edk2/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf

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## @file
# Open Virtual Machine Firmware: FDF
#
# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
OvmfPkg: use StatusCode Router and Handler from MdeModulePkg In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 1 "4.7 Status Code Service" defines the EFI_PEI_SERVICES.ReportStatusCode() service, - Volume 1 "6.3.5 Status Code PPI (Optional)" defines the EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI (equivalent to the above), - Volume 2 "14.2 Status Code Runtime Protocol" defines the EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL. These allow PEIMs and DXE (and later) modules to report status codes. Currently OvmfPkg uses modules from under "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/StatusCode/", which produce the above abstractions (PPI and PROTOCOL) directly, and write the status codes, as they are reported, to the serial port or to a memory buffer. This is called "handling" the status codes. In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 3 "7.2.2 Report Status Code Handler PPI" defines EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, - Volume 3 "7.2.1 Report Status Code Handler Protocol" defines EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. These allow several PEIMs and runtime DXE drivers to register callbacks for status code handling. MdeModulePkg offers a PEIM under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/Pei" that produces both EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI and EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, and a runtime DXE driver under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/RuntimeDxe" that produces both EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. MdeModulePkg also offers status code handler modules under MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/ that depend on EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL, respectively. The StatusCodeHandler modules register themselves with ReportStatusCodeRouter through EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI / EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. When another module reports a status code through EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI / EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL, it reaches the phase-matching ReportStatusCodeRouter module first, which in turn passes the status code to the pre-registered, phase-matching StatusCodeHandler module. The status code handling in the StatusCodeHandler modules is identical to the one currently provided by the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules. Replace the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules with the MdeModulePkg ones, so we can decrease our dependency on IntelFrameworkModulePkg. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Cinnamon Shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com> Suggested-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Fixes: https://tianocore.acgmultimedia.com/show_bug.cgi?id=63 [jordan.l.justen@intel.com: point out IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrap to 74 cols; fix IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2016-08-03 01:25:10 +08:00
# (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#
##
################################################################################
[Defines]
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfPkgDefines.fdf.inc
#
# Build the variable store and the firmware code as one unified flash device
# image.
#
[FD.OVMF]
BaseAddress = $(FW_BASE_ADDRESS)
Size = $(FW_SIZE)
ErasePolarity = 1
BlockSize = $(BLOCK_SIZE)
NumBlocks = $(FW_BLOCKS)
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/VarStore.fdf.inc
$(VARS_SIZE)|$(FVMAIN_SIZE)
FV = FVMAIN_COMPACT
$(SECFV_OFFSET)|$(SECFV_SIZE)
FV = SECFV
#
# Build the variable store and the firmware code as separate flash device
# images.
#
[FD.OVMF_VARS]
BaseAddress = $(FW_BASE_ADDRESS)
Size = $(VARS_SIZE)
ErasePolarity = 1
BlockSize = $(BLOCK_SIZE)
NumBlocks = $(VARS_BLOCKS)
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/VarStore.fdf.inc
[FD.OVMF_CODE]
BaseAddress = $(CODE_BASE_ADDRESS)
Size = $(CODE_SIZE)
ErasePolarity = 1
BlockSize = $(BLOCK_SIZE)
NumBlocks = $(CODE_BLOCKS)
0x00000000|$(FVMAIN_SIZE)
FV = FVMAIN_COMPACT
$(FVMAIN_SIZE)|$(SECFV_SIZE)
FV = SECFV
################################################################################
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MemFd.fdf.inc
################################################################################
[FV.SECFV]
OvmfPkg: add a Name GUID to each Firmware Volume The FDF spec mentions the FvNameGuid statement for [FV.xxxx] sections, but the detailed description can be found in Volume 3 of the Platform Init spec (which is at 1.4a currently). Adding an FvNameGuid statement to [FV.xxx] has the following effects (implemented by "BaseTools/Source/C/GenFv/GenFvInternalLib.c"): - The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset field is set to a nonzero value, pointing after EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER itself (although not directly, see below). - An EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER object is created at the pointed-to address. This object is not followed by any EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_ENTRY (= extension) entries, so it only specifies the Name GUID for the firmware volume. The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER for each firmware volume can be found in the Build directory as a separate file (20 bytes in size): Build/Ovmf*/*_GCC*/FV/*.ext - The new data consume 48 bytes in the following volumes: SECFV, FVMAIN_COMPACT, DXEFV. They comprise: - 16 padding bytes, - EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 (8 bytes in total: no Name and ExtendedSize fields, and Type=EFI_FV_FILETYPE_FFS_PAD), - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER (20 bytes, see above), - 4 padding bytes. (The initial 16 padding bytes and the EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 structure are the reason why EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset does not point immediately past EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.) The sizes of the firmware volumes don't change, only their internal usages grow by 48 bytes. I verified that the statements and calculations in "OvmfPkg/DecomprScratchEnd.fdf.inc" are unaffected and remain valid. - The new data consume 0 bytes in PEIFV. This is because PEIFV has enough internal padding at the moment to accomodate the above structures without a growth in usage. In the future, firmware volumes can be identified by Name GUID (Fv(...) device path nodes), rather than memory location (MemoryMapped(...) device path nodes). This is supposed to improve stability for persistent device paths that refer to FFS files; for example, UEFI boot options. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Suggested-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-07-12 16:48:47 +02:00
FvNameGuid = 763BED0D-DE9F-48F5-81F1-3E90E1B1A015
BlockSize = 0x1000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
#
# SEC Phase modules
#
# The code in this FV handles the initial firmware startup, and
OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVs By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-01-21 19:39:13 +00:00
