headroom/tests/test_memory_invariants.py
chopratejas 71d5a7b545 fix(proxy): MemoryDecision contract + 3 bypass bugs + drop 500-char query cap
Three bug classes fixed plus three architectural extension points,
together making the memory subsystem uniform across all five sites
and ready for future Mem0/Letta/Cognee backend integration.

## Bug fixes

* **3 sites silently ignored `x-headroom-bypass: true`** —
  ``anthropic.py:1303``, ``openai.py:1620`` (chat), ``gemini.py:382``
  injected memory under bypass, mutating request bytes when the user
  explicitly asked for byte-faithful passthrough. Now gated on
  ``MemoryDecision.decide(...)`` which honours bypass uniformly.

* **500-char query truncation** — ``memory_handler._extract_user_query``
  capped at 500 chars, silently throwing away signal. None of Letta /
  Mem0 / Cognee / Supermemory truncate. Removed; the embedding model
  handles its own window.

* **Gemini had no timeout** on ``search_and_format_context`` — the
  only chat handler without one. A slow backend could stall requests.
  Added ``asyncio.wait_for`` matching Anthropic + OpenAI Chat +
  Responses.

* **WS injected into ``body["instructions"]``** — the system /
  cache-hot-zone field, violating invariant I2 (all other handlers
  inject at user-message tail). Switched to ``ws_response_body["input"]``
  for string-shaped input; list-shaped input deferred to the Rust
  handler with a clear log.

## New value types (extension points)

* ``MemoryDecision`` — frozen dataclass + factory. Five-way skip
  reason enum (``bypass_header`` / ``no_handler`` / ``no_user_id`` /
  ``mode_disabled`` / ``mode_tool``). ``apply_to_tags()`` surfaces
  the skip reason in ``RequestOutcome.tags["memory_skip_reason"]``
  — dashboards can now slice memory-blind traffic by cause.

* ``MemoryQuery`` — multi-source retrieval query. ``from_messages()``
  walks the conversation and extracts latest user text + recent tool
  outputs + recent assistant turns at FULL fidelity (no truncation).
  Handles both OpenAI-shape ``role: tool`` and Anthropic-shape
  ``tool_result`` content blocks. ``to_embedding_input()`` produces
  a delimited concatenation the embedder sees as structured context.

* ``MemoryInjectionBudget`` — uniform token / entry / similarity
  bound on the formatted injection block. Pre-this-PR no cap (~4000
  tokens could land per request). Default 1024 tokens / 10 entries /
  0.3 similarity floor. ``apply_to_text()`` truncates at line
  boundaries so dashboard renders intact bullet points.

## Migration scope — all 5 sites uniform at the GATE level

| Site | Handler | Pre-PR gate | Post-PR gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | anthropic.py | `memory_handler and memory_user_id` | `memory_decision.inject` |
| 2 | gemini.py | `memory_handler and memory_user_id` | `memory_decision.inject` |
| 3 | openai.py chat | `memory_handler and memory_user_id` | `memory_decision.inject` |
| 4 | openai.py Responses | `memory_handler and memory_user_id and not _bypass` | `responses_memory_decision.inject` |
| 6 | openai.py WS | `memory_handler and body and not _ws_bypass` | `ws_memory_decision.inject` |

Site 5 (Responses bypass-elif log-only branch) is preserved verbatim.

## Deliberately deferred (separate PRs)

* **Memory injection order inversion** — sites 4 and 6 inject
  BEFORE compression; sites 1/2/3 inject AFTER. Moving 4 + 6 to
  post-compression needs its own focused cache-stability testing.
* **Importance scoring** — recency × source × access-count.
* **Per-memory atomize-and-split** — Mem0/Supermemory pattern.
* **AST-aware code chunking for tool outputs** — Supermemory's
  code-chunk approach.

The contracts shipped here (``MemoryQuery`` + ``MemoryInjectionBudget``)
are the extension points those will plug into.

