mypy on the new persistent metrics module.
- Observed result: `/stats-lifetime` is registered, non-loopback callers
receive only non-sensitive aggregate data, loopback/trusted dashboard
clients receive the full lifetime payload, admin/debug endpoints remain
loopback-only, and persistent metrics normalize malformed stored state
without type/lint errors.
- Not tested: Full repository pytest suite, full dashboard browser
screenshot pass, or live long-running proxy traffic.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [x] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable
## Screenshots (if applicable)
N/A
## Additional Notes
No changelog entry is required for this dashboard/internal metrics
iteration. The endpoint intentionally exposes only aggregate lifetime
data to ordinary network callers and strips project/persistence details
unless the caller passes the dashboard metadata access policy.
---------
Co-authored-by: JerrettDavis <mxjerrett@gmail.com>
2026-07-16 02:18:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_does_not_expand_other_management_endpoints(
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
|
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
|
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
|
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
|
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
|
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
|
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
health = client.get("/health")
|
|
|
|
|
assert health.status_code == 200
|
|
|
|
|
assert "config" not in health.json()
|
|
|
|
|
assert client.get("/admin/upstream").status_code == 404
|
|
|
|
|
assert client.get("/debug/tasks").status_code == 404
|
|
|
|
|
assert client.post("/stats/reset").status_code == 404
|