mirror of
https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom.git
synced 2026-08-27 14:17:10 -04:00
## Description
`#2927` brought eight telemetry/TOIN routes under `require_loopback`.
Two structurally identical siblings 60 lines above them were missed:
```
GET /v1/feedback
GET /v1/feedback/{tool_name}
```
Neither is an aggregate-counter endpoint. Their `common_queries` /
`queried_fields` keys are built verbatim from agent search text —
`event.query.lower()` at `headroom/cache/compression_feedback.py:311` —
and up to 100 queries are retained per tool, keyed by real tool name.
Under the shipped Docker default (`--host 0.0.0.0`) a LAN peer gets a
404 from `/v1/toin/patterns` and the query corpus from `/v1/feedback`.
Separately, five mutating loopback-only routes had no CSRF guard.
`require_loopback` cannot stop that attack: a remote page POSTing to a
known `127.0.0.1` URL with `Content-Type: text/plain` is a CORS *simple*
request, so there is no preflight, and the browser still sends the real
loopback `Host` header — both of the guard's gates pass. Only `Origin`
betrays the caller, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it. That
guard already existed at `headroom/proxy/loopback_guard.py:219` and was
applied solely to `/settings`.
Closes #2927 (completes it — the original eight routes were already
done).
## Type of Change
- [x] Bug fix (non-breaking change that fixes an issue)
- [ ] New feature (non-breaking change that adds functionality)
- [ ] Breaking change (fix or feature that would cause existing
functionality to change)
- [ ] Documentation update
## Changes Made
- Added `Depends(_require_loopback)` to `/v1/feedback` and
`/v1/feedback/{tool_name}`.
- Stripped `common_queries` / `queried_fields` from both response bodies
even on the guarded path, matching the whitelist discipline #2930
applied at `server.py:4909-4916`.
- Added `_feedback_stats_without_query_text()` so the scrub happens at
the HTTP boundary; `get_stats()` is unchanged and in-process compression
decisions are untouched.
- Added `Depends(_require_same_origin)` to `POST /stats/reset`,
`/cache/clear`, `/v1/retrieve`, `/v1/telemetry/import`,
`/admin/runtime-env`.
## Testing
- [x] Unit tests pass
- [x] Linting passes (ruff check + format)
- [ ] Type checking passes (`uv run mypy headroom`) — not run
- [x] New tests added for new functionality
### Test Output
```text
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py -q
99 passed, 1 warning in 4.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_proxy_settings_endpoints.py tests/test_telemetry.py \
tests/test_proxy_cache_telemetry.py tests/test_proxy_telemetry_env.py tests/test_telemetry_context.py -q
101 passed, 1 warning in 3.67s
$ .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_critical_fixes.py tests/test_compression_store.py \
tests/test_toin_full_integration.py tests/test_ccr_feedback.py tests/test_critical_gaps.py \
tests/test_proxy_ccr.py tests/test_proxy_dashboard_stats_cache.py -q
168 passed, 4 skipped, 3 warnings in 13.18s
$ .venv/bin/python -m ruff check headroom/proxy/server.py tests/test_proxy_loopback_gating.py
All checks passed!
```
Against the parent commit (`git stash` of `server.py` only), all 14 new
tests fail:
```text
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback]
FAILED test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404[get-/v1/feedback/example]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/stats/reset]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/cache/clear]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/retrieve]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/v1/telemetry/import]
FAILED test_cross_origin_post_rejected[/admin/runtime-env]
FAILED test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected[...] (5 cases)
FAILED test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text
FAILED test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text
14 failed, 85 passed
```
## Real Behavior Proof
- Environment: macOS 15 (darwin 25.4.0), Python 3.12.13, this branch,
FastAPI `TestClient` against the real `create_app` proxy.
- Exact command / steps: drive `/v1/feedback` with a feedback singleton
whose `common_queries` contains `"find the customer api key rotation
runbook"`, once from a non-loopback peer and once from a loopback peer;
POST each of the five mutating routes with `Origin:
https://attacker.example` and `Content-Type: text/plain`.
