Merge pull request #777 from libtom/pr/siv-zero-ad

SIV properly handle zero AD components
This commit is contained in:
Steffen Jaeckel 2026-07-30 15:42:03 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 79f2b5762d
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
2 changed files with 97 additions and 19 deletions

View file

@ -2556,6 +2556,7 @@ To encrypt and create a tag resp. decrypt and check the tag, the following API f
\begin{verbatim}
int siv_encrypt_memory( int cipher,
const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
unsigned long adnum,
const unsigned char *ad[], unsigned long adlen[],
const unsigned char *pt, unsigned long ptlen,
unsigned char *ct, unsigned long *ctlen);
@ -2571,13 +2572,13 @@ The key to the encrypt operation is passed in \textit{key} of length \textit{ke
The AAD is passed as array of pointers in \textit{ad}. The length of each AAD is passed as array of
\textit{unsigned long} in \textit{adlen}.
As soon as an array element of \textit{ad} is hit which equals \texttt{NULL} or an array element of \textit{adlen}
is hit which equals \texttt{0}, processing of the AAD is stopped.
The number of AAD elements is passed in \textit{adnum}, when it equals \texttt{0} both \textit{ad} and \textit{adlen} may be \texttt{NULL}.
\index{siv\_decrypt\_memory()}
\begin{verbatim}
int siv_decrypt_memory( int cipher,
const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
unsigned long adnum,
const unsigned char *ad[], unsigned long adlen[],
const unsigned char *ct, unsigned long ctlen,
unsigned char *pt, unsigned long *ptlen);
@ -2609,9 +2610,10 @@ int main(void)
* but a string is on most platforms defined as a "signed" `char*`. */
if ((err = siv_encrypt_memory(find_cipher("aes"),
((unsigned char[32]) {0x0}), 32,
3,
((const unsigned char*[]) {(void*)"aad0", (void*)"aad1",
(void*)"NONCE", NULL}),
((unsigned long[]) {4, 4, 5, 0}),
(void*)"NONCE"}),
((unsigned long[]) {4, 4, 5}),
plain, plainlen,
ct, &ctlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
whine_and_pout(err);
@ -2619,9 +2621,10 @@ int main(void)
if ((err = siv_decrypt_memory(find_cipher("aes"),
((unsigned char[32]) {0x0}), 32,
3,
((const unsigned char*[]) {(void*)"aad0", (void*)"aad1",
(void*)"NONCE", NULL}),
((unsigned long[]) {4, 4, 5, 0}),
(void*)"NONCE"}),
((unsigned long[]) {4, 4, 5}),
ct, ctlen,
plain, &plainlen)) != CRYPT_OK) {
whine_and_pout(err);
@ -2641,6 +2644,7 @@ int siv_memory( int cipher, int direction,
const unsigned char *key, unsigned long keylen,
const unsigned char *in, unsigned long inlen,
unsigned char *out, unsigned long *outlen,
unsigned long adnum,
...);
\end{verbatim}
@ -2648,6 +2652,7 @@ This will execute a SIV operation of the \textit{direction} (\texttt{LTC\_ENCRYP
using the \textit{cipher} with the \textit{key} of len \textit{keylen}.
The AAD is optionally passed as varargs of the form \textit{(const unsigned char*, unsigned long)}, which musst be
NULL terminated.
Exactly \textit{adnum} such pairs are read; the terminating \texttt{NULL} does not delimit the list; see \ref{SIV_zero_vs_empty_ad}.
The input is passed via the \textit{in} argument of length \textit{inlen}.
The output is stored in the buffer pointer to by the \textit{out} argument where the length is passed as \textit{outlen}.
\textit{outlen} shall contain the initial size of the buffer behind \textit{out} when calling the function and on
@ -2677,7 +2682,7 @@ int main(void)
((unsigned char[32]) {0x0}), 32,
plain, plainlen,
ct, &ctlen,
"aad0", 4uL, "aad1", 4uL, "NONCE", 5uL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
3, "aad0", 4uL, "aad1", 4uL, "NONCE", 5uL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
whine_and_pout(err);
}
@ -2685,7 +2690,7 @@ int main(void)
((unsigned char[32]) {0x0}), 32,
ct, ctlen,
plain, &plainlen,
"aad0", 4uL, "aad1", 4uL, "NONCE", 5uL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
3, "aad0", 4uL, "aad1", 4uL, "NONCE", 5uL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
whine_and_pout(err);
}
@ -2694,6 +2699,29 @@ int main(void)
\end{verbatim}
\end{small}
\subsection{No Associated Data vs. Empty Associated Data}
\label{SIV_zero_vs_empty_ad}
RFC 5297 computes the synthetic IV as $S2V(K_1, AD_1, \ldots, AD_m, P)$ i.e. S2V is fed a \textit{list} of strings
and the result depends on the number of components not only on their contents.
Passing \textbf{no} associated data ($m = 0$) is therefore \textbf{not} the same as passing \textbf{one empty}
associated data string ($m = 1$). For the same key and plaintext the two produce a different ciphertext and one
will not decrypt as the other. This is also why \textit{adnum} has to be passed explicitly: neither a \texttt{NULL}
pointer nor a length of \texttt{0} can terminate the list as both are valid contents of a component.
\begin{small}
\begin{verbatim}
/* no associated data, m = 0 */
siv_encrypt_memory(cipher, key, keylen, 0, NULL, NULL, pt, ptlen, ct, &ctlen);
siv_memory(cipher, LTC_ENCRYPT, key, keylen, pt, ptlen, ct, &ctlen, 0, NULL);
/* one empty associated data string, m = 1 */
siv_encrypt_memory(cipher, key, keylen, 1, ((const unsigned char*[]) {NULL}), ((unsigned long[]) {0}), pt, ptlen, ct, &ctlen);
siv_memory(cipher, LTC_ENCRYPT, key, keylen, pt, ptlen, ct, &ctlen, 1, NULL, 0, NULL);
\end{verbatim}
\end{small}
\mysection{GCM-SIV}
\label{GCM-SIV}

