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## Summary CVE-2026-77775 (SSRF via `x-headroom-base-url`) is **not fully fixed on current `main`**. The advisory lists 0.36.1 as the last affected version; one route still forwards to any destination a caller names. `upstream_guard.is_safe_upstream_url` was added and wired into `/v1/messages` and the catch-all passthrough. But `select_passthrough_base_url` moved from `providers/proxy_routes.py` to `providers/proxy_targets.py`, and the guard did not follow it. Its Azure branch returns the header verbatim whenever an `api-key` header is present — **both values are caller-supplied** — and `POST /v1/alpha/search` resolves its upstream through that helper without checking the header itself. ## Verified, not inferred Against the current tree, with a listener on loopback standing in for an internal service: ``` proxy status : 200 internal service hit : 1 time(s) Authorization it received : 'Bearer SECRET-CLIENT-TOKEN' internal body relayed back : True ``` The caller's credentials are forwarded to the attacker-named host and the internal response is relayed back. After this change: `400`, zero hits, nothing relayed. A sweep of all 99 routes isolates exactly one leak on unfixed code — `POST /v1/alpha/search` with `api-key` — and zero after. ## 1. The missing enforcement **Guarded at the chokepoint, not just the route.** `select_passthrough_base_url` now validates before returning, in `proxy_targets.py` and in the parallel copy in `providers/registry.py`, so a future caller that forgets the header check cannot reopen this. `/v1/alpha/search` also rejects explicitly with 400, matching its sibling routes. ## 2. A second gap in the address policy RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`) is not `is_private`, so it passed the guard — while routing to ISP and cloud-internal infrastructure. `_is_internal_address` now also rejects anything not globally routable. Verified over a 27-vector battery — 0 bypasses, public control unaffected: | Vector | Before | After | |---|---|---| | `100.64.0.0/10` shared address space | **allowed** | blocked | | `198.18/15`, TEST-NET, `240/4` | **allowed** | blocked | | 6to4 / Teredo embedding internal IPv4 | **allowed** | blocked | | NAT64 `64:ff9b::/96` embedding loopback | **allowed** | blocked | | loopback, RFC1918, link-local, metadata, IPv4-mapped, userinfo tricks | blocked | blocked | | multicast `224.0.0.1` | blocked | blocked | | public `8.8.8.8` | allowed | allowed | The category checks are **kept alongside** `is_global` rather than replaced — `is_global` is `True` for multicast, so a replacement would have regressed. NAT64 also reports as global, so its embedded IPv4 is extracted and judged on its own. ## 3. Unauthenticated stall via the resolver `socket.getaddrinfo` takes no timeout and runs on the calling thread — the event loop. Since the hostname is caller-supplied, a deliberately slow-resolving name stalled every other in-flight request; a handful of concurrent requests made the proxy unresponsive, unauthenticated. Resolution now runs in a small dedicated pool with a budget (`HEADROOM_UPSTREAM_RESOLVE_TIMEOUT_S`, default 3s) and fails closed on overrun, which bounds every caller including the synchronous chokepoint. `is_safe_upstream_url_async` runs the lookup off the loop, and the three route handlers that validate a caller-supplied upstream now await it. Caching was deliberately avoided: a TTL cache in front of a security decision invites poisoning, and would widen the rebinding window rather than narrow it. ## Why this survived The existing tests unit-tested the guard's *logic* but never asserted it was *reached*. Added enforcement tests at the sinks plus a **sweep over the whole route table** that fails if any route forwards to a loopback address — so the next unguarded upstream resolution fails in CI rather than in a CVE. All new tests were confirmed failing against the unfixed tree and passing after. ## Known residual — deliberately not addressed **DNS rebinding.** Validation and connection resolve the host separately, so a low-TTL answer can differ between them. Closing this needs connection-time pinning in the shared `http_client` transport, which carries every request in the proxy — too broad to fold into this patch. It should not be described as fixed. ## Compatibility An endpoint that does not resolve publicly (split-horizon, on-prem) is now rejected where it previously passed unvalidated. `HEADROOM_ALLOWED_BASE_URLS` is the documented opt-in, covered by test. Three existing tests used fictional hostnames and legitimately began failing; DNS is pinned in them so they keep testing target precedence rather than depending on the missing guard. Separately: `docker-compose.yml` has already been hardened since the advisory — `HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN` is now mandatory and ports are loopback-only — so the "exposed by default" multiplier the advisory cites no longer applies to the shipped compose. Full suite: the 3 failures outside this area (`test_learn/test_integration`, `test_release_workflows::test_no_native_tls_in_wheel_build_tree`, and a `test_graceful_shutdown` ordering flake) reproduce on clean `main` and are unrelated. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
277 lines
8.5 KiB
Python
277 lines
8.5 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from typing import Any
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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from headroom.providers.registry import (
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ProviderApiTargets,
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ProxyProviderRuntime,
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call_client_transport,
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create_proxy_backend,
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format_backend_status,
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)
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from headroom.proxy import upstream_guard
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class DummyStorage:
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def __init__(self) -> None:
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self.saved: list[Any] = []
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def save(self, metrics: Any) -> None:
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self.saved.append(metrics)
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class DummyClient:
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def __init__(self) -> None:
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self._storage = DummyStorage()
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self._wrapped_stream: tuple[Any, Any] | None = None
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self._original = SimpleNamespace(
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chat=SimpleNamespace(completions=SimpleNamespace(create=self._openai_create)),
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messages=SimpleNamespace(create=self._anthropic_create, stream=self._anthropic_stream),
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)
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self.openai_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
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self.anthropic_calls: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
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def _openai_create(self, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
