mirror of
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom.git
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## Summary `require_loopback` in `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py` guards `/debug/tasks`, `/debug/ws-sessions`, `/debug/warmup`, and `/stats/reset` by checking `request.client.host` only. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to make a victim's browser send requests to `127.0.0.1` while the page origin (and inbound `Host:` header) still reads `attacker.com`. The IP check passes — the browser IS on loopback — and `app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=["*"], ...)` (`headroom/proxy/server.py:1678`) lets the attacker's JS read the response. This PR adds the canonical second gate: the `Host:` header must also name loopback (`127.0.0.1[:port]`, `[::1][:port]`, or `localhost[:port]`). ## Impact While the proxy binds to `127.0.0.1` by default (`headroom/proxy/server.py:2956`), any browser the user opens can be used by an unrelated tab to reach the proxy via DNS rebinding. Concretely: - `GET /debug/tasks` → leaks asyncio task names, coroutine qualnames, and (with `?stack=true`) stack depths — reveals which coroutines are mid-flight and which codepaths are warm. Useful for fingerprinting + targeting follow-on attacks. - `GET /debug/ws-sessions` → leaks live WebSocket session metadata including `upstream_url` per session. - `GET /debug/warmup` → leaks warmup registry shape (lower risk). - `POST /stats/reset` → resets in-memory proxy stats (state mutation; minor DoS of dashboards/observability). The fix path matches the OWASP DNS-rebinding mitigation and Starlette's `TrustedHostMiddleware` posture. ## Location - `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py:73` — guarded the IP check only, no `Host:` validation - `headroom/proxy/server.py:1819-1845`, `:2312` — endpoints reachable via DNS rebinding under the old gate ## Fix `require_loopback` now runs two gates: (1) the existing `request.client.host` loopback IP check, and (2) a new `Host:` header allowlist via `is_loopback_host_header(...)`. The header helper accepts `127.0.0.1[:port]`, `[::1][:port]`, `localhost[:port]`, and IPv6-mapped IPv4 (`::ffff:127.0.0.1`) — strips brackets and ports, then delegates to the existing `is_loopback_host` logic. Cross-origin browser fetches always carry the attacker's hostname in `Host:`, so rebinding requests now 404 alongside any other external attempt. Same 404 (not 403) semantics, so debug endpoints remain invisible to external scanners. The new helper is in `__all__` for explicit re-use. The existing manual-`Request`-stub unit test path (no `.headers` attribute) is preserved by an `if headers is None: return` fallback so older callers that pass a bare stub still work. Test fixtures in `tests/test_proxy_debug_endpoints.py` were updated to pin `base_url="http://127.0.0.1"` so the loopback-`Host:` invariant holds in the green-path tests, plus a new `app_and_rebinding_client` fixture and `test_debug_endpoints_block_dns_rebinding` exercising the gate at the HTTP level. Six new unit tests cover `is_loopback_host_header` (canonical accept, external reject, malformed reject, and rebinding signature). Net: +219 lines, -4 lines, in two files. **Compatibility note for operators:** a deployment that fronts the proxy behind a reverse proxy with a non-loopback Host (e.g. `headroom.local` mapped to `127.0.0.1`) and still wants `/debug/*` exposed would need to either point that reverse proxy at the upstream API endpoints only, or extend `is_loopback_host_header` with an env-var allowlist in a follow-up. The default `HEADROOM_HOST=127.0.0.1` path is unaffected. ## Detected by Aeon (manual review — no scanner rule for this; pattern matches the threat-model-claims + local-HTTP-server axes from [`skills/vuln-scanner`](https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon-aaron/blob/main/skills/vuln-scanner/SKILL.md), priors that have surfaced 10+ similar finds across 5 languages over the last 6 weeks). - Severity: medium - CWE-350 (Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action) - CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery) — adjacent - Class match: DNS-rebinding-via-loopback-bind (recurring axis in the tracker) ## Verification - `python3 -m py_compile headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py` — parses. - The new unit tests in `tests/test_proxy_debug_endpoints.py` cover: canonical loopback Host headers (accept), external Host headers (reject), malformed/empty (reject), an HTTP-level DNS-rebinding simulation (`app_and_rebinding_client` fixture with `base_url="http://attacker.com"` + loopback client tuple), and the unchanged IP-only stub path. - Other test files that use `require_loopback` (`test_proxy_openai_responses_integration.py`, `test_proxy_openai_responses_bypass.py`, `test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py`) all override it via `app.dependency_overrides[require_loopback] = lambda: None`, so they are not affected by the new gate. - I was unable to run `pytest` locally in this sandbox; please confirm the new fixtures slot in cleanly when the CI matrix runs. --- Filed by [Aeon](https://github.com/aaronjmars/aeon-aaron). --------- Co-authored-by: aeonframework <noreply@anthropic.com>
528 lines
17 KiB
Python
528 lines
17 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the loopback-only /debug/* introspection endpoints (Unit 5)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import pytest
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pytest.importorskip("fastapi")
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pytest.importorskip("httpx")
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from fastapi import HTTPException
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from headroom.proxy.debug_introspection import (
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collect_tasks,
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)
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from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import (
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LOOPBACK_HOSTS,
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is_loopback_host,
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is_loopback_host_header,
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require_loopback,
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)
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from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
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from headroom.proxy.warmup import WarmupRegistry
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from headroom.proxy.ws_session_registry import (
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WebSocketSessionRegistry,
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WSSessionHandle,
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)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Shared fixtures
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@pytest.fixture
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def client():