# decompresses the PEI and DXE FVs which handles the rest of the boot sequence.
#
INF OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
INF RuleOverride=RESET_VECTOR OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
################################################################################
OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVs By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-01-21 19:39:13 +00:00
[FV.PEIFV]
OvmfPkg: add a Name GUID to each Firmware Volume The FDF spec mentions the FvNameGuid statement for [FV.xxxx] sections, but the detailed description can be found in Volume 3 of the Platform Init spec (which is at 1.4a currently). Adding an FvNameGuid statement to [FV.xxx] has the following effects (implemented by "BaseTools/Source/C/GenFv/GenFvInternalLib.c"): - The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset field is set to a nonzero value, pointing after EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER itself (although not directly, see below). - An EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER object is created at the pointed-to address. This object is not followed by any EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_ENTRY (= extension) entries, so it only specifies the Name GUID for the firmware volume. The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER for each firmware volume can be found in the Build directory as a separate file (20 bytes in size): Build/Ovmf*/*_GCC*/FV/*.ext - The new data consume 48 bytes in the following volumes: SECFV, FVMAIN_COMPACT, DXEFV. They comprise: - 16 padding bytes, - EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 (8 bytes in total: no Name and ExtendedSize fields, and Type=EFI_FV_FILETYPE_FFS_PAD), - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER (20 bytes, see above), - 4 padding bytes. (The initial 16 padding bytes and the EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 structure are the reason why EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset does not point immediately past EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.) The sizes of the firmware volumes don't change, only their internal usages grow by 48 bytes. I verified that the statements and calculations in "OvmfPkg/DecomprScratchEnd.fdf.inc" are unaffected and remain valid. - The new data consume 0 bytes in PEIFV. This is because PEIFV has enough internal padding at the moment to accomodate the above structures without a growth in usage. In the future, firmware volumes can be identified by Name GUID (Fv(...) device path nodes), rather than memory location (MemoryMapped(...) device path nodes). This is supposed to improve stability for persistent device paths that refer to FFS files; for example, UEFI boot options. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Suggested-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-07-12 16:48:47 +02:00
FvNameGuid = 6938079B-B503-4E3D-9D24-B28337A25806
BlockSize = 0x10000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
APRIORI PEI {
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Pei/Pcd.inf
}
#
# PEI Phase modules
#
!if $(DEBUG_TO_MEM)
INF OvmfPkg/MemDebugLogPei/MemDebugLogPei.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Pei/Pcd.inf
OvmfPkg: use StatusCode Router and Handler from MdeModulePkg In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 1 "4.7 Status Code Service" defines the EFI_PEI_SERVICES.ReportStatusCode() service, - Volume 1 "6.3.5 Status Code PPI (Optional)" defines the EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI (equivalent to the above), - Volume 2 "14.2 Status Code Runtime Protocol" defines the EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL. These allow PEIMs and DXE (and later) modules to report status codes. Currently OvmfPkg uses modules from under "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/StatusCode/", which produce the above abstractions (PPI and PROTOCOL) directly, and write the status codes, as they are reported, to the serial port or to a memory buffer. This is called "handling" the status codes. In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 3 "7.2.2 Report Status Code Handler PPI" defines EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, - Volume 3 "7.2.1 Report Status Code Handler Protocol" defines EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. These allow several PEIMs and runtime DXE drivers to register callbacks for status code handling. MdeModulePkg offers a PEIM under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/Pei" that produces both EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI and EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, and a runtime DXE driver under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/RuntimeDxe" that produces both EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. MdeModulePkg also offers status code handler modules under MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/ that depend on EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL, respectively. The StatusCodeHandler modules register themselves with ReportStatusCodeRouter through EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI / EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. When another module reports a status code through EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI / EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL, it reaches the phase-matching ReportStatusCodeRouter module first, which in turn passes the status code to the pre-registered, phase-matching StatusCodeHandler module. The status code handling in the StatusCodeHandler modules is identical to the one currently provided by the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules. Replace the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules with the MdeModulePkg ones, so we can decrease our dependency on IntelFrameworkModulePkg. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Cinnamon Shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com> Suggested-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Fixes: https://tianocore.acgmultimedia.com/show_bug.cgi?id=63 [jordan.l.justen@intel.com: point out IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrap to 74 cols; fix IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2016-08-03 01:25:10 +08:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/Pei/ReportStatusCodeRouterPei.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/Pei/StatusCodeHandlerPei.inf
!if $(CC_MEASUREMENT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Pei/TdTcg2Pei.inf
!endif
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei/S3Resume2Pei.inf
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 18:41:38 +00:00
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg: include FaultTolerantWritePei and VariablePei with -D SMM_REQUIRE FaultTolerantWritePei consumes: - PcdFlashNvStorageFtwWorkingBase, - PcdFlashNvStorageFtwSpareBase. VariablePei consumes: - PcdFlashNvStorageVariableBase64. Due to the previous patches in this series, the above PCDs are available in the PEI phase, in the SMM_REQUIRE build. FaultTolerantWritePei produces a GUID-ed HOB with FAULT_TOLERANT_WRITE_LAST_WRITE_DATA as contents. It also installs a Null PPI that carries the same gEdkiiFaultTolerantWriteGuid as the HOB. VariablePei depends on the Null PPI mentioned above with a DEPEX, consumes the HOB (which is safe due to the DEPEX), and produces EFI_PEI_READ_ONLY_VARIABLE2_PPI. This enables read-only access to non-volatile UEFI variables in the PEI phase, in the SMM_REQUIRE build. For now, the DxeLoadCore() function in "MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeLoad.c" will not access the "MemoryTypeInformation" variable, because OVMF's PlatformPei always produces the MemoryTypeInformation HOB. (Note: when the boot mode is BOOT_ON_S3_RESUME, PlatformPei doesn't build the HOB, but that's in sync with DxeLoadCore() also not looking for either the HOB or the UEFI variable.) Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=386 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200310222739.26717-5-lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
2020-03-10 23:27:38 +01:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWritePei/FaultTolerantWritePei.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/Pei/VariablePei.inf
OvmfPkg: add PEIM for providing TSEG-as-SMRAM during PEI "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" is the LockBoxLib instance with SMRAM access for the PEI phase. Said library instance must, and can, access the LockBox data in SMRAM directly if it is invoked before SMBASE relocation / SMI handler installation. In that case, it only needs PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI from the platform, and it doesn't depend on EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI. OVMF satisfies the description in SVN r18823 ("MdeModulePkg: SmmLockBoxPeiLib: work without EFI_PEI_SMM_COMMUNICATION_PPI"): in OVMF, only S3Resume2Pei links against SmmLockBoxPeiLib. Therefore, introduce a PEIM that produces the PEI_SMM_ACCESS_PPI interface, enabling SmmLockBoxPeiLib to work; we can omit including "UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCommunication/PiSmmCommunicationPei.inf". The load / installation order of S3Resume2Pei and SmmAccessPei is indifferent. SmmAccessPei produces the gEfiAcpiVariableGuid HOB during its installation (which happens during PEI), but S3Resume2Pei accesses the HOB only when the DXE IPL calls its S3RestoreConfig2 PPI member, as last act of PEI. MCH_SMRAM_D_LCK and MCH_ESMRAMC_T_EN are masked out the way they are, in SmmAccessPeiEntryPoint() and SmramAccessOpen() respectively, in order to prevent VS20xx from warning about the (otherwise fully intentional) truncation in the UINT8 casts. (Warnings reported by Michael Kinney.) Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19040 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 18:41:38 +00:00