## Test coverage

* 20 new tests on ``MemoryDecision``
* 14 new tests on ``MemoryQuery`` (full-fidelity, multi-source)
* 10 new tests on ``MemoryInjectionBudget``
* 3 new AST contract tests (no raw gate; no system writes; every
  search call passes ``query=``)
* All existing memory + cache-stability tests still pass (222 passed)

## Rust portability

Every new value type ports cleanly to a frozen Rust struct. Pure
functions, no I/O, no global state. Same Python ↔ Rust parity-test
pattern that ``CompressionDecision`` already uses.

## Zero-regression contract

Existing chat/completion harnesses (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor,
Continue, Aider) see ZERO wire-byte changes when bypass is NOT set.
When bypass IS set, the 3 chat handlers now correctly skip memory
injection — that's the bug fix, not a regression.
2026-05-19 11:13:52 -05:00

198 lines
8.1 KiB
Python

"""AST-walking contract tests locking memory-system invariants.
These tests introspect the four handler modules' source ASTs to assert
two structural properties that, if regressed, would silently re-
introduce the bug classes this PR fixed:
(a) **No raw memory-gate conjunction**: every memory injection block
must be gated by ``MemoryDecision``, not by an inline
``if self.memory_handler and memory_user_id`` conjunction. The
raw conjunction is what allowed sites 1/2/3 to silently ignore
``x-headroom-bypass: true``.
(b) **No memory writes to system/instructions**: memory injection
must target user-message-tail / body["input"] / messages, never
``body["instructions"]`` or system content. Pre-PR-this the WS
handler was the lone outlier writing to instructions; the AST
check ensures it doesn't sneak back.
The checks are static — no handler is invoked. They run in
milliseconds and catch future regressions at PR-review time.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ast
import re
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
HANDLER_FILES = [
Path("headroom/proxy/handlers/anthropic.py"),
Path("headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py"),
Path("headroom/proxy/handlers/gemini.py"),
Path("headroom/proxy/handlers/batch.py"),
]
# ── Invariant A — no raw memory-gate conjunction ──────────────────────
def _file_contains_raw_memory_gate(file_path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Find ``if (self.)memory_handler and memory_user_id`` raw
conjunctions in the file. Returns list of (line, snippet).
The acceptable replacements are ``if memory_decision.inject:`` or
``if (responses|ws)_memory_decision.inject:``.
AST-walking the conditional itself is complex (BoolOp + Attribute),
so we use a regex to scan source lines. False positives are caught
by the test author at write time — this is a one-line invariant.
"""
text = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
# Match "if self.memory_handler and memory_user_id" but NOT inside
# the helper that defines the decision (which references both names
# for documentation purposes) — we only care about handler logic.
pattern = re.compile(r"^\s*if\s+self\.memory_handler\s+and\s+memory_user_id\b")
hits = []
for i, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), start=1):
if pattern.match(line):
hits.append((i, line.rstrip()))
return hits
def test_no_raw_memory_handler_gate_in_handlers() -> None:
"""Pre-PR-this, sites 1/2/3 used ``if self.memory_handler and
memory_user_id:`` as the memory-injection gate — silently
ignoring bypass. After PR-this, every site routes through
``MemoryDecision.decide(...)`` and gates on
``memory_decision.inject``. This test ensures the raw conjunction
cannot return without explicit review."""
offenders = []
for f in HANDLER_FILES:
offenders.extend([(f, ln, src) for (ln, src) in _file_contains_raw_memory_gate(f)])
if offenders:
formatted = "\n".join(f" {f.name}:{ln} {src!r}" for f, ln, src in offenders)
pytest.fail(
f"{len(offenders)} handler site(s) use the pre-PR raw memory "
"gate `if self.memory_handler and memory_user_id`:\n"
f"{formatted}\n\n"
"Replace with `MemoryDecision.decide(...)` + "
"`if memory_decision.inject:`. See PR for the canonical pattern."
)
# ── Invariant B — memory never writes to system/instructions ─────────
_FORBIDDEN_SYSTEM_WRITES = (
