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## Description Closes #3281. The security gate is registered with `@app.middleware("http")` (`proxy/server.py`), which is a Starlette `BaseHTTPMiddleware` — and that class hands any scope whose type is not `http` straight to the wrapped app. WebSocket connections therefore never reached it, so **every `app.websocket(...)` route accepted unauthenticated callers even with `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` configured.** Those routes are not incidental: - `/v1/responses`, `/v1/codex/responses`, `/backend-api/responses`, `/backend-api/codex/responses` - `/v1/live`, `/v1/codex/live`, `/backend-api/live`, `/backend-api/codex/live` Both families are registered **unconditionally** (`providers/proxy_routes.py:207` and `:230`), and they relay to the upstream provider using the operator's own credentials. `/v1/responses` is served on both transports, which makes the shape of the bug concrete: the POST was authenticated, the upgrade on the very same path was not. The existing WebSocket origin check (`_is_allowed_websocket_origin`) is not a substitute — it defends against browser-driven cross-site connections, and a non-browser client simply omits `Origin`. ## Type of Change - [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue) ## Changes Made - Added `WebSocketAuthMiddleware`, a raw ASGI middleware, beside the existing `WebSocketProjectPrefixMiddleware` (the codebase already uses that idiom for the WebSocket scope). Registered after the HTTP gate so it runs outermost — an unauthenticated handshake is refused before any project-prefix or routing work. - It applies exactly the HTTP gate's rule: loopback exempt (`is_loopback_host`, including the `None` → loopback case for UDS/TestClient), credential from `Authorization: Bearer` or `X-Headroom-Proxy-Token`, `hmac.compare_digest` against a pre-encoded token. - Extracted the credential-reading rule into one shared `read_proxy_token` used by both transports, so they cannot drift. - Rejection sends `websocket.close` with **1008** *before* accept, after receiving `websocket.connect` — that is what refuses the upgrade on the wire rather than accepting and dropping it. Deliberately **not** done: no query-string credential. Browsers cannot set headers on a WebSocket, but these routes serve programmatic clients that can, and a token in a URL lands in access logs and history. ## Testing - [x] Unit tests pass (`pytest`) - [x] Linting passes (CI-pinned `ruff` 0.16.3) - [x] Type checking passes (`mypy headroom`) - [x] New tests added for new functionality ### Test Output ```text $ pytest tests/test_proxy_hardening.py 27 passed in 5.17s $ pytest tests/test_proxy/ 267 passed in 86.03s $ pytest tests/ -k "hardening or websocket or ws or loopback or auth or security" 852 passed, 18 skipped, 11420 deselected in 83.95s $ uvx ruff@0.16.3 check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_hardening.py All checks passed! $ mypy headroom/proxy/server.py Success: no issues found in 1 source file ``` Tests are in two layers, deliberately: **Unit (8)** — the middleware driven directly over ASGI. Asserted at this layer because a pre-accept close surfaces through `TestClient` as a bare `AttributeError`, indistinguishable from any other handshake failure, so an exception-shape assertion would pass for the wrong reason. These assert the downstream app is never invoked and that a `websocket.close` with code 1008 was sent. **Integration (4)** — that the middleware is actually wired into `create_app`, asserted via the security property itself: the route handler must never run for an unauthenticated handshake. Verified by removing only the registration line — both `/v1/responses` and `/v1/live` then fail: ```text FAILED ...test_unauthenticated_handshake_never_reaches_the_handler[/v1/responses] FAILED ...test_unauthenticated_handshake_never_reaches_the_handler[/v1/live] 2 failed, 2 passed ``` The 2 that still pass are the authenticated-path invariants, which must hold either way. ## Real Behavior Proof - **Environment:** macOS arm64, Python 3.12.13, `main` @ 0.36.5. - **Exact command / steps:** build the real app with `proxy_token` set, spy on both WebSocket route handlers, then attempt a handshake from a non-loopback client (`203.0.113.5`, TEST-NET-3) with and without a credential. - **Observed result:** before — the handler ran for an unauthenticated handshake on both route families. After — the handler is never reached without a credential, and is reached with either accepted header form. Loopback and no-token-configured both stay open, unchanged. - **Not tested:** no live upstream WebSocket session end to end; the upstream relay itself is unchanged by this PR. Not exercised against a real browser client, which cannot send the header — see the query-string note above. ## Runtime Rollout Safety - **Rollout-managed feature(s):** none. - **Minimum rollout channel:** n/a. - **Stable/default behavior changed:** **no** for the default deployment. With no `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` the middleware is a passthrough, so nothing gains a new challenge. Behaviour changes only where a token is already configured — where the WebSocket routes were meant to be gated and silently were not. - **Kill switch / disable path:** unset `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` (restores the previous, open behaviour on both transports). - **Unsafe override required:** none. - **Qualification impact:** none. - **Rollback path:** revert this commit; it is one middleware class plus its registration. ## Review Readiness - [x] I have performed a self-review - [x] This PR is ready for human review --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
393 lines
15 KiB
Python
393 lines
15 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the Tier-2 pilot hardening features:
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- 2.1 optional inbound auth token (HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN) on the data plane
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- 3.1 response security headers
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- 2.4 admin/state-mutating audit log
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- 2.2 air-gap master switch (HEADROOM_OFFLINE)
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import pytest
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pytest.importorskip("fastapi")
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from headroom.cache.compression_store import reset_compression_store
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from headroom.offline import apply_offline_env, is_offline
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from headroom.proxy.audit import is_auditable_path
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from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, WebSocketAuthMiddleware, create_app
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NONLOOPBACK = ("203.0.113.5", 44444) # TEST-NET-3, never loopback
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LOOPBACK = ("127.0.0.1", 12345)
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def _make_app(**overrides):
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reset_compression_store()
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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**overrides,
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)
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return create_app(config)
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# ───────────────────────────── 2.1 inbound auth token ─────────────────────
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class TestInboundAuthToken:
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def test_no_token_configured_leaves_data_plane_open(self):
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"""Default (no token): non-loopback callers are not challenged."""