INF OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccessPei.inf
!endif
OvmfPkg: include UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei In the next patch we're going to put EFI_PEI_MP_SERVICES_PPI to use. CpuMpPei uses the following PCDs from gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid, beyond those already used by CpuDxe: - PcdCpuMicrocodePatchAddress and PcdCpuMicrocodePatchRegionSize: these control whether CpuMpPei performs microcode update. If the region size is zero, then the microcode update is skipped. UefiCpuPkg.dec sets the region size to zero by default, which is appropriate for OVMF. - PcdCpuApLoopMode and PcdCpuApTargetCstate: the former controls how CpuMpPei puts the APs to sleep: 1 -- HLT, 2 -- MWAIT, 3 -- busy wait (with PAUSE). The latter PCD is only relevant if the former PCD is 2 (MWAIT). In order to be consistent with SeaBIOS and with CpuDxe itself, we choose HLT. That's the default set by UefiCpuPkg.dec. Furthermore, although CpuMpPei could consume SecPeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib technically, it is supposed to consume PeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib. See: - http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.edk2.devel/12703 - git commit a81abf161666 ("UefiCpuPkg/ExceptionLib: Import PeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib module"), part of the series linked above. Jeff recommended to resolve CpuExceptionHandlerLib to PeiCpuExceptionHandlerLib for all PEIMs: - http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.edk2.devel/14471/focus=14477 Since at the moment we have no resolution in place that would cover this for PEIMs (from either [LibraryClasses] or [LibraryClasses.common.PEIM]), it's easy to do. Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-07-06 18:09:16 +02:00
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
INF FILE_GUID = $(UP_CPU_PEI_GUID) UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmPei.fdf.inc
################################################################################
[FV.DXEFV]
OvmfPkg: disable build-time relocation for DXEFV modules When the GenFv utility from BaseTools composes a firmware volume, it checks whether modules in the firmware volume are subject to build-time relocation. The primary indication for relocation is whether the firmware volume has a nonzero base address, according to the [FD] section(s) in the FDF file that refer to the firmware volume. The idea behind build-time relocation is that XIP (execute in place) modules will not be relocated at boot-time: - Pre-DXE phase modules generally execute in place. (OVMF is no exception, despite the fact that we have writeable memory even in SEC: PEI_CORE and PEIMs run in-place from PEIFV, after SEC decompresses PEIFV and DXEFV from FVMAIN_COMPACT (flash) to RAM. PEI_CORE and the PEIMs are relocated at boot-time only after PlatformPei installs the permanent PEI RAM, and the RAM migration occurs.) - Modules dispatched by the DXE Core are generally relocated at boot-time. However, this is not necessarily so. Quoting Liming from <https://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2017-July/012053.html>: > PI spec has no limitation that XIP is for PEIM only. DXE driver may be > built as XIP for other purpose. For example, if DXE driver image address > is not zero, DxeCore will try allocating the preferred address and load > it. In another case, once DXE driver is relocated at build time, DxeCore > will dispatch it and start it directly without loading, it may save boot > performance. Therefore GenFv relocates even DXE and UEFI driver modules if the containing firmware volume has a nonzero base address. In OVMF, this is the case for both PEIV and DXEFV: > [FD.MEMFD] > BaseAddress = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS) > Size = 0xB00000 > ErasePolarity = 1 > BlockSize = 0x10000 > NumBlocks = 0xB0 > ... > 0x020000|0x0E0000 > gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize > FV = PEIFV > > 0x100000|0xA00000 > gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize > FV = DXEFV While the build-time relocation certainly makes sense for PEIFV (see above), the reasons for which we specify DXEFV under [FD.MEMFD] are weaker: - we set the PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase and PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize PCDs here, - and we ascertain that DXEFV, when decompressed by SEC from FVMAIN_COMPACT, will fit into the area allotted here, at build time. In other words, the build-time relocation of the modules in DXEFV is a waste of resources. But, it gets worse: Build-time relocation of an executable is only possible if the on-disk and in-memory layouts are identical, i.e., if the sections of the PE/COFF image adhere to the same alignment on disk and in memory. Put differently, the FileAlignment and SectionAlignment headers must be equal. For boot-time modules that we build as part of edk2, both alignment values are 0x20 bytes. For runtime modules that we build as part of edk2, both alignment values are 0x1000 bytes. This is why the DXEFV relocation, albeit wasteful, is also successful every time. Unfortunately, if we try to include a PE/COFF binary in DXEFV that originates from outside of edk2, the DXEFV relocation can fail due to the binary having unmatched FileAlignment and SectionAlignment headers. This is precisely the case with the E3522X2.EFI network driver for the e1000 NIC, from Intel's BootUtil / PREBOOT.EXE distribution. The solution is to use the FvForceRebase=FALSE override under [FV.DXEFV]. This tells GenFv not to perform build-time relocation on the firmware volume, despite the FV having a nonzero base address. In DXEFV we also have SMM drivers. Those are relocated at boot-time (into SMRAM) unconditionally; SMRAM is always discovered at boot-time. Kudos to Ard and Liming for the PE/COFF sections & relocations explanation, and for the FvForceRebase=FALSE tip. I regression-tested this change in the following configurations (all with normal boot and S3 suspend/resume): IA32, q35, SMM, Linux IA32X64, q35, SMM, Linux IA32X64, q35, SMM, Windows-8.1 X64, i440fx, no-SMM, Linux Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=613 Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=615 Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2017-06-28 20:20:17 +02:00
FvForceRebase = FALSE
OvmfPkg: add a Name GUID to each Firmware Volume The FDF spec mentions the FvNameGuid statement for [FV.xxxx] sections, but the detailed description can be found in Volume 3 of the Platform Init spec (which is at 1.4a currently). Adding an FvNameGuid statement to [FV.xxx] has the following effects (implemented by "BaseTools/Source/C/GenFv/GenFvInternalLib.c"): - The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset field is set to a nonzero value, pointing after EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER itself (although not directly, see below). - An EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER object is created at the pointed-to address. This object is not followed by any EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_ENTRY (= extension) entries, so it only specifies the Name GUID for the firmware volume. The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER for each firmware volume can be found in the Build directory as a separate file (20 bytes in size): Build/Ovmf*/*_GCC*/FV/*.ext - The new data consume 48 bytes in the following volumes: SECFV, FVMAIN_COMPACT, DXEFV. They comprise: - 16 padding bytes, - EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 (8 bytes in total: no Name and ExtendedSize fields, and Type=EFI_FV_FILETYPE_FFS_PAD), - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER (20 bytes, see above), - 4 padding bytes. (The initial 16 padding bytes and the EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 structure are the reason why EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset does not point immediately past EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.) The sizes of the firmware volumes don't change, only their internal usages grow by 48 bytes. I verified that the statements and calculations in "OvmfPkg/DecomprScratchEnd.fdf.inc" are unaffected and remain valid. - The new data consume 0 bytes in PEIFV. This is because PEIFV has enough internal padding at the moment to accomodate the above structures without a growth in usage. In the future, firmware volumes can be identified by Name GUID (Fv(...) device path nodes), rather than memory location (MemoryMapped(...) device path nodes). This is supposed to improve stability for persistent device paths that refer to FFS files; for example, UEFI boot options. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Suggested-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-07-12 16:48:47 +02:00
FvNameGuid = 7CB8BDC9-F8EB-4F34-AAEA-3EE4AF6516A1
BlockSize = 0x10000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
APRIORI DXE {
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DevicePathDxe/DevicePathDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf