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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)
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app = create_app(config)
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# Pin the simulated client address to loopback so the /debug/* guard
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# accepts the request. Without this, FastAPI's TestClient reports
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# the host as ``testclient`` and the guard correctly 404s us.
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# ``base_url`` pins the inbound ``Host:`` header to a loopback name
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# so the DNS-rebinding gate added in 2026-06 also passes.
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with TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
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client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
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) as test_client:
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yield test_client
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@pytest.fixture
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def app_and_client():
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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)
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app = create_app(config)
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with TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
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client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
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) as test_client:
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yield app, test_client
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@pytest.fixture
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def app_and_external_client():
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"""TestClient that reports a non-loopback address (to exercise 404)."""
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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)
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app = create_app(config)
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with TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
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client=("10.0.0.1", 54321),
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) as test_client:
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yield app, test_client
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@pytest.fixture
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def app_and_rebinding_client():
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"""TestClient that simulates a DNS-rebinding attack.
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The simulated TCP peer is loopback (``request.client.host`` passes
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the legacy IP check), but the inbound ``Host:`` header reads
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``attacker.com`` — exactly what the browser sends after the
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attacker's DNS record flips to ``127.0.0.1``.
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"""
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config = ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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)
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app = create_app(config)
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with TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://attacker.com",
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client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
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) as test_client:
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yield app, test_client
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Loopback guard unit tests
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_is_loopback_host_accepts_canonical_hosts():
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for host in LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
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assert is_loopback_host(host) is True
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# None (TestClient with no client info) is treated as loopback.
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assert is_loopback_host(None) is True
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def test_is_loopback_host_rejects_external_hosts():
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assert is_loopback_host("10.0.0.1") is False
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assert is_loopback_host("192.168.1.100") is False
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assert is_loopback_host("8.8.8.8") is False
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def test_is_loopback_host_accepts_ipv6_mapped_ipv4_loopback():
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# On Linux dual-stack sockets with IPV6_V6ONLY=0, an IPv4 loopback
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# connection arrives as ``::ffff:127.0.0.1``. The guard must treat
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# this as loopback or /debug/* silently 404s when the proxy binds
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# to ``::`` / ``0.0.0.0``.
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assert is_loopback_host("::ffff:127.0.0.1") is True
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def test_is_loopback_host_rejects_ipv6_mapped_external_ipv4():
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assert is_loopback_host("::ffff:10.0.0.1") is False
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def test_is_loopback_host_rejects_non_loopback_ipv6():
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assert is_loopback_host("2001:db8::1") is False
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def test_is_loopback_host_rejects_malformed_input():
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assert is_loopback_host("not-an-ip") is False
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assert is_loopback_host("") is False
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def test_require_loopback_raises_404_for_external_client():
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class _FakeClient:
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host = "10.0.0.1"
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class _FakeRequest:
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client = _FakeClient()
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
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require_loopback(_FakeRequest()) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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assert exc_info.value.status_code == 404
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# Privacy: 404 explicitly, not 403 — endpoints should be invisible.
