2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
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# Build frontend
|
2025-12-09 17:10:31 +00:00
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FROM node:22-bookworm-slim AS frontend-builder
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2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
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WORKDIR /app/frontend
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2026-01-02 12:28:32 +01:00
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# Copy package files first for better caching
|
2025-12-12 16:48:12 +01:00
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COPY frontend/package*.json ./
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2026-01-02 12:28:32 +01:00
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# Use cache mount for npm
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RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.npm \
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npm ci
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2025-12-09 17:09:09 +00:00
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2025-12-09 17:10:31 +00:00
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COPY frontend/ ./
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2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
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RUN npm run build
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# Production image
|
2026-04-19 10:57:07 +02:00
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FROM python:3.13-slim-trixie
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2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
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WORKDIR /app
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2025-12-14 09:36:19 +01:00
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# Install system dependencies
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ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
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RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
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curl \
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ffmpeg \
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2026-04-24 12:01:22 +02:00
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gnupg \
|
fix(docker): normalise data-volume ownership at startup via gosu entrypoint
Two related failure modes have been biting Docker users repeatedly,
most recently in #1211:
1. Docker named volumes are created by the daemon as root:root, and
the previous `chmod 777 /app/data` Dockerfile workaround only
covered the named-volume root — so subdirs Bambuddy creates at
runtime (virtual_printer/uploads, virtual_printer/certs, etc.)
inherited wrong ownership when the container ran as 1000:1000.
2. The shipped docker-compose.yml ships
`./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer` uncommented, and
dockerd creates a missing bind-mount source on the host as root
before the container starts — leaving the host directory
unwritable by uid 1000 inside the container even though the named
volume above it had the chmod-777 workaround.
Symptom either way: [Errno 13] Permission denied:
'/app/data/virtual_printer/uploads', no virtual printer ever starts,
"VP doesn't work" support reports follow.
Replace the chmod-777 hack with a proper entrypoint:
- deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh runs as root, chowns /app/data and
/app/logs (and /app/data/virtual_printer when bind-mounted) to
PUID:PGID, then drops to that uid via gosu before exec'ing the
app. The chown is gated behind a top-level ownership check so
subsequent restarts skip the recursive traversal — no multi-
second startup penalty on multi-GB archive directories.
- A sentinel .bambuddy file in each data path prevents Docker from
re-syncing image directory metadata on every mount (otherwise
empty volumes have their ownership reverted from the image on
each restart, defeating the idempotency).
- When the container is started with an explicit `user:` directive
or `--user` flag the entrypoint detects it isn't root and falls
through to direct exec — preserving compatibility for users who
pin a specific uid.
Compose template changes:
- Remove `user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"` (entrypoint owns
privilege drop now).
- Add PUID / PGID env vars with the same defaults.
- Comment out the ./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer
bind mount by default, with explicit "only needed if you also
run a native install of Bambuddy on the same host and want both
to share the VP CA cert" guidance. The entrypoint chowns the
host-side dir through the bind mount the first time it sees
wrong ownership, so existing uncomented installs continue to
work and #1211 specifically gets fixed.
2026-05-05 17:22:08 +02:00
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gosu \
|
2026-03-12 11:16:12 +01:00
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iproute2 \
|
2026-02-27 10:25:48 +01:00
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libcap2-bin \
|
2026-03-23 12:51:21 +01:00
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openssh-client \
|
2026-05-19 12:40:46 +01:00
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ca-certificates \
|
2026-03-14 10:33:21 +01:00
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&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
|
2025-12-14 09:15:49 +01:00
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|
2026-04-24 12:01:22 +02:00
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# Install the Tailscale CLI only (no tailscaled — the daemon runs on the host).