# AmdSevDxe must be loaded before TdxDxe. Because in SEV guest AmdSevDxe
# driver performs a MemEncryptSevClearMmioPageEncMask() call against the
# PcdPciExpressBaseAddress range to mark it shared/unencrypted.
# Otherwise #VC handler terminates the guest for trying to do MMIO to an
# encrypted region (Since the range has not been marked shared/unencrypted).
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/TdxDxe/TdxDxe.inf
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == FALSE && $(QEMU_PV_VARS) == FALSE
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesRuntimeDxe.inf
!endif
}
#
# DXE Phase modules
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf
OvmfPkg: use StatusCode Router and Handler from MdeModulePkg In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 1 "4.7 Status Code Service" defines the EFI_PEI_SERVICES.ReportStatusCode() service, - Volume 1 "6.3.5 Status Code PPI (Optional)" defines the EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI (equivalent to the above), - Volume 2 "14.2 Status Code Runtime Protocol" defines the EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL. These allow PEIMs and DXE (and later) modules to report status codes. Currently OvmfPkg uses modules from under "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Universal/StatusCode/", which produce the above abstractions (PPI and PROTOCOL) directly, and write the status codes, as they are reported, to the serial port or to a memory buffer. This is called "handling" the status codes. In the Platform Init v1.4a spec, - Volume 3 "7.2.2 Report Status Code Handler PPI" defines EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, - Volume 3 "7.2.1 Report Status Code Handler Protocol" defines EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. These allow several PEIMs and runtime DXE drivers to register callbacks for status code handling. MdeModulePkg offers a PEIM under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/Pei" that produces both EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI and EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI, and a runtime DXE driver under "MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/RuntimeDxe" that produces both EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. MdeModulePkg also offers status code handler modules under MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/ that depend on EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI and EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL, respectively. The StatusCodeHandler modules register themselves with ReportStatusCodeRouter through EFI_PEI_RSC_HANDLER_PPI / EFI_RSC_HANDLER_PROTOCOL. When another module reports a status code through EFI_PEI_PROGRESS_CODE_PPI / EFI_STATUS_CODE_PROTOCOL, it reaches the phase-matching ReportStatusCodeRouter module first, which in turn passes the status code to the pre-registered, phase-matching StatusCodeHandler module. The status code handling in the StatusCodeHandler modules is identical to the one currently provided by the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules. Replace the IntelFrameworkModulePkg modules with the MdeModulePkg ones, so we can decrease our dependency on IntelFrameworkModulePkg. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Cinnamon Shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com> Suggested-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com> Fixes: https://tianocore.acgmultimedia.com/show_bug.cgi?id=63 [jordan.l.justen@intel.com: point out IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrap to 74 cols; fix IntelFareworkModulePkg typos] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2016-08-03 01:25:10 +08:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/RuntimeDxe/ReportStatusCodeRouterRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/RuntimeDxe/StatusCodeHandlerRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
INF FILE_GUID = $(UP_CPU_DXE_GUID) UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/LocalApicTimerDxe/LocalApicTimerDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: prevent 64-bit MMIO BAR degradation if there is no CSM According to edk2 commit "MdeModulePkg/PciBus: do not improperly degrade resource" and to the EFI_INCOMPATIBLE_PCI_DEVICE_SUPPORT_PROTOCOL definition in the Platform Init 1.4a specification, a platform can provide such a protocol in order to influence the PCI resource allocation performed by the PCI Bus driver. In particular it is possible instruct the PCI Bus driver, with a "wildcard" hint, to allocate the 64-bit MMIO BARs of a device in 64-bit address space, regardless of whether the device features an option ROM. (By default, the PCI Bus driver considers an option ROM reason enough for allocating the 64-bit MMIO BARs in 32-bit address space. It cannot know if BDS will launch a legacy boot option, and under legacy boot, a legacy BIOS binary from a combined option ROM could be dispatched, and fail to access MMIO BARs in 64-bit address space.) In platform code we can ascertain whether a CSM is present or not. If not, then legacy BIOS binaries in option ROMs can't be dispatched, hence the BAR degradation is detrimental, and we should prevent it. This is expected to conserve the 32-bit address space for 32-bit MMIO BARs. The driver added in this patch could be simplified based on the following facts: - In the Ia32 build, the 64-bit MMIO aperture is always zero-size, hence the driver will exit immediately. Therefore the driver could be omitted from the Ia32 build. - In the Ia32X64 and X64 builds, the driver could be omitted if CSM_ENABLE was defined (because in that case the degradation would be justified). On the other hand, if CSM_ENABLE was undefined, then the driver could be included, and it could provide the hint unconditionally (without looking for the Legacy BIOS protocol). These short-cuts are not taken because they would increase the differences between the OVMF DSC/FDF files. If we can manage without extreme complexity, we should use dynamic logic (vs. build time configuration), plus keep conditional compilation to a minimum. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-05-18 20:13:41 +02:00
INF OvmfPkg/IncompatiblePciDeviceSupportDxe/IncompatiblePciDeviceSupport.inf
OvmfPkg: add PciHotPlugInitDxe After IncompatiblePciDeviceSupportDxe, this is another small driver / protocol implementation that tweaks the behavior of the PCI bus driver in edk2. The protocol is specified in the Platform Init Spec v1.4a, Volume 5, Chapter 12.6 "PCI Hot Plug PCI Initialization Protocol". This implementation steers the PCI bus driver to reserve the following resources ("padding") for each PCI bus, in addition to the BARs of the devices on that PCI bus: - 2MB of 64-bit non-prefetchable MMIO aperture, - 512B of IO port space. The goal is to reserve room for devices hot-plugged at runtime even if the bridge receiving the device is empty at boot time. The 2MB MMIO size is inspired by SeaBIOS. The 512B IO port size is actually only 1/8th of the PCI spec mandated reservation, but the specified size of 4096 has proved wasteful (given the limited size of our IO port space -- see commit bba734ab4c7c). Especially on Q35, where every PCIe root port and downstream port qualifies as a separate bridge (capable of accepting a single device). Test results for this patch: - regardless of our request for 64-bit MMIO reservation, it is downgraded to 32-bit, - although we request 512B alignment for the IO port space reservation, the next upstream bridge rounds it up to 4096B. Cc: "Johnson, Brian J." <bjohnson@sgi.com> Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com> Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Suggested-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <Ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
2016-06-30 20:16:06 +02:00
INF OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe/PciHostBridgeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ResetSystemRuntimeDxe/ResetSystemRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Metronome/Metronome.inf
INF PcAtChipsetPkg/PcatRealTimeClockRuntimeDxe/PcatRealTimeClockRuntimeDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: Make the VirtIo devices use the new VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL This change replaces the accesses to the PCI bus from the Block, Scsi and Net drivers by the use of the new VIRTIO_DEVICE_PROTOCOL protocol that abstracts the transport layer. It means these drivers can be used on PCI and MMIO transport layer. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Olivier Martin <olivier.martin@arm.com> v5: - VirtioFlush(): update comment block in VirtioLib.[hc]; error code is propagated from VirtIo->SetQueueNotify(). - VirtioBlkInit(): jump to Failed label if SetPageSize() fails - VirtioBlkInit(): fixup comment, and add error handling, near SetQueueNum() call - VirtioBlkDriverBindingStart(): remove redundant (always false) check for a subsystem device ID different from VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_BLOCK_DEVICE; VirtioBlkDriverBindingSupported() handles it already - VirtioNetGetFeatures(): update stale comment block - VirtioNetGetFeatures(): retrieve MAC address byte for byte (open-coded loop) - VirtioNetDriverBindingStart(): remove redundant (always false) check for a subsystem device ID different from VIRTIO_SUBSYSTEM_NETWORK_CARD; VirtioNetDriverBindingSupported() handles it already - VirtioNetInitRing(): call SetQueueNum() and SetQueueAlign() for proper MMIO operation - VirtioNetInitialize(): fix destination error label for when SetPageSize() fails - VirtioScsi.c: fix comment block of VIRTIO_CFG_WRITE()/VIRTIO_CFG_READ() - VirtioScsiInit(): fix destination error label for when SetPageSize() fails - VirtioScsiInit(): call SetQueueNum() and SetQueueAlign() for proper MMIO operation Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@14966 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2013-12-11 16:58:22 +00:00
