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migration/mem pull for 11.2

Browse source 
v2: fixes macos build error
 
 - Dongli's patch to add cpr-transfer support for HMP
 - Fabiano's doc update for migration on security issues
 - Gavin's fix for MMIO access support for memory APIs, reverting ram_device ops
 - Sam's migration test build fix for !ASN1
 - Peter's a few migration hardening fixes
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Merge tag 'next-pull-request' of https://gitlab.com/peterx/qemu into staging

migration/mem pull for 11.2

v2: fixes macos build error

- Dongli's patch to add cpr-transfer support for HMP
- Fabiano's doc update for migration on security issues
- Gavin's fix for MMIO access support for memory APIs, reverting ram_device ops
- Sam's migration test build fix for !ASN1
- Peter's a few migration hardening fixes

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# gpg: Signature made Thu 13 Aug 2026 06:43:29 AM PDT
# gpg:                using EDDSA key B9184DC20CC457DACF7DD1A93B5FCCCDF3ABD706
# gpg:                issuer "peterx@redhat.com"
# gpg: Good signature from "Peter Xu <xzpeter@gmail.com>" [unknown]
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* tag 'next-pull-request' of https://gitlab.com/peterx/qemu:
  migration: Fix rare hang of migration_channel_read_peek()
  migration/ram: Check for RAMBlock size mismatch when parsing
  migration/multifd: Replace assert() with error_setg() in recv paths
  migration/multifd: Validate next_packet_size in zlib/zstd recv
  tests/qtest/migration: Only build tls_no_hostname test with TASN1
  system/memory: Make ram device region directly accessible
  system/memory: Use qemu_ram_move() for directly accessible regions
  system/memory: Use memmove() for directly accessible regions
  migration/cpr: Add HMP support for cpr-transfer
  docs: Add security considerations for migration

Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
Richard Henderson 2026-08-13 07:14:33 -07:00
commit 42f8118926
16 changed files with 216 additions and 82 deletions
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22
docs/system/security.rst
View file

@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug.
that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be
fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time.
* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
an attack vector.
* **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which
are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will
usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment
@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the
guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the
QEMU process on the host.
Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A
malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data.
Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless
explicitly shared between them by the user.
Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them.
A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access
their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected
from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with
them by the user.
Principle of Least Privilege
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default.
system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel
attack surface.
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure authenticity and
encryption of the live migration connection where the network is untrusted.
Sensitive configurations
------------------------