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self.openai_calls.append(kwargs)
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if kwargs["stream"]:
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return iter(["chunk-1", "chunk-2"])
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return SimpleNamespace(
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usage=SimpleNamespace(
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completion_tokens=7,
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prompt_tokens_details=SimpleNamespace(cached_tokens=3),
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)
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)
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def _anthropic_create(self, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
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self.anthropic_calls.append(kwargs)
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return SimpleNamespace(
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usage=SimpleNamespace(
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output_tokens=5,
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cache_read_input_tokens=2,
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)
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)
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def _anthropic_stream(self, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
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self.anthropic_calls.append(kwargs)
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return "anthropic-stream"
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def _wrap_stream(self, stream: Any, metrics: Any) -> Any:
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self._wrapped_stream = (stream, metrics)
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return ("wrapped", stream)
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def test_proxy_provider_runtime_selects_targets_and_providers() -> None:
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runtime = ProxyProviderRuntime(
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api_targets=ProviderApiTargets(
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anthropic="https://anthropic.example",
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openai="https://openai.example",
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gemini="https://gemini.example",
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cloudcode="https://cloudcode.example",
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),
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pipeline_providers={
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"anthropic": SimpleNamespace(name="anthropic"),
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"openai": SimpleNamespace(name="openai"),
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},
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)
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assert runtime.api_target("anthropic") == "https://anthropic.example"
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assert runtime.pipeline_provider("openai").name == "openai"
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assert runtime.model_metadata_provider({"Authorization": "Bearer sk-ant-api03-test"}) == (
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"anthropic"
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)
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assert runtime.select_passthrough_base_url({"x-goog-api-key": "test"}) == (
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"https://gemini.example"
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)
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# The Azure branch honours the override only after the SSRF guard clears
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# the destination (CVE-2026-77775), and `azure.example` does not resolve.
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# Pin a public answer so this stays a test of target *precedence*.
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with patch.object(
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upstream_guard.socket,
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"getaddrinfo",
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return_value=[(None, None, None, None, ("20.10.10.10", 443))],
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):
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assert (
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runtime.select_passthrough_base_url(
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{"api-key": "azure-key", "x-headroom-base-url": "https://azure.example/openai/"}
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)
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== "https://azure.example/openai"
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)
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assert runtime.select_passthrough_base_url({}) == "https://openai.example"
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def test_create_proxy_backend_uses_injected_backend_types() -> None:
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logger = logging.getLogger("test")
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anyllm = create_proxy_backend(
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backend="anyllm",
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anyllm_provider="groq",
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bedrock_region=None,
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logger=logger,
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anyllm_backend_cls=lambda provider, api_base: {
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"kind": "anyllm",
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"provider": provider,
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"api_base": api_base,
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},
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)
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litellm = create_proxy_backend(
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backend="bedrock",
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anyllm_provider="ignored",
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bedrock_region="us-east-1",
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logger=logger,
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litellm_backend_cls=lambda provider, region, profile_name=None: {
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"kind": "litellm",
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"provider": provider,
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"region": region,
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},
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)
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assert anyllm == {"kind": "anyllm", "provider": "groq", "api_base": None}
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assert litellm == {"kind": "litellm", "provider": "bedrock", "region": "us-east-1"}
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def test_create_proxy_backend_passes_openai_api_url_to_anyllm() -> None:
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"""Regression for #942: --openai-api-url must reach the any-llm backend."""