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioSerialDxe/VirtioSerial.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioInputDxe/VirtioInput.inf
!if $(SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg: disable stale fork of SecureBootConfigDxe OvmfPkg forked SecureBootConfigDxe from SecurityPkg in SVN r13635 (git commit 8c71ec8f). Since then, the original (in "SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe") has diverged significantly. The initial diff between the original and the fork, when the fork was made (ie. at SVN r13635), reads as follows: > diff -ur SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr > --- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr 2014-09-30 23:35:28.598067147 +0200 > +++ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr 2014-08-09 02:40:35.824851626 +0200 > @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ > questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE, > prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PROMPT), > help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_HELP), > - flags = INTERACTIVE | RESET_REQUIRED, > + flags = INTERACTIVE, > endcheckbox; > endif; > > @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ > questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK, > prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK), > help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK_HELP), > - flags = INTERACTIVE | RESET_REQUIRED, > + flags = INTERACTIVE, > endcheckbox; > endif; > endform; > diff -ur SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf > --- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf 2014-09-30 23:35:28.598067147 +0200 > +++ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf 2014-09-30 23:35:28.577067027 +0200 > @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ > ## @file > -# Component name for SecureBoot configuration module. > +# Component name for SecureBoot configuration module for OVMF. > +# > +# Need custom SecureBootConfigDxe for OVMF that does not force > +# resets after PK changes since OVMF doesn't have persistent variables > # > # Copyright (c) 2011 - 2012, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR> > # This program and the accompanying materials > diff -ur SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c > --- SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c 2014-09-30 23:35:28.599067153 +0200 > +++ OvmfPkg/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c 2014-09-30 23:35:28.578067033 +0200 > @@ -2559,7 +2559,7 @@ > NULL > ); > } else { > - *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_RESET; > + *ActionRequest = EFI_BROWSER_ACTION_REQUEST_SUBMIT; > } > break; The commit message is not overly verbose: OvmfPkg: Add custom SecureBootConfigDxe that doesn't reset We don't force a platform reset for OVMF when PK is changed in custom mode setup. But the INF file hunk is telling: Need custom SecureBootConfigDxe for OVMF that does not force resets after PK changes since OVMF doesn't have persistent variables We do have persistent variables now. Let's disable the (now obsolete) OvmfPkg fork, and revert to the (well maintained) SecurityPkg-provided config driver. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16191 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-10-02 08:08:05 +00:00
INF SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/IgvmSecureBootDxe/IgvmSecureBootDxe.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/CapsuleRuntimeDxe/CapsuleRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConPlatformDxe/ConPlatformDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitterDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe/GraphicsConsoleDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DriverHealthManagerDxe/DriverHealthManagerDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe/BdsDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Application/BootManagerMenuApp/BootManagerMenuApp.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DevicePathDxe/DevicePathDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/DiskIoDxe/DiskIoDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/PartitionDxe/PartitionDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: enable SATA controller In this patch, we replace the traditional IDE driver stack that comes from PcAtChipsetPkg and IntelFrameworkModulePkg with more featureful drivers from OvmfPkg and MdeModulePkg. The resultant driver stack is compatible with the previous one, but provides more protocols, on more kinds of virtual hardware. Remove: - PcAtChipsetPkg/Bus/Pci/IdeControllerDxe/IdeControllerDxe.inf (removing EFI_IDE_CONTROLLER_INIT_PROTOCOL [1]) Remove the dependent: - IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Bus/Pci/IdeBusDxe/IdeBusDxe.inf (removing EFI_DISK_INFO_PROTOCOL [2], EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL [3]) As replacement, add: - OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf (supplying EFI_IDE_CONTROLLER_INIT_PROTOCOL [1]) On top of which, add the dependent: - MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf (providing EFI_ATA_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL, EFI_EXT_SCSI_PASS_THRU_PROTOCOL) On top of which, add the dependent: - MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf (supplying EFI_DISK_INFO_PROTOCOL [2], EFI_BLOCK_IO_PROTOCOL [3], providing EFI_BLOCK_IO2PROTOCOL, EFI_STORAGE_SECURITY_COMMAND_PROTOCOL) Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Cc: Reza Jelveh <reza.jelveh@tuhh.de> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Gabriel L. Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Reza Jelveh <reza.jelveh@tuhh.de> [lersek@redhat.com: rewrote commit message] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gabriel Somlo <somlo@cmu.edu> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18532 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-09-22 11:18:45 +00:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/CxlDxe/CxlDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: Fix dependency issue when StandaloneMm enabled When enabled support of StandaloneMm on OVMF, ovmf boot manager depends on S3SaveStateDxe. However, the support of StandaloneMm currently doesn't include that driver. This causes assertion on ovmf with DEBUG and exception on RELEASE. PlatformBootManagerLib requires S3SaveStateDxe which produces EFI_S3_SAVE_STATE_PROTOCOL to successfully able to store boot secript. Given the commit b017b1b that introduced didn't indicate any potential issue. Also enabling that library, there is no other issues observed. S3SaveStateDxe should always be built with OVMF whether StandaloneMm is enabled or not. Observations: OVMF DEBUG build has been observed to trigger this assertions: ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status = Not Found) ASSERT BdsPlatform.c(1583): !(((RETURN_STATUS)(Status)) >= 0x8000000000000000ULL) On OVMF RELEASE build due missing null check BootScript is dereferenced while it is NULL. Which caused following exception: !!!! X64 Exception Type - 06(#UD - Invalid Opcode) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!! RIP - 00000000000E0000, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000010246 RAX - 0000000000000000, RCX - 0000000000000000, RDX - 000000000000000A RBX - 0000000000000000, RSP - 0000000007E8E968, RBP - 0000000007E8EE50 RSI - 0000000006B9ADE3, RDI - 0000000006BA2670 R8 - 0000000000000004, R9 - 0000000006BA1DD5, R10 - 00000000076DF100 R11 - 00000000076DE295, R12 - 0000000007E8EAA8, R13 - 0000000007E8EED8 R14 - 0000000000000600, R15 - 000000008000F880 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 0000000007801000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400 GDTR - 00000000075DA000 0000000000000057, LDTR - 0000000000000000 IDTR - 0000000007270018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000048 FXSAVE_STATE - 0000000007E8E5C0 !!!! Can't find image information. !!!! Signed-off-by: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>
2026-01-13 16:45:52 +00:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/S3SaveStateDxe/S3SaveStateDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SioBusDxe/SioBusDxe.inf
!if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == FALSE
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciSioSerialDxe/PciSioSerialDxe.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KeyboardDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SmbiosDxe/SmbiosDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SmbiosPlatformDxe/SmbiosPlatformDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe/AcpiTableDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/AcpiPlatformDxe/AcpiPlatformDxe.inf
!if $(STANDALONE_MM_ENABLE) != TRUE