# Direct mutation of cache-hot-zone system fields by the memory
# path. The patterns below are exact assignment forms — they match
# the pre-PR-this WS bug at openai.py:3517.
re.compile(r'ws_response_body\["instructions"\]\s*='),
re.compile(r'response_body\["instructions"\]\s*='),
re.compile(r'body\["instructions"\]\s*='),
re.compile(r'body\["system"\]\s*='),
)
def _line_is_memory_related(line: str) -> bool:
"""Heuristic: a line that contains ``memory_context`` or
``memory_inject`` is in the memory-injection code path."""
return "memory_context" in line or "memory_inject" in line
def _find_system_writes_in_memory_context(file_path: Path) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Find lines that both:
- Look like a write to body["instructions"] / body["system"]
- Live within ~10 lines of a ``memory_context`` reference
This is a windowed-context check — we don't want false positives
from unrelated instructions-writes (e.g. tool-result handling).
"""
text = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
memory_line_indices = [i for i, line in enumerate(text) if _line_is_memory_related(line)]
hits = []
for i, line in enumerate(text):
if not any(p.search(line) for p in _FORBIDDEN_SYSTEM_WRITES):
continue
# Within 10 lines of any memory-related line?
if any(abs(i - mi) <= 10 for mi in memory_line_indices):
hits.append((i + 1, line.strip()))
return hits
def test_memory_never_writes_to_system_or_instructions() -> None:
"""Pre-PR-this, the WS handler wrote memory context to
``ws_response_body["instructions"]`` — the system / cache-hot-zone
field. That mutated the prefix cache bytes on every turn. All
other sites route to user-message tail / body["input"]. This
test asserts memory_context-related code paths never write to a
forbidden system-field assignment."""
offenders = []
for f in HANDLER_FILES:
offenders.extend([(f, ln, src) for (ln, src) in _find_system_writes_in_memory_context(f)])
if offenders:
formatted = "\n".join(f" {f.name}:{ln} {src!r}" for f, ln, src in offenders)
pytest.fail(
f"{len(offenders)} suspected memory→system write(s):\n"
f"{formatted}\n\n"
"Memory must append to user-message tail (e.g. body['input'] "
"for Responses, optimized_messages for chat). Never write to "
"body['instructions'] or body['system'] — they are the cache "
"hot zone (invariant I2)."
)
# ── Invariant C — every memory-search call passes a MemoryQuery ──────
def _find_search_and_format_context_calls_without_query(
file_path: Path,
) -> list[tuple[int, str]]:
"""Find ``search_and_format_context(...)`` invocations that DON'T
pass a ``query=`` kwarg.
Pre-PR-this no site passed a query — they all relied on the
handler's internal ``_extract_user_query(messages)`` with its
500-char truncation. The new contract: every handler builds a
full-fidelity ``MemoryQuery`` and passes it explicitly.
"""
text = file_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
tree = ast.parse(text, filename=str(file_path))
hits = []
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
if not isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute):
continue
if node.func.attr != "search_and_format_context":
continue
kwarg_keys = {kw.arg for kw in node.keywords if kw.arg is not None}
if "query" not in kwarg_keys:
line_no = node.lineno
snippet = text.splitlines()[line_no - 1].strip()
hits.append((line_no, snippet))
return hits
def test_every_search_and_format_context_call_passes_query_kwarg() -> None:
"""Every handler that searches memory MUST pass a ``query=`` kwarg
(a :class:`MemoryQuery` instance), not rely on the handler's
internal ``_extract_user_query`` (which used to truncate to 500
chars). Locks the full-fidelity-query contract."""
offenders = []
for f in HANDLER_FILES:
offenders.extend(
[(f, ln, src) for (ln, src) in _find_search_and_format_context_calls_without_query(f)]
)
if offenders:
formatted = "\n".join(f" {f.name}:{ln} {src!r}" for f, ln, src in offenders)
pytest.fail(
f"{len(offenders)} search_and_format_context call(s) miss `query=`:\n"
f"{formatted}\n\n"
"Pass `query=MemoryQuery.from_messages(...)` — the multi-source, "
"untruncated query value type. See headroom/proxy/memory_query.py."
)