Extract request log redaction policy (#1968)

## Description

Extracts the pure image-base64 request-log redaction decision/transform
logic from `request_logger.py` into a dedicated policy module.
`RequestLogger` remains the owner of the Prometheus-facing redaction
counter and existing request_logger constants remain available for
compatibility.

Closes #

## Type of Change

- [ ] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
- [ ] Performance improvement
- [x] Code refactoring (no functional changes)

## Changes Made

- Added `headroom.proxy.request_log_redaction_policy` with a pure
`RedactionResult` outcome.
- Kept global redaction metrics/counter side effects in
`request_logger.py`.
- Added direct policy tests for count reporting, nested image paths, and
data URL threshold behavior.
- Carried forward the LiteLLM callback compatibility shim needed for
current mypy on `main`.

## Testing

- [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`)
- [x] Linting passes (`ruff check .`)
- [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`)
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
- [ ] Manual testing performed

### Test Output

```text
python -m pytest tests\test_request_log_redaction_policy.py tests\test_image_log_redaction.py
20 passed in 0.31s

python -m ruff check .
All checks passed!

python -m ruff format --check .
1095 files already formatted

python -m mypy headroom --ignore-missing-imports
Success: no issues found in 409 source files

gitleaks protect --staged --no-banner --redact
no leaks found
```

## Real Behavior Proof

- Environment: Windows, Python 3.13.13, branch
`jd/architecture-slice-23`.
- Exact command / steps: ran targeted request-log redaction tests, ruff,
ruff format check, mypy, and staged gitleaks scan.
- Observed result: redaction behavior remains covered through existing
logger tests and new pure policy tests; local lint/type/security checks
pass.
- Not tested: full proxy runtime; this slice only moves pure redaction
policy and keeps the logger entry point intact.

## Review Readiness

- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review

## Checklist

- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [ ] I have made corresponding changes to the documentation
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective or that my
feature works
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
- [ ] I have updated the CHANGELOG.md if applicable

## Screenshots (if applicable)

N/A

## Additional Notes

Documentation and changelog updates are N/A for this internal
architecture-only refactor. The push reported existing default-branch
Dependabot alerts; no staged secret leaks were found for this PR.

headroom/integrations/litellm_callback.py

@@ -92,11 +92,18 @@ class HeadroomCallback(_CustomLogger):
 
     async def async_pre_call_hook(
         self,
-        user_api_key: str,
-        data: dict[str, Any],
-        call_type: str,
-    ) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        user_api_key_dict: Any = None,
+        cache: Any = None,
+        data: dict[Any, Any] | None = None,
+        call_type: str = "",
+        *_args: Any,
+        **_kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> dict[Any, Any] | None:
         """Called by LiteLLM before each API call. Compresses messages."""
+        if isinstance(cache, dict) and isinstance(data, str):
+            data, call_type = cache, data
+        if data is None:
+            return None
         if call_type not in ("completion", "acompletion"):
             return data
 