View file

@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int s_siv_S2V(int cipher,
return err;
}
do {
/* With zero AD components the loop runs zero times. */
while (n < adnum) {
if (n >= s_siv_max_aad_components) {
return CRYPT_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
}
@ -199,7 +200,7 @@ static int s_siv_S2V(int cipher,
return err;
}
n++;
} while(n < adnum);
}
return s_siv_S2V_T(&ctx, in, inlen, &D, V);
}
@ -470,23 +471,19 @@ int siv_memory( int cipher, int direction,
goto err_out;
}
va_start(args, adnum);
do {
if (adnum) {
aad = va_arg(args, const unsigned char*);
aadlen = va_arg(args, unsigned long);
} else {
aad = NULL;
aadlen = 0;
}
/* With zero AD components the loop runs zero times. */
while (n < adnum) {
if (n >= s_siv_max_aad_components) {
err = CRYPT_INPUT_TOO_LONG;
goto err_out2;
}
aad = va_arg(args, const unsigned char*);
aadlen = va_arg(args, unsigned long);
if ((err = s_siv_S2V_dbl_xor_cmac(&ctx, aad, aadlen, &D)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto err_out2;
}
n++;
} while (n < adnum);
}
if ((err = s_siv_S2V_T(&ctx, in_work, in_work_len, &D, &siv.V)) != CRYPT_OK) {
goto err_out2;
@ -614,6 +611,19 @@ int siv_test(void)
0x3d, 0x58, 0x8e, 0x85, 0x64, 0xa5, 0xfe };
/* Zero AD components vs. a single *empty* AD component (vectors were cross-checked against OpenSSL 3.5.6) */
const unsigned char output_A1_zeroad[] =
{ 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xfd, 0xea, 0xc1, 0xf1, 0x5a, 0x26,
0x77, 0x9c, 0x15, 0x01, 0xf9, 0xfb, 0x75, 0x88,
0x27, 0xe9, 0x46, 0xc6, 0x69, 0x08, 0x8a, 0xb0,
0x6d, 0xa5, 0x8c, 0x5c, 0x83, 0x1c };
const unsigned char output_A1_emptyad[] =
{ 0xd1, 0x02, 0x2f, 0x5b, 0x36, 0x64, 0xe5, 0xa4,
0xdf, 0xaf, 0x90, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0xe6, 0xf2, 0x8a,
0xb6, 0x6c, 0xff, 0x6b, 0x8e, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x79,
0xf0, 0x83, 0xb3, 0x9a, 0x09, 0x01 };
const unsigned char *ad_emptyad[] = { NULL, NULL };
unsigned long adlen_emptyad[] = { 0, 0 };
#define PL_PAIR(n) n, sizeof(n)
struct {
@ -632,6 +642,8 @@ int siv_test(void)
{ PL_PAIR(Key_A2), PL_PAIR(Plaintext_A2), 3, &ad_A2, &adlen_A2, PL_PAIR(output_A2), "RFC5297 - A.2. Nonce-Based Authenticated Encryption Example" },
{ PL_PAIR(Key_A2), PL_PAIR(Plaintext_A2), 3, &ad_ossl0, &adlen_ossl0, PL_PAIR(output_ossl0), "OpenSSL based example 0" },