- Observed result: non-loopback callers now receive 404 where they
previously received 200 with the query corpus; on the loopback path the
response no longer contains `common_queries`, `queried_fields`, or the
substring `customer api key rotation`, while `retrieval_rate` still
resolves to `0.25`. All five cross-origin POSTs return 403; the same
requests with no `Origin`, or with `Origin: http://127.0.0.1`, are
unaffected.
- Not tested: a real browser issuing the cross-origin POST (the CORS
simple-request shape is reproduced at the header level, not in a
browser), and a live non-loopback deployment.
## Runtime Rollout Safety
- Rollout-managed feature(s): none.
- Minimum rollout channel: N/A.
- Stable/default behavior changed: yes — `/v1/feedback*` now 404 for
non-loopback callers and no longer return query text; five POST routes
reject cross-origin browser callers.
- Kill switch / disable path: none; these are security guards and are
deliberately not configurable.
- Unsafe override required: none.
- Qualification impact: none.
- Rollback path: revert this commit.
## Review Readiness
- [x] I have performed a self-review
- [x] This PR is ready for human review
## Checklist
- [x] My code follows the project's style guidelines
- [x] I have performed a self-review of my code
- [x] I have commented my code, particularly in hard-to-understand areas
- [x] My changes generate no new warnings
- [x] I have added tests that prove my fix is effective
- [x] New and existing unit tests pass locally with my changes
## Additional Notes
`/stats` also calls `feedback.get_stats()` (`server.py:3896`) but only
reads aggregate counters at `:4303-4311` and never emits query text —
verified, and the reason the scrub is applied at the HTTP boundary
rather than inside `get_stats()`.
The five POST routes are strictly loopback-gated, so the
trusted-dashboard wrapper `/settings` uses is unnecessary here; for a
loopback caller that wrapper falls through to the same raw guard. No
dashboard asset calls them, and the TypeScript SDK
(`sdk/typescript/src/client.ts:322,443`) sends no `Origin` header, which
the guard passes through unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Tejas Chopra <tejas@Tejass-MacBook-Pro.local>
747 lines
26 KiB
Python
747 lines
26 KiB
Python
"""Loopback-gating tests for state-mutating / content-leaking endpoints.
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``/transformations/feed`` can return full prompt + completion bodies (when
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``log_full_messages`` is on) and ``/cache/clear`` mutates server state. With the
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default ``--host 0.0.0.0`` Docker bind, neither should be reachable by an
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arbitrary network client — they are gated to the loopback interface via
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``require_loopback`` (the same guard already used for ``/admin/*`` and
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``/debug/*``). See #863.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from fastapi import FastAPI
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from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
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from headroom.cache.backends import InMemoryBackend
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from headroom.cache.compression_feedback import CompressionHints
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from headroom.cache.compression_store import get_compression_store, reset_compression_store
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from headroom.proxy.loopback_guard import is_ip_literal_host_header
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from headroom.proxy.server import ProxyConfig, create_app
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GATED = [
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("get", "/transformations/feed"),
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("post", "/cache/clear"),
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("get", "/v1/telemetry"),
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("get", "/v1/telemetry/export"),
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("post", "/v1/telemetry/import"),
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("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools"),
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("get", "/v1/telemetry/tools/example"),
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("get", "/v1/toin/stats"),
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("get", "/v1/toin/patterns"),
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("get", "/v1/toin/pattern/example"),
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# #2927 guarded the eight telemetry/TOIN routes the issue enumerated but
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# left these two siblings open, and their payload carries the same raw
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# agent query text (``common_queries``, built from ``event.query``).
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("get", "/v1/feedback"),
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("get", "/v1/feedback/example"),
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]
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def _make_app() -> FastAPI:
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return create_app(
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ProxyConfig(
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optimize=False,
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cache_enabled=False,
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rate_limit_enabled=False,
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cost_tracking_enabled=False,
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log_requests=False,
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ccr_inject_tool=False,
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ccr_handle_responses=False,
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ccr_context_tracking=False,
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image_optimize=False,
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)
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)
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def _loopback_client() -> TestClient:
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# A real loopback peer + a loopback Host header — passes both guard gates
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# (client-IP check and the DNS-rebinding Host-header check).