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootScriptExecutorDxe/BootScriptExecutorDxe.inf
!endif
OvmfPkg: Install BGRT ACPI table While debugging OS for ACPI BGRT support (especially on VMs), it is very useful to have the EFI firmware (OVMF in most cases which use Tianocore) to export the ACPI BGRT table. This patch tries to add this support in OvmfPkg. Tested this patch in the following environments: 1. On both RHEL7.3 and Fedora-25 VM guests running on a Fedora-24 Host: - Ensured that the BGRT logo is properly prepared and can be viewed with user-space tools (like 'Gwenview' on KDE, for example): $ file /sys/firmware/acpi/bgrt/image /sys/firmware/acpi/bgrt/image: PC bitmap, Windows 3.x format, 193 x 58 x 24 2. On a Windows-10 VM Guest running on a Fedora-24 Host: - Ensured that the BGRT ACPI table is properly prepared and can be read with freeware tool like FirmwareTablesView: ================================================== Signature : BGRT Firmware Provider : ACPI Length : 56 Revision : 1 Checksum : 129 OEM ID : INTEL OEM Table ID : EDK2 OEM Revision : 0x00000002 Creator ID : 0x20202020 Creator Revision : 0x01000013 Description : ================================================== Note from Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>: without the BGRT ACPI table, Windows 8 and Windows 10 first clear the screen, then display a blue, slanted Windows picture above the rotating white boot animation. With the BGRT ACPI table, Windows 8 and Windows 10 don't clear the screen, the blue Windows image is not displayed, and the rotating white boot animation is shown between the firmware's original TianoCore boot splash and (optional) "Start boot option" progress bar. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: cover effect on Windows 8/10 boot anim. in commit msg] Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2017-01-06 15:17:15 +05:30
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf
INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioFsDxe/VirtioFsDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: Add TdxDxe driver RFC: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429 TdxDxe driver is dispatched early in DXE, due to being list in APRIORI. This module is responsible for below features: - Sets max logical cpus based on TDINFO - Sets PCI PCDs based on resource hobs - Set shared bit in MMIO region - Relocate Td mailbox and set its address in MADT table. 1. Set shared bit in MMIO region Qemu allows a ROM device to set to ROMD mode (default) or MMIO mode. When it is in ROMD mode, the device is mapped to guest memory and satisfies read access directly. In EDK2 Option ROM is treated as MMIO region. So Tdx guest access Option ROM via TDVMCALL(MMIO). But as explained above, since Qemu set the Option ROM to ROMD mode, the call of TDVMCALL(MMIO) always return INVALID_OPERAND. Tdvf then falls back to direct access. This requires to set the shared bit to corresponding PageTable entry. Otherwise it triggers GP fault. TdxDxe's entry point is the right place to set the shared bit in MMIO region because Option ROM has not been discoverd yet. 2. Relocate Td mailbox and set the new address in MADT Mutiprocessor Wakeup Table. In TDX the guest firmware is designed to publish a multiprocessor-wakeup structure to let the guest-bootstrap processor wake up guest-application processors with a mailbox. The mailbox is memory that the guest firmware can reserve so each guest virtual processor can have the guest OS send a message to them. The address of the mailbox is recorded in the MADT table. See [ACPI]. TdxDxe registers for protocol notification (gQemuAcpiTableNotifyProtocolGuid) to call the AlterAcpiTable(), in which MADT table is altered by the above Mailbox address. The protocol will be installed in AcpiPlatformDxe when the MADT table provided by Qemu is ready. This is to maintain the simplicity of the AcpiPlatformDxe. AlterAcpiTable is the registered function which traverses the ACPI table list to find the original MADT from Qemu. After the new MADT is configured and installed, the original one will be uninstalled. [ACPI] https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.4/05_ACPI_Software_Programming_Model /ACPI_Software_Programming_Model.html#multiprocessor-wakeup-structure Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
2021-09-22 13:26:01 +08:00
INF OvmfPkg/TdxDxe/TdxDxe.inf
#
# Hash2 Protocol producer
#
!if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/Hash2DxeCrypto/Hash2DxeCrypto.inf
!endif
#
# Network modules
#
!if $(E1000_ENABLE)
FILE DRIVER = 5D695E11-9B3F-4b83-B25F-4A8D5D69BE07 {
SECTION PE32 = Intel3.5/EFIX64/E3522X2.EFI
}
!endif
!include NetworkPkg/Network.fdf.inc
!if $(NETWORK_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioNetDxe/VirtioNet.inf
!endif
#
# Usb Support
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/UhciDxe/UhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/EhciDxe/EhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/XhciDxe/XhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbBusDxe/UsbBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/UsbKbDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: exclude the CSM-based VideoDxe driver The CSM-based VideoDxe driver is a special UEFI_DRIVER module that both follows and doesn't follow the UEFI driver model. Namely, in the Supported and Start members of its Driver Binding Protocol instance, it consumes the Legacy Bios Protocol directly from the UEFI protocol database, as opposed to (only) opening protocols on the handle that it is supposed to bind. Furthermore, the driver "marks" its own image handle with the NULL-interface "Legacy Bios" (pseudo-protocol) GUID, in order to "inform back" the provider of the Legacy Bios Protocol, i.e., LegacyBiosDxe, that VideoDxe is a "BIOS Thunk Driver" in the system. Quoting "OvmfPkg/Csm/Include/Guid/LegacyBios.h", such a driver follows the UEFI Driver Model, but still uses the Int86() or FarCall() services of the Legacy Bios Protocol as the basis for the UEFI protocol it produces. In a sense, there is a circular dependency between VideoDxe and LegacyBiosDxe; each knows about the other. However, VideoDxe is a UEFI_DRIVER, while LegacyBiosDxe is a platform DXE_DRIVER with a very long DEPEX. Therefore, for keeping dependencies conceptually intact, first exclude VideoDxe from the OVMF platforms. Always include the hypervisor-specific real UEFI video driver. --*-- Note that the pathname "IntelFrameworkModulePkg/Csm/BiosThunk/VideoDxe/VideoDxe.inf" in the bhyve platform DSC and FDF files is bogus anyway. Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Corvin Köhne <corvink@freebsd.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4588 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20231110235820.644381-9-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Corvin Köhne <corvink@FreeBSD.org> Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
2023-11-11 00:57:51 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe/VirtHstiDxe.inf
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/SmmAccess/SmmAccess2Dxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SmmControl2Dxe/SmmControl2Dxe.inf
!if $(STANDALONE_MM_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/SmmControl2Dxe/MmControlPei.inf
INF StandaloneMmPkg/Drivers/StandaloneMmIplPei/StandaloneMmIplPei.inf
INF StandaloneMmPkg/Drivers/MmCommunicationDxe/MmCommunicationDxe.inf
INF StandaloneMmPkg/Core/StandaloneMmCore.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Smm/CpuIo2StandaloneMm.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/PiSmmCpuStandaloneMm.inf
!else
INF OvmfPkg/CpuS3DataDxe/CpuS3DataDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmIpl.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/PiSmmCore/PiSmmCore.inf
INF OvmfPkg/CpuHotplugSmm/CpuHotplugSmm.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Smm/CpuIo2Smm.inf
OvmfPkg: LockBox: use SMM stack with -D SMM_REQUIRE During DXE, drivers save data in the LockBox. A save operation is layered as follows: - The unprivileged driver wishing to store data in the LockBox links against the "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxDxeLib.inf" library instance. The library allows the unprivileged driver to format requests for the privileged SMM LockBox driver (see below), and to parse responses. We apply this resolution for DXE_DRIVER modules. - The privileged SMM LockBox driver is built from "MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.inf". This driver has module type DXE_SMM_DRIVER and can access SMRAM. The driver delegates command parsing and response formatting to "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxSmmLib.inf". Therefore we include this DXE_SMM_DRIVER in the build, and apply said resolution specifically to it. (Including the driver requires us to resolve a few of other library classes for DXE_SMM_DRIVER modules.) - In PEI, the S3 Resume PEIM (UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei) retrieves data from the LockBox. It is capable of searching SMRAM itself. We resolve LockBoxLib to "MdeModulePkg/Library/SmmLockBoxLib/SmmLockBoxPeiLib.inf" specifically for this one PEIM. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19048 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 18:42:15 +00:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/LockBox/SmmLockBox/SmmLockBox.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SmmCommunicationBufferDxe/SmmCommunicationBufferDxe.inf