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app = _make_app()
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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assert c.get("/livez").status_code == 200
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def test_token_set_rejects_nonloopback_without_credential(self):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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resp = c.get("/stats")
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_token_set_accepts_correct_bearer(self):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer s3cr3t-token"})
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assert resp.status_code != 401
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def test_token_set_accepts_custom_header(self):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token"})
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assert resp.status_code != 401
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def test_token_set_rejects_wrong_token(self):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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resp = c.get("/stats", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer wrong"})
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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def test_loopback_is_exempt_from_token(self):
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"""Loopback callers (same trust boundary as admin routes) skip the token."""
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
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assert c.get("/stats").status_code != 401
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def test_health_endpoints_exempt_even_nonloopback(self):
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"""Orchestrator health probes must work without the token."""
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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assert c.get("/livez").status_code == 200
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assert c.get("/readyz").status_code in (200, 503) # ready/not-ready, never 401
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# ──────────────────── 2.1b inbound auth token over WebSocket ──────────────
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WS_PATHS = ("/v1/responses", "/v1/live")
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class _SpyApp:
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"""Downstream ASGI app that records whether it was ever reached."""
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def __init__(self) -> None:
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self.called = False
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async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send) -> None:
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self.called = True
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def _ws_scope(*, client=NONLOOPBACK, headers=(), path="/v1/responses"):
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return {
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"type": "websocket",
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"path": path,
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"client": client,
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"headers": [(k.lower().encode("latin-1"), v.encode("latin-1")) for k, v in headers],
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}
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async def _drive(middleware, scope):
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"""Run one connection through the middleware, returning (sent, downstream)."""
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inbox = [{"type": "websocket.connect"}]
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sent: list[dict] = []
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async def receive():
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return inbox.pop(0) if inbox else {"type": "websocket.disconnect"}
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async def send(message):
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sent.append(message)
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await middleware(scope, receive, send)
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return sent
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def _closed_with_policy_violation(sent) -> bool:
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return any(m.get("type") == "websocket.close" and m.get("code") == 1008 for m in sent)
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class TestWebSocketAuthMiddleware:
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"""The middleware itself, driven directly over ASGI.
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Asserted at this layer because a pre-accept close surfaces through
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``TestClient`` as a bare ``AttributeError`` — indistinguishable from any
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other handshake failure — so an exception-shape assertion would pass for
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the wrong reason.
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"""
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async def test_rejects_missing_credential(self):
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())
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assert downstream.called is False
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assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_rejects_wrong_credential(self):
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer wrong")]))
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assert downstream.called is False
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assert _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_accepts_correct_bearer(self):
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token")]))
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_accepts_custom_header(self):
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(headers=[("x-headroom-proxy-token", "s3cr3t-token")]))
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_loopback_is_exempt(self):
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"""Same trust boundary the HTTP gate already grants loopback."""
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=LOOPBACK))
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_unknown_client_is_treated_as_loopback(self):
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"""Mirrors is_loopback_host(None) -> True, as the HTTP gate does."""
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope(client=None))
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_repeated_header_resolves_like_the_http_gate(self):
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"""A duplicated Authorization must mean the same thing on both transports.
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Starlette's Headers (what the HTTP gate reads) returns the FIRST
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occurrence. A hand-built dict returns the last, which would let the two
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paths disagree about which credential counted.
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"""
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(
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mw,
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_ws_scope(
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headers=[
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("authorization", "Bearer s3cr3t-token"),
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("authorization", "Bearer wrong"),
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]
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),
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)
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# First header wins → authenticated, same as the HTTP gate.
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_no_token_configured_is_a_passthrough(self):
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"""Default deployment must gain no new challenge."""