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assert exc_info.value.status_code != 403
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def test_require_loopback_accepts_loopback_client():
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class _FakeClient:
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host = "127.0.0.1"
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class _FakeRequest:
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client = _FakeClient()
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# Should not raise. ``headers`` is absent so the Host-header gate
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# falls back to the legacy IP-only behaviour for callers that
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# construct a bare request stub.
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require_loopback(_FakeRequest()) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Host-header (DNS-rebinding) guard unit tests
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_is_loopback_host_header_accepts_canonical_values():
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for value in (
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"127.0.0.1",
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"127.0.0.1:8787",
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"localhost",
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"localhost:8787",
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"LOCALHOST",
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"Localhost:8787",
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"[::1]",
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"[::1]:8787",
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):
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assert is_loopback_host_header(value) is True, value
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def test_is_loopback_host_header_rejects_external_names():
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for value in (
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"attacker.com",
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"attacker.com:8787",
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"evil.example",
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"10.0.0.1",
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"10.0.0.1:8787",
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"8.8.8.8",
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):
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assert is_loopback_host_header(value) is False, value
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def test_is_loopback_host_header_rejects_missing_and_malformed():
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assert is_loopback_host_header(None) is False
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assert is_loopback_host_header("") is False
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assert is_loopback_host_header(" ") is False
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# Unterminated bracketed IPv6
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assert is_loopback_host_header("[::1") is False
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# Hostname that merely contains a loopback substring
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assert is_loopback_host_header("localhost.attacker.com") is False
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def test_require_loopback_blocks_dns_rebinding_host_header():
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"""Loopback IP + ``Host: attacker.com`` is the rebinding signature."""
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class _FakeClient:
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host = "127.0.0.1"
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class _FakeHeaders:
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def get(self, key, default=None):
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if key.lower() == "host":
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return "attacker.com"
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return default
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class _FakeRequest:
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client = _FakeClient()
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headers = _FakeHeaders()
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
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require_loopback(_FakeRequest()) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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assert exc_info.value.status_code == 404
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def test_require_loopback_accepts_loopback_host_header():
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class _FakeClient:
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host = "127.0.0.1"
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class _FakeHeaders:
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def get(self, key, default=None):
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if key.lower() == "host":
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return "127.0.0.1:8787"
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return default
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class _FakeRequest:
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client = _FakeClient()
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headers = _FakeHeaders()
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# Should not raise — both gates pass.
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require_loopback(_FakeRequest()) # type: ignore[arg-type]
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Serializer unit tests
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_warmup_registry_to_dict_returns_registry_shape():
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"""Serializer equivalent of the old collect_warmup helper.
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The helper was inlined at the /debug/warmup route handler in server.py
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(``registry.to_dict() if registry else {}``); this test preserves
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coverage of the registry's own serializer contract.
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"""
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registry = WarmupRegistry()
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registry.kompress.mark_loaded(handle=object(), source_status="enabled")
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registry.memory_backend.mark_error("boom")
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payload = registry.to_dict()
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assert payload["kompress"]["status"] == "loaded"
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assert payload["memory_backend"]["status"] == "error"
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assert payload["memory_backend"]["error"] == "boom"
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# Raw handle must never leak into the serialized payload.
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assert "handle" not in payload["kompress"]
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def test_ws_session_registry_snapshot_returns_registered_entries():
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"""Serializer equivalent of the old collect_ws_sessions helper."""