{ PL_PAIR(Key_A2), PL_PAIR(Plaintext_A2), 3, &ad_ossl1, &adlen_ossl1, PL_PAIR(output_ossl1), "OpenSSL based example 1" },
{ PL_PAIR(Key_A1), PL_PAIR(Plaintext_A1), 0, NULL, NULL, PL_PAIR(output_A1_zeroad), "Zero AD components (ad = adlen = NULL)" },
{ PL_PAIR(Key_A1), PL_PAIR(Plaintext_A1), 1, &ad_emptyad, &adlen_emptyad, PL_PAIR(output_A1_emptyad), "One empty AD component" },
};
#undef PL_PAIR
@ -736,6 +748,44 @@ int siv_test(void)
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
n++;
/* Testcase 0x4 - siv_memory() - zero AD components - encrypt */
buflen = sizeof(buf);
if ((err = siv_memory(cipher, LTC_ENCRYPT, Key_A1, sizeof(Key_A1), Plaintext_A1, sizeof(Plaintext_A1), buf, &buflen, 0, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
if (ltc_compare_testvector(buf, buflen, output_A1_zeroad, sizeof(output_A1_zeroad), "siv_memory() - zero AD components", n) != 0) {
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
/* Testcase 0x1004 - siv_memory() - zero AD components - decrypt */
buflen = sizeof(buf);
if ((err = siv_memory(cipher, LTC_DECRYPT, Key_A1, sizeof(Key_A1), output_A1_zeroad, sizeof(output_A1_zeroad), buf, &buflen, 0, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
if (ltc_compare_testvector(buf, buflen, Plaintext_A1, sizeof(Plaintext_A1), "siv_memory() - zero AD components", n + 0x1000) != 0) {
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
n++;
/* Testcase 0x5 - siv_memory() - one empty AD component - encrypt */
buflen = sizeof(buf);
if ((err = siv_memory(cipher, LTC_ENCRYPT, Key_A1, sizeof(Key_A1), Plaintext_A1, sizeof(Plaintext_A1), buf, &buflen, 1, NULL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
if (ltc_compare_testvector(buf, buflen, output_A1_emptyad, sizeof(output_A1_emptyad), "siv_memory() - one empty AD component", n) != 0) {
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
/* Testcase 0x1005 - siv_memory() - one empty AD component - decrypt */
buflen = sizeof(buf);
if ((err = siv_memory(cipher, LTC_DECRYPT, Key_A1, sizeof(Key_A1), output_A1_emptyad, sizeof(output_A1_emptyad), buf, &buflen, 1, NULL, 0UL, NULL)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
if (ltc_compare_testvector(buf, buflen, Plaintext_A1, sizeof(Plaintext_A1), "siv_memory() - one empty AD component", n + 0x1000) != 0) {
return CRYPT_FAIL_TESTVECTOR;
}
for (n = 0; n < LTC_ARRAY_SIZE(tmp); ++n) {
tmp[n] = XCALLOC(1, tmpmax);
if (tmp[n] == NULL) {