#
# Variable driver stack (SMM)
#
!if $(STANDALONE_MM_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesStandaloneMm.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteStandaloneMm.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableStandaloneMm.inf
!else
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesSmm.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteSmm.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmm.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf
!else
!if $(QEMU_PV_VARS) == TRUE
#
# Variable driver stack (qemu-system-x86_64 -device uefi-vars-isa)
#
INF OvmfPkg/VirtMmCommunicationDxe/VirtMmCommunication.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.inf
!else
#
# Variable driver stack (non-SMM)
#
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesRuntimeDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe/Fvb.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
!endif
!endif
OvmfPkg: Add WSMT ACPI table for SMM builds Windows uses the Windows SMM Security Mitigation Table to decide whether SMM firmware advertises the communication-buffer protections needed by VBS [1]. WSMT ProtectionFlags represent a pinky promise that the underlying firmware will implement various security practices [2]. Add a small DXE driver that installs a revision 1 WSMT table for the OvmfPkgIa32X64 and OvmfPkgX64 builds. WSMT ProtectionFlags are set to 0x3, asserting: EFI_WSMT_PROTECTION_FLAGS_FIXED_COMM_BUFFERS EFI_WSMT_PROTECTION_FLAGS_COMM_BUFFER_NESTED_PTR_PROTECTION Note, we are intentionally not asserting EFI_WSMT_PROTECTION_FLAGS_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_PROTECTION, as the QEMU side is not yet tuned up to enforce this protection. Note: when Windows Hypervisor Enforced Code Integrity is enabled, Windows msinfo -> Virtualization-based security Available Security Properties will NOT include "SMM Security Mitigations 1.0", due to the missing SYSTEM_RESOURCE_PROTECTION flag. Note, WSMT is required for default enablement of HVCI [3], so we're taking a step in the right direction here, but not yet 100% complete as of this patch. References: [1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-vbs [2] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-uefi-wsmt [3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/oem-hvci-enablement#check-results-of-memory-integrity-default-enablement Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
2026-05-27 13:16:53 -07:00
INF OvmfPkg/WsmtDxe/WsmtDxe.inf
#
# EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL
#
!if $(CC_MEASUREMENT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TdTcg2Dxe/TdTcg2Dxe.inf
!endif
#
# TPM support
#
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfTpmDxe.fdf.inc
OvmfPkg: include Tcg2Dxe module This module measures and log the boot environment. It also produces the Tcg2 protocol, which allows for example to read the log from OS. The linux kernel doesn't yet read the EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2, which is required for crypto-agile log. In fact, only upcoming 4.16 adds support EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2: [ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II [ 0.000000] efi: SMBIOS=0x3fa1f000 ACPI=0x3fbb6000 ACPI 2.0=0x3fbb6014 MEMATTR=0x3e7d4318 TPMEventLog=0x3db21018 $ python chipsec_util.py tpm parse_log binary_bios_measurements [CHIPSEC] Version 1.3.5.dev2 [CHIPSEC] API mode: using OS native API (not using CHIPSEC kernel module) [CHIPSEC] Executing command 'tpm' with args ['parse_log', '/tmp/binary_bios_measurements'] PCR: 0 type: EV_S_CRTM_VERSION size: 0x2 digest: 1489f923c4dca729178b3e3233458550d8dddf29 + version: PCR: 0 type: EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB size: 0x10 digest: fd39ced7c0d2a61f6830c78c7625f94826b05bcc + base: 0x820000 length: 0xe0000 PCR: 0 type: EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB size: 0x10 digest: 39ebc6783b72bc1e73c7d5bcfeb5f54a3f105d4c + base: 0x900000 length: 0xa00000 PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x35 digest: 57cd4dc19442475aa82743484f3b1caa88e142b8 PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x24 digest: 9b1387306ebb7ff8e795e7be77563666bbf4516e PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x26 digest: 9afa86c507419b8570c62167cb9486d9fc809758 PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x24 digest: 5bf8faa078d40ffbd03317c93398b01229a0e1e0 PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x26 digest: 734424c9fe8fc71716c42096f4b74c88733b175e PCR: 7 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x3e digest: 252f8ebb85340290b64f4b06a001742be8e5cab6 PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x6e digest: 22a4f6ee9af6dba01d3528deb64b74b582fc182b PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x80 digest: b7811d5bf30a7efd4e385c6179fe10d9290bb9e8 PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x84 digest: 425e502c24fc924e231e0a62327b6b7d1f704573 PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x9a digest: 0b5d2c98ac5de6148a4a1490ff9d5df69039f04e PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0xbd digest: 20bd5f402271d57a88ea314fe35c1705956b1f74 PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x88 digest: df5d6605cb8f4366d745a8464cfb26c1efdc305c PCR: 4 type: EV_EFI_ACTION size: 0x28 digest: cd0fdb4531a6ec41be2753ba042637d6e5f7f256 PCR: 0 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 1 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 2 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 3 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 4 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 PCR: 5 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473 $ tpm2_pcrlist sha1 : 0 : 35bd1786b6909daad610d7598b1d620352d33b8a 1 : ec0511e860206e0af13c31da2f9e943fb6ca353d 2 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236 3 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236 4 : 45a323382bd933f08e7f0e256bc8249e4095b1ec 5 : d16d7e629fd8d08ca256f9ad3a3a1587c9e6cc1b 6 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236 7 : 518bd167271fbb64589c61e43d8c0165861431d8 8 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 9 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 10 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 11 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 12 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 13 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 14 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 15 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 16 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 17 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 18 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 19 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 20 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 21 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 22 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 23 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 sha256 : 0 : 9ae903dbae3357ac00d223660bac19ea5c021499a56201104332ab966631ce2c 1 : acc611d90245cf04e77b0ca94901f90e7fa54770f0426f53c3049b532243d1b8 2 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969 3 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969 4 : 7a94ffe8a7729a566d3d3c577fcb4b6b1e671f31540375f80eae6382ab785e35 5 : a5ceb755d043f32431d63e39f5161464620a3437280494b5850dc1b47cc074e0 6 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969 7 : 65caf8dd1e0ea7a6347b635d2b379c93b9a1351edc2afc3ecda700e534eb3068 8 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 9 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 10 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 11 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 12 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 13 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 14 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 15 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 16 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 17 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 18 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 19 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 20 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 21 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 22 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 23 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 sha384 : The PhysicalPresenceLib is required, it sets some variables, but the firmware doesn't act on it yet. Laszlo Ersek explained on the list why Tpm2DeviceLib has to be resolved differently for DXE_DRIVER modules in general and for "Tcg2Dxe.inf" specifically: * We have a library class called Tpm2DeviceLib -- this is basically the set of APIs declared in "SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h". Its leading comment says "This library abstract how to access TPM2 hardware device". There are two *sets* of APIs in "Tpm2DeviceLib.h": (a) functions that deal with the TPM2 device: - Tpm2RequestUseTpm(), - Tpm2SubmitCommand() This set of APIs is supposed to be used by clients that *consume* the TPM2 device abstraction. (b) the function Tpm2RegisterTpm2DeviceLib(), which is