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reg = WebSocketSessionRegistry()
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handle = WSSessionHandle(
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session_id="sess-debug-1",
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request_id="req-debug-1",
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client_addr="127.0.0.1:9999",
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upstream_url="wss://upstream/test",
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)
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reg.register(handle)
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payload = reg.snapshot()
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assert len(payload) == 1
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assert payload[0]["session_id"] == "sess-debug-1"
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assert payload[0]["request_id"] == "req-debug-1"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_collect_tasks_returns_current_tasks_with_metadata():
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async def _noop_task():
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await asyncio.sleep(0.05)
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task = asyncio.create_task(_noop_task(), name="debug-test-task")
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try:
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entries = collect_tasks()
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matching = [e for e in entries if e["name"] == "debug-test-task"]
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assert matching, "expected the named task to appear in collect_tasks output"
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entry = matching[0]
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assert entry["coro_qualname"] is not None
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# Privacy: no frame locals, no coroutine args.
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assert "locals" not in entry
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assert "cr_frame" not in entry
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assert "args" not in entry
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assert entry["stack_depth"] is None or isinstance(entry["stack_depth"], int)
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finally:
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task.cancel()
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try:
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await task
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except (asyncio.CancelledError, BaseException):
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pass
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_collect_tasks_derives_age_from_ws_registry_for_codex_relays():
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reg = WebSocketSessionRegistry()
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sid = "relay-sess-1"
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reg.register(
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WSSessionHandle(
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session_id=sid,
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request_id="req-relay-1",
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client_addr="127.0.0.1:1",
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upstream_url="wss://upstream",
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)
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)
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async def _long_relay():
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await asyncio.sleep(0.2)
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relay_task = asyncio.create_task(_long_relay(), name=f"codex-ws-c2u-{sid}")
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try:
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await asyncio.sleep(0.02) # let some age accrue
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entries = collect_tasks(ws_registry=reg)
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named = [e for e in entries if e["name"] == f"codex-ws-c2u-{sid}"]
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assert named, "expected relay task in output"
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entry = named[0]
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assert entry["age_seconds"] is not None
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assert entry["age_seconds"] >= 0.0
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finally:
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relay_task.cancel()
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try:
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await relay_task
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except (asyncio.CancelledError, BaseException):
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pass
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# HTTP endpoint tests (loopback)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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def test_debug_tasks_returns_json_array_for_loopback(client):
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response = client.get("/debug/tasks")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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data = response.json()
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assert isinstance(data, list)
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# Each entry at least has name + coro_qualname fields.
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for entry in data:
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assert "name" in entry
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assert "coro_qualname" in entry
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def test_debug_tasks_stack_depth_is_gated_behind_query(client):
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"""Default response must not compute stack_depth (P3 Fix 29 perf gate).
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``?stack=true`` opts into the synchronous ``Task.get_stack`` walk; the
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default stays cheap so snapshotting during a reconnect storm does
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not stall the event loop.
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"""
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default = client.get("/debug/tasks")
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assert default.status_code == 200
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for entry in default.json():
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assert entry["stack_depth"] is None, (
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f"default /debug/tasks must not compute stack_depth; "
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f"got {entry['stack_depth']!r} for {entry.get('name')!r}"
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)
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with_stack = client.get("/debug/tasks?stack=true")
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assert with_stack.status_code == 200
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entries = with_stack.json()
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# At least one entry should have a computed depth (the TestClient
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# itself runs under a task). Some entries may still be None if
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# get_stack raised defensively — we only require that opting in
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# produces at least one integer result.
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integer_depths = [e["stack_depth"] for e in entries if isinstance(e["stack_depth"], int)]
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assert integer_depths, (
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f"expected at least one int stack_depth when ?stack=true; got entries={entries!r}"
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)
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def test_debug_warmup_reports_registry_slots(client):
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response = client.get("/debug/warmup")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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data = response.json()
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# Registry surfaces all canonical slot names.
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assert "kompress" in data
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assert "magika" in data
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assert "memory_backend" in data
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assert "memory_embedder" in data
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assert "runtime" in data
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# Each slot has at least a status field.