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logger = logging.getLogger("test")
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anyllm = create_proxy_backend(
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backend="anyllm",
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anyllm_provider="openai",
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bedrock_region=None,
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logger=logger,
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openai_api_url="https://custom-provider.example/v1",
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anyllm_backend_cls=lambda provider, api_base: {
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"provider": provider,
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"api_base": api_base,
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},
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)
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assert anyllm == {
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"provider": "openai",
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"api_base": "https://custom-provider.example/v1",
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}
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def test_create_proxy_backend_handles_missing_or_direct_backends(
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caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture,
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) -> None:
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logger = logging.getLogger("test")
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direct = create_proxy_backend(
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backend="anthropic",
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anyllm_provider="ignored",
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bedrock_region=None,
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logger=logger,
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)
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with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING):
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missing = create_proxy_backend(
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backend="anyllm",
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anyllm_provider="groq",
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bedrock_region=None,
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logger=logger,
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anyllm_backend_cls=lambda provider, api_base: (_ for _ in ()).throw(
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ImportError("missing")
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),
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)
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assert direct is None
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assert missing is None
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assert "any-llm backend not available" in caplog.text
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def test_format_backend_status_uses_litellm_provider_metadata(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"headroom.backends.litellm.get_provider_config",
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lambda provider: SimpleNamespace(
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display_name=provider.upper(),
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uses_region=(provider == "bedrock"),
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),
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)
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assert (
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format_backend_status(
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backend="litellm-bedrock",
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anyllm_provider="ignored",
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bedrock_region="us-west-2",
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)
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== "BEDROCK via LiteLLM (region=us-west-2)"
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)
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assert (
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format_backend_status(
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backend="litellm-openai",
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anyllm_provider="ignored",
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bedrock_region=None,
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)
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== "OPENAI via LiteLLM"
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)
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def test_call_client_transport_covers_openai_and_anthropic_paths() -> None:
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client = DummyClient()
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openai_metrics = SimpleNamespace(tokens_output=0, cached_tokens=0)
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anthropic_metrics = SimpleNamespace(tokens_output=0, cached_tokens=0)
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openai_response = call_client_transport(
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"openai",
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client,
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model="gpt-4o",
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messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
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stream=False,
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metrics=openai_metrics,
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temperature=0,
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)
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openai_stream = call_client_transport(
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"openai",
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client,
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model="gpt-4o",
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messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
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stream=True,
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metrics=openai_metrics,
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)
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anthropic_response = call_client_transport(
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"anthropic",
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client,
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model="claude-sonnet",
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messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
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stream=False,
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metrics=anthropic_metrics,
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max_tokens=32,
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)
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anthropic_stream = call_client_transport(
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"anthropic",
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client,
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model="claude-sonnet",
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messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "hello"}],
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stream=True,
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metrics=anthropic_metrics,
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max_tokens=32,
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)
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assert openai_response.usage.completion_tokens == 7
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assert openai_metrics.tokens_output == 7
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assert openai_metrics.cached_tokens == 3
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assert openai_stream == ("wrapped", client._wrapped_stream[0])
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assert anthropic_response.usage.output_tokens == 5
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assert anthropic_metrics.tokens_output == 5
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assert anthropic_metrics.cached_tokens == 2
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assert anthropic_stream == "anthropic-stream"
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assert len(client._storage.saved) == 3
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def test_call_client_transport_rejects_unknown_api_style() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsupported api_style"):
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call_client_transport(
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"unknown",
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DummyClient(),
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model="gpt-4o",
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messages=[],
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stream=False,
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metrics=SimpleNamespace(),
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)
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