supposed to be used by *providers* of various TPM2 device abstractions. * Then, we have two implementations (instances) of the Tpm2DeviceLib class: (1) SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.inf (2) SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterDxe.inf (1) The first library instance ("Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.inf") implements the APIs listed under (a), and it does not implement (b) -- see EFI_UNSUPPORTED. In other words, this lib instance is strictly meant for drivers that *consume* the TPM2 device abstraction. And, the (a) group of APIs is implemented by forwarding the requests to the TCG2 protocol. The idea here is that all the drivers that consume the TPM2 abstraction do not have to be statically linked with a large TPM2 device library instance; instead they are only linked (statically) with this "thin" library instance, and all the actual work is delegated to whichever driver that provides the singleton TCG2 protocol. (2) The second library instance ("Tpm2DeviceLibRouterDxe.inf") is meant for the driver that offers (produces) the TCG2 protocol. This lib instance implements both (a) and (b) API groups. * Here's how things fit together: (i) The "SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm.inf" library instance (which has no lib class) is linked into "Tcg2Dxe.inf" via NULL class resolution. This simply means that before the "Tcg2Dxe.inf" entry point function is entered, the constructor function of "Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm.inf" will be called. (ii) This Tpm2InstanceLibDTpmConstructor() function calls API (b), and registers its own actual TPM2 command implementation with the "Tpm2DeviceLibRouter" library instance (also linked into the Tcg2Dxe driver). This provides the back-end for the API set (a). TCG2 protocol provider (Tcg2Dxe.inf driver) launches | v NULL class: Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm instance construction | v Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibRouter instance backend registration for API set (a) (iii) The Tcg2Dxe driver exposes the TCG2 protocol. (iv) A TPM2 consumer calls API set (a) via lib instance (1). Such calls land in Tcg2Dxe, via the protocol. (v) Tcg2Dxe serves the protocol request by forwarding it to API set (a) from lib instance (2). (vi) Those functions call the "backend" functions registered by Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm in step (ii). TPM 2 consumer driver | v Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2 instance | v TCG2 protocol interface | v TCG2 protocol provider: Tcg2Dxe.inf driver | v Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibRouter instance | v NULL class: Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm instance (via earlier registration) | v TPM2 chip (actual hardware) * So that is the "router" pattern in edk2. Namely, - Consumers of an abstraction use a thin library instance. - The thin library instance calls a firmware-global (singleton) service, i.e. a PPI (in the PEI phase) or protocol (in the DXE phase). - The PEIM providing the PPI, or the DXE driver providing the protocol, don't themselves implement the actual service either. Instead they offer a "registration" service too, and they only connect the incoming "consumer" calls to the earlier registered back-end(s). - The "registration service", for back-ends to use, may take various forms. It can be exposed globally to the rest of the firmware, as another member function of the PPI / protocol structure. Then backends can be provided by separate PEIMs / DXE drivers. Or else, the registration service can be exposed as just another library API. In this case, the backends are provided as NULL class library instances, and a platform DSC file links them into the PEIM / DXE driver via NULL class resolutions. The backend lib instances call the registration service in their own respective constructor functions. Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2018-02-22 17:53:16 +01:00
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/ShellDxe.fdf.inc
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/MorLock.fdf.inc
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfRngDxe.fdf.inc
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/OvmfOptHw.fdf.inc
#
# Smbios Measurement support
#
!if $(TPM2_ENABLE) == TRUE || $(CC_MEASUREMENT_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SmbiosMeasurementDxe/SmbiosMeasurementDxe.inf
!endif
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
OvmfPkg: add a Name GUID to each Firmware Volume The FDF spec mentions the FvNameGuid statement for [FV.xxxx] sections, but the detailed description can be found in Volume 3 of the Platform Init spec (which is at 1.4a currently). Adding an FvNameGuid statement to [FV.xxx] has the following effects (implemented by "BaseTools/Source/C/GenFv/GenFvInternalLib.c"): - The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset field is set to a nonzero value, pointing after EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER itself (although not directly, see below). - An EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER object is created at the pointed-to address. This object is not followed by any EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_ENTRY (= extension) entries, so it only specifies the Name GUID for the firmware volume. The EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER for each firmware volume can be found in the Build directory as a separate file (20 bytes in size): Build/Ovmf*/*_GCC*/FV/*.ext - The new data consume 48 bytes in the following volumes: SECFV, FVMAIN_COMPACT, DXEFV. They comprise: - 16 padding bytes, - EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 (8 bytes in total: no Name and ExtendedSize fields, and Type=EFI_FV_FILETYPE_FFS_PAD), - EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_EXT_HEADER (20 bytes, see above), - 4 padding bytes. (The initial 16 padding bytes and the EFI_FFS_FILE_HEADER2 structure are the reason why EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.ExtHeaderOffset does not point immediately past EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER.) The sizes of the firmware volumes don't change, only their internal usages grow by 48 bytes. I verified that the statements and calculations in "OvmfPkg/DecomprScratchEnd.fdf.inc" are unaffected and remain valid. - The new data consume 0 bytes in PEIFV. This is because PEIFV has enough internal padding at the moment to accomodate the above structures without a growth in usage. In the future, firmware volumes can be identified by Name GUID (Fv(...) device path nodes), rather than memory location (MemoryMapped(...) device path nodes). This is supposed to improve stability for persistent device paths that refer to FFS files; for example, UEFI boot options. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Suggested-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
2016-07-12 16:48:47 +02:00
FvNameGuid = 48DB5E17-707C-472D-91CD-1613E7EF51B0
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
SECTION GUIDED EE4E5898-3914-4259-9D6E-DC7BD79403CF PROCESSING_REQUIRED = TRUE {
OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVs By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-01-21 19:39:13 +00:00
#
# These firmware volumes will have files placed in them uncompressed,
# and then both firmware volumes will be compressed in a single
# compression operation in order to achieve better overall compression.
#
SECTION FV_IMAGE = PEIFV
SECTION FV_IMAGE = DXEFV
}
}
!include OvmfPkg/Include/Fdf/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
################################################################################
[Rule.Common.SEC]
FILE SEC = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING ="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING ="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.PEI_CORE]
FILE PEI_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 Align=Auto $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING ="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING ="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.PEIM]
FILE PEIM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PEI_DEPEX PEI_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 Align=Auto $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_CORE]
FILE DXE_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
RAW ACPI Optional |.acpi
RAW ASL Optional |.aml
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_DRIVER.BINARY]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional |.depex
PE32 PE32 |.efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION.BINARY]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 |.efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.USER_DEFINED.RESET_VECTOR]
FILE RAW = $(NAMED_GUID) {
RAW BIN Align = 16 |.bin
}
[Rule.Common.SMM_CORE]
FILE SMM_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_SMM_DRIVER]
FILE SMM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
SMM_DEPEX SMM_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.MM_CORE_STANDALONE]
FILE MM_CORE_STANDALONE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.MM_STANDALONE]
FILE MM_STANDALONE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
SMM_DEPEX SMM_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}