headroom/proxy/request_log_redaction_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""Pure request-log redaction policy for image-bearing payloads."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from collections.abc import Mapping, Sequence
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+# Phase G PR-G3 - base64 redaction threshold (P4-45).
+#
+# Anthropic image blocks carry base64-encoded JPEGs/PNGs in
+# ``source.data``; OpenAI's vision shape carries them in
+# ``image_url.url`` as a ``data:image/...;base64,<payload>`` URL.
+# The threshold gates "real image payload" against short base64
+# strings (which can appear in arguments, signatures, etc.).
+IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 1024
+
+# Phase G PR-G3 - replacement-marker format. Operators can grep the
+# JSONL for ``<image:base64-redacted`` to count the redactions; the
+# byte count keeps cost attribution honest even after redaction.
+# M5: ``bytes=`` is the UTF-8 byte length, not the character count.
+IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE = "<image:base64-redacted bytes={n}>"
+
+# M2: JSON field names that carry image payloads in either the
+# Anthropic or OpenAI shapes. Strings reached via one of these key
+# names (at any depth) are eligible for the redaction heuristic.
+# Anything OUTSIDE these paths is left untouched even if it looks
+# base64-shaped - encrypted blobs, signed tokens, minified JSON,
+# tool outputs all live elsewhere and stay verbatim.
+IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        # Anthropic image-block shape: ``{"type":"image","source":{"type":"base64","data":"..."}}``.
+        "data",
+        # OpenAI vision shape: ``{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"data:image/..."}}``.
+        "url",
+        # OpenAI Responses input_image: ``{"type":"input_image","image_url":"..."}``
+        # - string-valued directly under the key (not nested).
+        "image_url",
+        # Some SDKs put the URL under ``image`` directly. Tolerated.
+        "image",
+        # Anthropic vision blocks sometimes wrap under ``source.data``;
+        # ``source`` is a container, not a string field, so it doesn't
+        # need to be in this set, but the data string itself is keyed
+        # by ``data`` (already above).
+    }
+)
+
+# M2: explicit data-URL MIME prefix. A string starting with this
+# prefix is always treated as an image payload, regardless of where
+# it lives in the JSON - operators occasionally embed data URLs in
+# arbitrary fields and we want those redacted to keep logs small.
+_DATA_IMAGE_URL_PREFIX = "data:image/"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RedactionResult:
+    """A redacted value and the number of replacements made."""
+
+    value: Any
+    redactions: int
+
+
+def is_base64_image_payload(value: object) -> bool:
+    """Return True if ``value`` is an over-threshold image data URL.
+
+    Per M2 remediation the prior bare-base64 density heuristic over-fired on
+    non-image content. This helper only recognizes explicit image data URLs;
+    image-bearing JSON-path eligibility is handled by the recursive policy.
+    """
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return False
+    if len(value) < IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES:
+        return False
+    return value.startswith(_DATA_IMAGE_URL_PREFIX)
+
+
+def redact_image_base64_value(payload: Any) -> RedactionResult:
+    """Return ``payload`` with over-threshold image strings redacted."""
+    return _redact_value(payload, in_image_path=False)
+
+
+def _redact_value(value: Any, *, in_image_path: bool) -> RedactionResult:
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        should_redact = is_base64_image_payload(value) or (
+            in_image_path and len(value) >= IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
+        )
+        if not should_redact:
+            return RedactionResult(value=value, redactions=0)
+
+        byte_len = len(value.encode("utf-8"))
+        return RedactionResult(
+            value=IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE.format(n=byte_len),
+            redactions=1,
+        )
+
+    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
+        redactions = 0
+        redacted: dict[Any, Any] = {}
+        for key, item in value.items():
+            item_result = _redact_value(
+                item,
+                in_image_path=(key in IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES),
+            )
+            redacted[key] = item_result.value
+            redactions += item_result.redactions
+        return RedactionResult(value=redacted, redactions=redactions)
+
+    if isinstance(value, Sequence) and not isinstance(value, str | bytes | bytearray):
+        redactions = 0
+        redacted_items: list[Any] = []
+        for item in value:
+            item_result = _redact_value(item, in_image_path=in_image_path)
+            redacted_items.append(item_result.value)
+            redactions += item_result.redactions
+        return RedactionResult(value=redacted_items, redactions=redactions)
+
+    return RedactionResult(value=value, redactions=0)

headroom/proxy/request_logger.py

@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ import json
 import logging
 import sys
 from collections import deque
-from collections.abc import Mapping, Sequence
 from dataclasses import asdict
 from pathlib import Path
 from threading import Lock
@@ -34,55 +33,17 @@ from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from ..memory.tracker import ComponentStats
 
+from headroom.proxy import request_log_redaction_policy
 from headroom.proxy.models import RequestLog
 
-logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
-
-# Phase G PR-G3 — base64 redaction threshold (P4-45).
-#
-# Anthropic image blocks carry base64-encoded JPEGs/PNGs in
-# ``source.data``; OpenAI's vision shape carries them in
-# ``image_url.url`` as a ``data:image/...;base64,<payload>`` URL.
-# The threshold gates "real image payload" against short base64
-# strings (which can appear in arguments, signatures, etc.).
-IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 1024
-
-# Phase G PR-G3 — replacement-marker format. Operators can grep the
-# JSONL for ``<image:base64-redacted`` to count the redactions; the
-# byte count keeps cost attribution honest even after redaction.
-# M5: ``bytes=`` is the UTF-8 byte length, not the character count.
-IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE = "<image:base64-redacted bytes={n}>"
-
-# M2: JSON field names that carry image payloads in either the
-# Anthropic or OpenAI shapes. Strings reached via one of these key
-# names (at any depth) are eligible for the redaction heuristic.
-# Anything OUTSIDE these paths is left untouched even if it looks
-# base64-shaped — encrypted blobs, signed tokens, minified JSON,
-# tool outputs all live elsewhere and stay verbatim.
-IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
-    {
-        # Anthropic image-block shape: ``{"type":"image","source":{"type":"base64","data":"..."}}``.
-        "data",
-        # OpenAI vision shape: ``{"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"data:image/..."}}``.
-        "url",
-        # OpenAI Responses input_image: ``{"type":"input_image","image_url":"..."}``
-        # — string-valued directly under the key (not nested).
-        "image_url",
-        # Some SDKs put the URL under ``image`` directly. Tolerated.
-        "image",
-        # Anthropic vision blocks sometimes wrap under ``source.data``;
-        # ``source`` is a container, not a string field, so it doesn't
-        # need to be in this set, but the data string itself is keyed
-        # by ``data`` (already above).
-    }
+IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = (
+    request_log_redaction_policy.IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
 )
+IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE = request_log_redaction_policy.IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE
+IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES = request_log_redaction_policy.IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES
+_is_base64_image_payload = request_log_redaction_policy.is_base64_image_payload
 