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return TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
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def _seed_ccr_entry() -> str:
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reset_compression_store()
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store = get_compression_store(backend=InMemoryBackend())
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return store.store(
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"seeded-ccr-content",
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"<<ccr:seeded>>",
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original_tokens=3,
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compressed_tokens=1,
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tool_name="seeded-test",
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)
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
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def test_non_loopback_caller_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
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# A vanilla TestClient presents client.host="testclient", which is not a
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# loopback IP, so the guard returns 404 (invisible, not 403).
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client = TestClient(_make_app())
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resp = client.request(method, path)
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assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", GATED)
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def test_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
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client = _loopback_client()
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resp = client.request(method, path, json={} if method == "post" else None)
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# Detail routes legitimately return 404 when their test key is absent;
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# the companion non-loopback test proves the guard itself.
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assert resp.status_code in {200, 404, 422}, resp.text
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def test_toin_pattern_detail_whitelists_learned_payload(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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class FakeTOIN:
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def export_patterns(self):
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return {
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"patterns": {
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"unknown|unknown|abc123": {
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"sample_size": 10,
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"total_compressions": 8,
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"total_retrievals": 2,
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"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
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"confidence": 0.4,
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"skip_compression_recommended": False,
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"optimal_max_items": 20,
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"query_pattern_frequency": {"secret prompt": 1},
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"common_query_patterns": ["secret prompt"],
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"field_semantics": {"secret": "value"},
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}
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}
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}
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monkeypatch.setattr("headroom.proxy.server.get_toin", lambda: FakeTOIN())
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response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/toin/pattern/unknown")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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assert response.json() == {
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"compressions": 8,
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"retrievals": 2,
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"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
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"confidence": 0.4,
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"skip_recommended": False,
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"optimal_max_items": 20,
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}
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# Mutating routes reachable from loopback. `require_loopback` cannot stop a
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# remote page from POSTing to a known 127.0.0.1 URL: a "simple" cross-origin
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# request (Content-Type: text/plain carrying JSON) skips preflight, and the
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# browser still sends the real loopback Host header. Only `Origin` betrays the
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# attacker, and only `require_same_origin` inspects it.
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CSRF_GUARDED = [
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"/stats/reset",
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"/cache/clear",
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"/v1/retrieve",
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"/v1/telemetry/import",
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"/admin/runtime-env",
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
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def test_cross_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
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resp = _loopback_client().post(
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path,
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headers={"Origin": "https://attacker.example", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
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content="{}",
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
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def test_sandboxed_null_origin_post_rejected(path: str) -> None:
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# A sandboxed iframe or file:// page sends the opaque literal "null".
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resp = _loopback_client().post(
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path,
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headers={"Origin": "null", "Content-Type": "text/plain"},
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content="{}",
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
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def test_loopback_origin_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
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# The local dashboard is same-origin on loopback and must keep working.
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resp = _loopback_client().post(
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path,
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headers={"Origin": "http://127.0.0.1"},
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json={},
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)
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assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("path", CSRF_GUARDED)
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def test_originless_post_allowed(path: str) -> None:
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# CLI tools and the TypeScript SDK send no Origin header at all; the guard
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# must pass them through or it breaks every non-browser client.
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resp = _loopback_client().post(path, json={})
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assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
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def _feedback_with_query_text():
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"""A feedback singleton whose patterns carry raw agent query text."""
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class FakePattern:
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total_compressions = 8
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total_retrievals = 2
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retrieval_rate = 0.25
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full_retrieval_rate = 0.1
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search_rate = 0.5
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common_queries = {"find the customer api key rotation runbook": 3}
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queried_fields = {"internal_field_name": 2}
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class FakeFeedback:
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def get_stats(self):
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return {
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"total_compressions": 8,
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"total_retrievals": 2,
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"global_retrieval_rate": 0.25,
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"tools_tracked": 1,
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"tool_patterns": {
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"Grep": {
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"compressions": 8,
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"retrievals": 2,
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"retrieval_rate": 0.25,
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"full_rate": 0.1,
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"search_rate": 0.5,
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"common_queries": ["find the customer api key rotation runbook"],
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"queried_fields": ["internal_field_name"],
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}
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},
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}
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def get_compression_hints(self, tool_name):
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# The real implementation is annotated ``-> CompressionHints`` and
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# always returns one, so the double must too.