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token=None)
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sent = await _drive(mw, _ws_scope())
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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async def test_http_scope_is_left_to_the_http_gate(self):
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downstream = _SpyApp()
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mw = WebSocketAuthMiddleware(downstream, proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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sent = await _drive(mw, {**_ws_scope(), "type": "http"})
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assert downstream.called is True
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assert not _closed_with_policy_violation(sent)
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class TestWebSocketRoutesAreGatedInTheApp:
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"""The middleware is actually wired into ``create_app``.
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Asserts the security property directly — the route handler must never run
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for an unauthenticated handshake — rather than inspecting the exception the
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client happens to see.
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"""
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)
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def test_unauthenticated_handshake_never_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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try:
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with c.websocket_connect(path):
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pass
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - the refusal shape is asserted above
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pass
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assert reached() is False
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", WS_PATHS)
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def test_authenticated_handshake_reaches_the_handler(self, path, monkeypatch):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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reached = _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch)
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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try:
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with c.websocket_connect(path, headers={"X-Headroom-Proxy-Token": "s3cr3t-token"}):
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pass
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - route may fail with no upstream
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pass
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assert reached() is True
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def _record_ws_handler_reached(app, monkeypatch):
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"""Spy both WebSocket route families; returns a callable reporting arrival."""
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from headroom.providers import proxy_routes
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seen: list[str] = []
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# Each spy must terminate the handshake itself: a handler that returns
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# without accepting or closing leaves the client waiting forever.
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async def _responses_spy(websocket):
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seen.append("responses")
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await websocket.close(code=1000)
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async def _live_spy(websocket, *args, **kwargs):
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seen.append("live")
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await websocket.close(code=1000)
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monkeypatch.setattr(app.state.proxy, "handle_openai_responses_ws", _responses_spy)
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monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_routes, "handle_codex_live_websocket", _live_spy)
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return lambda: bool(seen)
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# ───────────────────────────── 3.1 security headers ───────────────────────
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class TestSecurityHeaders:
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def test_headers_present_on_responses(self):
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app = _make_app()
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
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h = c.get("/livez").headers
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assert h.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
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assert h.get("X-Frame-Options") == "DENY"
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assert h.get("Referrer-Policy") == "no-referrer"
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assert "max-age=" in h.get("Strict-Transport-Security", "")
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def test_headers_present_on_401(self):
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app = _make_app(proxy_token="s3cr3t-token")
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://testserver", client=NONLOOPBACK) as c:
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resp = c.get("/stats")
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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assert resp.headers.get("X-Content-Type-Options") == "nosniff"
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# ───────────────────────────── 2.4 admin audit log ────────────────────────
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class TestAdminAuditLog:
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def test_auditable_path_classification(self):
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assert is_auditable_path("/admin/runtime-env")
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assert is_auditable_path("/cache/clear")
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assert is_auditable_path("/stats/reset")
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assert not is_auditable_path("/v1/messages")
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assert not is_auditable_path("/livez")
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def test_cache_clear_emits_audit_event(self):
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# Capture the dedicated audit logger directly (the proxy's logging setup
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# configures propagation, so attach to the logger rather than rely on
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# caplog's root handler).
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messages: list[str] = []
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class _Capture(logging.Handler):
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def emit(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> None:
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messages.append(record.getMessage())
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handler = _Capture()
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audit_logger = logging.getLogger("headroom.audit")
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audit_logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
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audit_logger.addHandler(handler)
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try:
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app = _make_app()
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with TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=LOOPBACK) as c:
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assert c.post("/cache/clear").status_code == 200
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finally:
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audit_logger.removeHandler(handler)
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assert messages, "expected an audit record for /cache/clear"
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assert any("/cache/clear" in m for m in messages)
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assert any("headroom_admin_audit" in m for m in messages)
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assert any('"source_ip": "127.0.0.1"' in m for m in messages)
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# ───────────────────────────── 2.2 air-gap switch ─────────────────────────
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class TestOfflineSwitch:
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def test_is_offline_reads_env(self, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", raising=False)
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assert is_offline() is False
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
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assert is_offline() is True
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "off")
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assert is_offline() is False
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def test_offline_disables_telemetry(self, monkeypatch):
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from headroom.telemetry.beacon import is_telemetry_enabled
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_TELEMETRY", "on")
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
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assert is_telemetry_enabled() is False # offline overrides the opt-in
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def test_offline_disables_update_check(self, monkeypatch):
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from headroom.update_check import is_update_check_enabled
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monkeypatch.delenv("CI", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_STATELESS", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
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assert is_update_check_enabled() is False
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def test_apply_offline_env_sets_hf_offline(self, monkeypatch):
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monkeypatch.delenv("HF_HUB_OFFLINE", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.delenv("TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE", raising=False)
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monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_OFFLINE", "1")
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apply_offline_env()
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import os
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assert os.environ.get("HF_HUB_OFFLINE") == "1"
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assert os.environ.get("TRANSFORMERS_OFFLINE") == "1"
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