-# M2: explicit data-URL MIME prefix. A string starting with this
-# prefix is always treated as an image payload, regardless of where
-# it lives in the JSON — operators occasionally embed data URLs in
-# arbitrary fields and we want those redacted to keep logs small.
-_DATA_IMAGE_URL_PREFIX = "data:image/"
-
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 # Constants for log redaction counter export (Prometheus). The
 # Python proxy's ``/metrics`` exporter surfaces
@@ -105,72 +66,6 @@ def redactions_total() -> int:
         return _redactions_total
 
 
-def _is_base64_image_payload(value: str) -> bool:
-    """Return True if ``value`` is an over-threshold base64 image.
-
-    Per M2 remediation the prior bare-base64 density heuristic
-    over-fired on non-image content (encrypted blobs, signed
-    tokens, minified JSON, tool outputs). We now only consider a
-    string an image payload when EITHER:
-
-    1. It starts with ``data:image/`` (an explicit data URL),
-       OR
-    2. The caller has already established the string lives inside
-       an image-bearing JSON path (see ``IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES``)
-       AND the string itself is over the byte threshold.
-
-    Case (2) is decided by the caller (``_redact_value``) which
-    threads ``in_image_path`` through the recursion; this helper
-    handles case (1) on its own.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(value, str):
-        return False
-    if len(value) < IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES:
-        return False
-    return value.startswith(_DATA_IMAGE_URL_PREFIX)
-
-
-def _redact_value(value: Any, *, in_image_path: bool = False) -> Any:
-    """Recursively redact base64-image payloads in a JSON-ish value.
-
-    Returns a new structure with any over-threshold base64 string
-    replaced by the placeholder. Non-string, non-container values
-    pass through unchanged.
-
-    ``in_image_path`` is True when the caller reached this value
-    via one of the ``IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES`` keys; once inside
-    an image-bearing field, any over-threshold string is treated
-    as an image payload (M2: prevents redaction of unrelated
-    base64-shaped content outside known image fields).
-    """
-    global _redactions_total
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        # Always-redact: explicit data URL, regardless of path.
-        # Also redact when the caller signalled image-bearing path
-        # AND the string is over threshold (no density check — the
-        # path tells us it's an image).
-        should_redact = _is_base64_image_payload(value) or (
-            in_image_path and len(value) >= IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
-        )
-        if should_redact:
-            with _redactions_lock:
-                _redactions_total += 1
-            byte_len = len(value.encode("utf-8"))
-            return IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE.format(n=byte_len)
-        return value
-    if isinstance(value, Mapping):
-        return {
-            k: _redact_value(
-                v,
-                in_image_path=(k in IMAGE_BEARING_FIELD_NAMES),
-            )
-            for k, v in value.items()
-        }
-    if isinstance(value, Sequence) and not isinstance(value, str | bytes | bytearray):
-        return [_redact_value(item, in_image_path=in_image_path) for item in value]
-    return value
-
-
 def redact_image_base64(payload: Any) -> Any:
     """Public entry point for base64-image redaction.
 
@@ -178,7 +73,13 @@ def redact_image_base64(payload: Any) -> Any:
     over-threshold base64 string with a size-only placeholder.
     Idempotent — applying twice yields the same structure.
     """
-    return _redact_value(payload, in_image_path=False)
+    global _redactions_total
+
+    result = request_log_redaction_policy.redact_image_base64_value(payload)
+    if result.redactions:
+        with _redactions_lock:
+            _redactions_total += result.redactions
+    return result.value
 
 
 class RequestLogger:

tests/test_request_log_redaction_policy.py

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from headroom.proxy.request_log_redaction_policy import (
+    IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
+    IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE,
+    is_base64_image_payload,
+    redact_image_base64_value,
+)
+
+
+def test_policy_reports_redaction_count_without_side_effects() -> None:
+    image_payload = "x" * IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
+    non_image_payload = "y" * IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
+
+    result = redact_image_base64_value(
+        {
+            "source": {"data": image_payload},
+            "signature": non_image_payload,
+        }
+    )
+
+    assert result.redactions == 1
+    assert result.value["source"]["data"] == IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE.format(
+        n=len(image_payload)
+    )
+    assert result.value["signature"] == non_image_payload
+
+
+def test_policy_counts_nested_list_redactions() -> None:
+    data_url = "data:image/png;base64," + ("A" * IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES)
+    direct_payload = "B" * IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES
+
+    result = redact_image_base64_value(
+        [{"content": [{"image_url": {"url": data_url}}, {"image": direct_payload}]}]
+    )
+
+    assert result.redactions == 2
+    assert result.value[0]["content"][0]["image_url"]["url"] == (
+        IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE.format(n=len(data_url))
+    )
+    assert result.value[0]["content"][1]["image"] == IMAGE_BASE64_REPLACEMENT_TEMPLATE.format(
+        n=len(direct_payload)
+    )
+
+
+def test_explicit_image_data_url_requires_threshold() -> None:
+    short_data_url = ""
+    long_data_url = "data:image/png;base64," + ("A" * IMAGE_BASE64_REDACT_THRESHOLD_BYTES)
+
+    assert not is_base64_image_payload(short_data_url)
+    assert is_base64_image_payload(long_data_url)