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return CompressionHints()
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def get_all_patterns(self):
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return {"Grep": FakePattern()}
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return FakeFeedback()
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def test_feedback_stats_exclude_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
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_feedback_with_query_text,
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)
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response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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pattern = response.json()["feedback"]["tool_patterns"]["Grep"]
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assert "common_queries" not in pattern
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assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
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# The aggregate counters the endpoint exists to expose still survive.
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assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
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assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
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def test_feedback_tool_detail_excludes_agent_query_text(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"headroom.proxy.server.get_compression_feedback",
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_feedback_with_query_text,
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)
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response = _loopback_client().get("/v1/feedback/Grep")
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assert response.status_code == 200
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pattern = response.json()["pattern"]
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assert "common_queries" not in pattern
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assert "queried_fields" not in pattern
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assert pattern["retrieval_rate"] == 0.25
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assert "customer api key rotation" not in response.text
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assert "internal_field_name" not in response.text
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# CCR data endpoints — cached session content, gated to 404 off-loopback (#1227).
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def test_stats_lifetime_route_uses_dashboard_metadata_access_policy(
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monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
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) -> None:
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monkeypatch.setenv(
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"HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS",
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"100.90.0.5/32",
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)
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app = _make_app()
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expected = {
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"requests": {"total": 7},
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"projects": {"headroom": {"requests": 3}},
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"persistence": {
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"enabled": True,
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"healthy": False,
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"error": "D:/private/proxy_savings.json: access denied",
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},
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}
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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app.state.proxy.metrics.savings_tracker,
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"lifetime_response",
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lambda: expected,
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)
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network = TestClient(app).get("/stats-lifetime")
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assert network.status_code == 200, network.text
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assert network.json() == {
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"requests": {"total": 7},
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"persistence": {
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"enabled": True,
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"healthy": False,
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"error": None,
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},
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}
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loopback = TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://127.0.0.1",
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client=("127.0.0.1", 12345),
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).get("/stats-lifetime")
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assert loopback.status_code == 200, loopback.text
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assert loopback.json() == expected
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trusted_dashboard = TestClient(
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app,
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base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
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client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
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).get("/stats-lifetime")
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assert trusted_dashboard.status_code == 200, trusted_dashboard.text
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assert trusted_dashboard.json() == expected
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CCR_GATED = [
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("post", "/v1/retrieve"),
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("get", "/v1/retrieve/stats"),
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("get", "/v1/retrieve/somehash"),
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("post", "/v1/retrieve/tool_call"),
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("post", "/v1/compress"),
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", CCR_GATED)
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def test_ccr_non_loopback_gets_404(method: str, path: str) -> None:
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resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path, json={})
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assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
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def test_ccr_retrieve_hash_route_blocks_valid_hash_for_non_loopback() -> None:
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ccr_hash = _seed_ccr_entry()
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try:
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loopback = _loopback_client()
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loopback_resp = loopback.get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
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assert loopback_resp.status_code == 200, loopback_resp.text
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assert loopback_resp.json()["original_content"] == "seeded-ccr-content"
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network_resp = TestClient(_make_app()).get(f"/v1/retrieve/{ccr_hash}")
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assert network_resp.status_code == 404, network_resp.text
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finally:
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reset_compression_store()
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SETTINGS_GATED = [
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("get", "/settings/schema"),
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("get", "/settings"),
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("get", "/dashboard/settings"),
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]
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
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def test_settings_non_loopback_gets_404_without_trusted_cidr(method: str, path: str) -> None:
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resp = TestClient(_make_app()).request(method, path)
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assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
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def test_settings_loopback_caller_allowed(method: str, path: str) -> None:
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resp = _loopback_client().request(method, path)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("method,path", SETTINGS_GATED)
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def test_settings_trusted_gateway_dashboard_client_allowed(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, method: str, path: str
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Settings routes must follow the same trust chain as /stats so the
|
|
dashboard works behind a reverse-proxy/gateway (#2466)."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
resp = client.request(method, path)
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_trusted_gateway_cidr_mismatch_still_404s(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.9", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
assert client.get("/settings").status_code == 404
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"path,body",
|
|
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_same_origin_allowed(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Regression for #2491 review: a trusted-gateway dashboard client's real
|
|
same-origin browser POST (Origin matching this Host) must not be rejected
|
|
by the loopback-only same-origin guard."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"})
|
|
assert resp.status_code != 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"path,body",
|
|
[("/settings", {"values": {}}), ("/settings/apply", None)],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_settings_post_trusted_gateway_client_mismatched_origin_rejected(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, path: str, body: dict | None
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""A trusted-gateway peer with a foreign Origin is still CSRF-rejected.
