headroom/tests/test_docker_compose_persistence.py
Tejas Chopra 24fc6a8d43 fix(docker): publish compose ports on loopback only
`docker compose up -d` published every service on 0.0.0.0, and none of the
three authenticates an inbound caller by default:

  8787  proxy    — /v1/* data plane is open unless HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN is set
  6333  Qdrant   — no API key at all; holds embeddings derived from prompts
  7687  Neo4j    — NEO4J_AUTH falls back to neo4j/devpassword, published here

So the shipped default handed any peer on the surrounding network a relay
through the proxy plus direct read/write on the vector and graph stores built
from the operator's own prompt content. The proxy already warns loudly about
this shape at server.py:3289 — the compose file just never took the advice.

Publishing is now pinned to 127.0.0.1. The proxy container still listens on
0.0.0.0 internally, so service-to-service traffic on the compose network is
unaffected, and `http://localhost:8787` from the host still works exactly as
the quick-start describes. Only cross-machine reachability changes, which is
the behavior that was unsafe.

The header comment now documents how to expose the proxy deliberately, pairing
the port override with HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN rather than leaving that implicit.

Adds a regression test asserting every published port names a loopback host
IP; it fails on the parent commit.
2026-08-16 18:23:35 -07:00

65 lines
2.7 KiB
Python

"""Regression checks for Docker Compose persistence wiring."""
from __future__ import annotations
from pathlib import Path
import yaml
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
def test_top_level_compose_publishes_only_to_loopback() -> None:
"""Every published port must name an explicit loopback host IP.
None of the three services authenticates by default: the proxy's /v1/*
data plane is open without HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, Qdrant has no API key,
and NEO4J_AUTH falls back to a password published in the compose file. A
bare "8787:8787" binds 0.0.0.0 on the host, so `docker compose up -d` on a
shared network would expose all three.
"""
compose = yaml.safe_load((ROOT / "docker-compose.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
published = [
(service, port)
for service, spec in compose["services"].items()
for port in spec.get("ports", [])
]
assert published, "expected the compose file to publish at least one port"
for service, port in published:
# Short syntax is "HOST_IP:HOST_PORT:CONTAINER_PORT"; anything with
# fewer than three segments is published on every interface.
assert isinstance(port, str), f"{service}: expected short-syntax port, got {port!r}"
segments = port.split(":")
assert len(segments) == 3, f"{service}: port {port!r} publishes on all interfaces"
assert segments[0] in {"127.0.0.1", "::1"}, (
f"{service}: port {port!r} publishes on {segments[0]}, not loopback"
)
def test_top_level_compose_pins_headroom_state_to_named_volume() -> None:
compose = (ROOT / "docker-compose.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "- headroom_workspace:/home/nonroot/.headroom" in compose
assert "- HOME=/home/nonroot" in compose
assert "- HEADROOM_WORKSPACE_DIR=/home/nonroot/.headroom" in compose
assert "- HEADROOM_CONFIG_DIR=/home/nonroot/.headroom/config" in compose
def test_top_level_compose_marks_source_build_version() -> None:
compose = (ROOT / "docker-compose.yml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
dockerfile = (ROOT / "Dockerfile").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
dockerignore = (ROOT / ".dockerignore").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
assert "HEADROOM_BUILD_VERSION: ${HEADROOM_BUILD_VERSION:-source-build}" in compose
assert 'ARG HEADROOM_BUILD_VERSION=""' in dockerfile
assert "ARG PYTHON_SITE_PACKAGES" in dockerfile
assert "if not build_version:" in dockerfile
assert "source-build+g{revision}" in dockerfile
assert "source-build+sha256." in dockerfile
assert "_build_info.py" in dockerfile
assert "import headroom._version" not in dockerfile
assert ".git/*" in dockerignore
assert "!.git/HEAD" in dockerignore
assert "!.git/refs/**" in dockerignore