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assert "status" in data["memory_backend"]
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assert data["runtime"]["anthropic_pre_upstream"]["resolved_concurrency"] >= 0
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assert data["runtime"]["websocket_sessions"]["active_relay_tasks"] == 0
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def test_debug_ws_sessions_reports_live_session(app_and_client):
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app, client = app_and_client
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proxy = app.state.proxy
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assert proxy is not None, "create_app must wire app.state.proxy"
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|
|
|
sid = "sess-debug-http"
|
|
proxy.ws_sessions.register(
|
|
WSSessionHandle(
|
|
session_id=sid,
|
|
request_id="req-debug-http",
|
|
client_addr="127.0.0.1:12345",
|
|
upstream_url="wss://upstream/test",
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
response = client.get("/debug/ws-sessions")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
data = response.json()
|
|
matching = [entry for entry in data if entry["session_id"] == sid]
|
|
assert matching, "expected live session in /debug/ws-sessions output"
|
|
assert matching[0]["request_id"] == "req-debug-http"
|
|
finally:
|
|
proxy.ws_sessions.deregister(sid, cause="response_completed")
|
|
|
|
# After cleanup the session is gone.
|
|
response = client.get("/debug/ws-sessions")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert all(entry["session_id"] != sid for entry in response.json())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_debug_endpoints_do_not_mutate_state(client):
|
|
# Call each endpoint 100 times and confirm the second read equals
|
|
# the first — no accidental mutation from serialization.
|
|
first_tasks = client.get("/debug/tasks").json()
|
|
first_warmup = client.get("/debug/warmup").json()
|
|
first_ws = client.get("/debug/ws-sessions").json()
|
|
|
|
for _ in range(100):
|
|
client.get("/debug/tasks")
|
|
client.get("/debug/warmup")
|
|
client.get("/debug/ws-sessions")
|
|
|
|
# Warmup and ws-sessions are deterministic (no background work touches
|
|
# them in this test config), so they must be identical.
|
|
assert client.get("/debug/warmup").json() == first_warmup
|
|
assert client.get("/debug/ws-sessions").json() == first_ws
|
|
# Tasks may vary naturally, but the call itself never raises and the
|
|
# shape never changes.
|
|
new_tasks = client.get("/debug/tasks").json()
|
|
assert isinstance(new_tasks, list)
|
|
for entry in new_tasks:
|
|
assert set(entry.keys()) == set(first_tasks[0].keys()) if first_tasks else True
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_debug_tasks_does_not_leak_coro_locals(client):
|
|
response = client.get("/debug/tasks")
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
for entry in response.json():
|
|
# Privacy check: the serializer must not leak coroutine locals,
|
|
# frame state, or request bodies. Only name / qualname / age /
|
|
# depth / done are allowed.
|
|
assert set(entry.keys()) <= {
|
|
"name",
|
|
"coro_qualname",
|
|
"age_seconds",
|
|
"stack_depth",
|
|
"done",
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
# HTTP endpoint tests (non-loopback)
|
|
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_debug_endpoints_return_404_for_non_loopback_client(app_and_external_client):
|
|
_, client = app_and_external_client
|
|
for path in ("/debug/tasks", "/debug/ws-sessions", "/debug/warmup"):
|
|
response = client.get(path)
|
|
assert response.status_code == 404, path
|
|
# Must be 404, not 403 — invisible to scanners.
|
|
assert response.status_code != 403
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_debug_endpoints_block_dns_rebinding(app_and_rebinding_client):
|
|
"""Loopback client + ``Host: attacker.com`` must 404 like an external client.
|
|
|
|
Regression for the DNS-rebinding gap: prior to 2026-06 the guard
|
|
only checked ``request.client.host``, which a rebound browser
|
|
passes trivially. Adding a ``Host:`` header allowlist closes that
|
|
gap so a malicious site cannot read /debug/* over the user's
|
|
loopback proxy via the wide-open CORS policy.
|
|
"""
|
|
_, client = app_and_rebinding_client
|
|
for path in ("/debug/tasks", "/debug/ws-sessions", "/debug/warmup"):
|
|
response = client.get(path)
|
|
assert response.status_code == 404, path
|
|
assert response.status_code != 403
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_existing_health_routes_unchanged(client):
|
|
# Invariant: Unit 5 must not regress the existing health endpoints.
|
|
for path in ("/livez", "/readyz", "/health"):
|
|
response = client.get(path)
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200, path
|