|
|
|
|
The mismatched Origin also fails the first (loopback-or-trusted-client)
|
|
gate's own same-origin check, so this surfaces as 404, not 403 -- either
|
|
way the write must not go through."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
resp = client.post(path, json=body, headers={"origin": "http://attacker.example"})
|
|
assert resp.status_code in (403, 404), resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_settings_post_loopback_null_origin_still_rejected() -> None:
|
|
"""Loopback callers keep the stricter loopback-only origin check: a
|
|
sandboxed-iframe/file:// "null" Origin must still 403, unaffected by the
|
|
trusted-dashboard-client carve-out."""
|
|
client = _loopback_client()
|
|
resp = client.post("/settings", json={"values": {}}, headers={"origin": "null"})
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 403, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dns_rebinding_host_header_rejected() -> None:
|
|
# Loopback peer IP but an attacker-controlled Host header (the DNS-rebinding
|
|
# shape) must still be rejected by the second gate.
|
|
client = TestClient(_make_app(), base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
|
|
resp = client.get("/transformations/feed", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
|
|
assert resp.status_code == 404, resp.text
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"host_header",
|
|
["100.82.0.2", "100.82.0.2:8787", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]", "[fd7a:115c:a1e0::2]:8787"],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_ip_literal_host_header_accepts_ip_addresses(host_header: str) -> None:
|
|
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is True
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"host_header",
|
|
[None, "", "attacker.example", "localhost", "user@100.82.0.2", "100.82.0.2/path", "[fd7a::1"],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_ip_literal_host_header_rejects_non_addresses(host_header: str | None) -> None:
|
|
assert is_ip_literal_host_header(host_header) is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _client(*, loopback: bool) -> TestClient:
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
if loopback:
|
|
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=("127.0.0.1", 12345))
|
|
# Default TestClient presents client.host="testclient" — not loopback.
|
|
return TestClient(app)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_health_config_block_is_loopback_only(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
|
|
"""/health stays reachable for monitors but hides the `config` block (which
|
|
echoes upstream API URLs + backend settings) from non-loopback callers."""
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_SKIP_UPSTREAM_CHECK", "1")
|
|
|
|
network = _client(loopback=False).get("/health")
|
|
assert network.status_code == 200
|
|
assert "config" not in network.json()
|
|
# Basic health is still visible to monitors.
|
|
assert network.json()["status"] in {"healthy", "unhealthy"}
|
|
|
|
local = _client(loopback=True).get("/health")
|
|
assert local.status_code == 200
|
|
assert "config" in local.json()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_stats_per_request_metadata_is_loopback_only() -> None:
|
|
"""/stats keeps aggregate counters public but restricts per-request metadata
|
|
(recent_requests / request_logs) and `config` to loopback callers."""
|
|
network = _client(loopback=False).get("/stats")
|
|
assert network.status_code == 200
|
|
payload = network.json()
|
|
assert "tokens" in payload # aggregate counters still served
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in payload
|
|
assert "config" not in payload
|
|
|
|
local = _client(loopback=True).get("/stats").json()
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in local
|
|
assert "config" in local
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_stats_metadata_served_to_trusted_gateway_peer(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
"""Containerized dashboards: a browser on the host reaches a bridge-network
|
|
container via the gateway IP, so the peer isn't 127.0.0.1 and per-request
|
|
metadata gets stripped. When the operator allow-lists the gateway CIDR via
|
|
HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS, the peer is treated as
|
|
loopback-equivalent and the metadata is served again."""
|
|
gateway_ip = "172.18.0.1" # typical docker/mocker bridge gateway
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
def _gateway_client() -> TestClient:
|
|
# Loopback Host header (the operator browses http://127.0.0.1:8787) but
|
|
# the peer IP is the container gateway, not loopback.
|
|
return TestClient(app, base_url="http://127.0.0.1", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
|
|
|
|
# Without the allow-list, the gateway peer is untrusted → metadata stripped.
|
|
monkeypatch.delenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", raising=False)
|
|
stripped = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in stripped
|
|
assert "config" not in stripped
|
|
|
|
# Allow-list the gateway CIDR → peer trusted → metadata served.
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
|
|
served = _gateway_client().get("/stats").json()
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in served
|
|
assert "config" in served
|
|
|
|
# DNS-rebinding defence still applies even for a trusted gateway peer: a
|
|
# non-loopback Host header must be rejected.
|
|
rebind = TestClient(app, base_url="http://attacker.example", client=(gateway_ip, 54321))
|
|
payload = rebind.get("/stats").json()
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_for_ip_literal_host(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
cached: bool,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}).json()
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"headers",
|
|
[
|
|
{"origin": "http://100.82.0.2:8787"},
|
|
{"referer": "http://100.82.0.2:8787/dashboard"},
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_grants_stats_metadata_to_same_origin_browser(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
payload = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers).json()
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"headers",
|
|
[
|
|
{"origin": "http://attacker.example"},
|
|
{"referer": "http://attacker.example/dashboard"},
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cached", [False, True])
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_hides_stats_metadata_from_cross_origin_browser(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, headers: dict[str, str], cached: bool
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
response = client.get("/stats", params={"cached": int(cached)}, headers=headers)
|
|
payload = response.json()
|
|
|
|
assert response.status_code == 200
|
|
assert "tokens" in payload
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in payload
|
|
assert "config" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_uses_forwarded_proto_from_trusted_gateway(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
payload = client.get(
|
|
"/stats",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5",
|
|
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
|
|
},
|
|
).json()
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" in payload
|
|
assert "config" in payload
|
|
|
|
spoofed = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get(
|
|
"/stats",
|
|
headers={
|
|
"origin": "https://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in spoofed
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in spoofed
|
|
assert "config" not in spoofed
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_rejects_unlisted_clients_and_hostname_hosts(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
unlisted = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.6", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get("/stats")
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
hostname = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"host": "attacker.example"})
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
for payload in (unlisted, hostname):
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in payload
|
|
assert "request_logs" not in payload
|
|
assert "config" not in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_only_accepts_forwarded_client_from_trusted_gateway(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_GATEWAY_CIDRS", "172.18.0.0/16")
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
|
|
trusted = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("172.18.0.1", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
forged = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("198.51.100.10", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get("/stats", headers={"x-forwarded-for": "100.90.0.5"})
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in trusted
|
|
assert "recent_requests" not in forged
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_normalizes_ipv4_mapped_ipv6(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.0/24")
|
|
app = _make_app()
|
|
payload = (
|
|
TestClient(
|
|
app,
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("::ffff:100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
.get("/stats")
|
|
.json()
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert "recent_requests" in payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_dashboard_client_cidr_does_not_expand_other_management_endpoints(
|
|
monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
|
|
) -> None:
|
|
monkeypatch.setenv("HEADROOM_PROXY_TRUSTED_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_CIDRS", "100.90.0.5/32")
|
|
client = TestClient(
|
|
_make_app(),
|
|
base_url="http://100.82.0.2:8787",
|
|
client=("100.90.0.5", 12345),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
health = client.get("/health")
|
|
assert health.status_code == 200
|
|
assert "config" not in health.json()
|
|
assert client.get("/admin/upstream").status_code == 404
|
|
assert client.get("/debug/tasks").status_code == 404
|
|
assert client.post("/stats/reset").status_code == 404
|