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# Bambuddy calls `tailscale status` / `tailscale cert` via the host's socket,
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# which the user mounts in via docker-compose when they want to enable the
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# Tailscale integration for virtual printers. Without the socket mount, the
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# binary is harmless — the code logs a hint and falls back to self-signed.
|
2026-07-16 10:36:05 +02:00
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RUN curl -fsSL https://pkgs.tailscale.com/stable/debian/trixie.noarmor.gpg \
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-o /usr/share/keyrings/tailscale-archive-keyring.gpg \
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&& curl -fsSL https://pkgs.tailscale.com/stable/debian/trixie.tailscale-keyring.list \
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-o /etc/apt/sources.list.d/tailscale.list \
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&& apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends tailscale \
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&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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2026-04-24 12:01:22 +02:00
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|
2026-02-27 10:25:48 +01:00
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|
# Allow binding to privileged ports (e.g. 990/FTPS) as non-root user.
|
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|
|
# File capabilities are more reliable than Docker cap_add with user: directive,
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|
# which depends on ambient capability support in the container runtime.
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|
RUN setcap cap_net_bind_service=+ep "$(readlink -f /usr/local/bin/python3)"
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|
2026-05-11 12:36:31 +02:00
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|
# Install Python dependencies with cache mount.
|
|
|
|
|
# pip is upgraded to >=26.1 first to close CVE-2026-6357 — the python:3.13-slim
|
|
|
|
|
# base image ships pip 26.0.1, which runs its self-update check after installing
|
|
|
|
|
# wheels (so a hostile wheel could hijack stdlib imports during install).
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
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|
|
COPY requirements.txt ./
|
2026-01-02 12:28:32 +01:00
|
|
|
RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/pip \
|
2026-07-21 12:54:17 +02:00
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|
pip install --root-user-action=ignore --upgrade 'pip>=26.1.2' \
|
2026-05-11 12:36:31 +02:00
|
|
|
&& pip install --root-user-action=ignore -r requirements.txt
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
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|
|
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|
# Copy backend
|
|
|
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|
COPY backend/ ./backend/
|
|
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|
2026-04-10 11:11:39 +02:00
|
|
|
# Capture the current git branch at build time. `.git/HEAD` is the only
|
|
|
|
|
# .git metadata the build context lets through (see .dockerignore); it
|
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|
# contains `ref: refs/heads/<branch>`, which the SpoolBuddy remote-update
|
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|
|
# flow reads at runtime via detect_current_branch() in spoolbuddy_ssh.py.
|
|
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|
|
# Without this, the production image has no git metadata at all and would
|
|
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|
# always pull `main` on the remote device regardless of which branch
|
|
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|
|
# Bambuddy itself was built from.
|
|
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|
COPY .git/HEAD ./.git/HEAD
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|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
# Copy built frontend from builder stage
|
|
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|
COPY --from=frontend-builder /app/static ./static
|
|
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|
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|
2026-05-06 14:23:39 +02:00
|
|
|
# Copy embedded GCode viewer static assets (PrettyGCode + Bambuddy adapter).
|
|
|
|
|
# Served by the explicit @app.get("/gcode-viewer/{...}") routes in main.py,
|
|
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|
|
# which resolve files under (static_dir.parent / "gcode_viewer") = /app/gcode_viewer/.
|
|
|
|
|
# Without this COPY the routes return a bare 404 at request time and the 3D
|
|
|
|
|
# Preview iframe shows {"detail":"Not Found"} (see #1218). The directory is
|
|
|
|
|
# vendored third-party JS — the Vite build does NOT stage it into static/,
|
|
|
|
|
# the dev server serves it via a configureServer middleware that's dev-only.
|
|
|
|
|
COPY gcode_viewer/ ./gcode_viewer/
|
|
|
|
|
|
fix(docker): normalise data-volume ownership at startup via gosu entrypoint
Two related failure modes have been biting Docker users repeatedly,
most recently in #1211:
1. Docker named volumes are created by the daemon as root:root, and
the previous `chmod 777 /app/data` Dockerfile workaround only
covered the named-volume root — so subdirs Bambuddy creates at
runtime (virtual_printer/uploads, virtual_printer/certs, etc.)
inherited wrong ownership when the container ran as 1000:1000.
2. The shipped docker-compose.yml ships
`./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer` uncommented, and
dockerd creates a missing bind-mount source on the host as root
before the container starts — leaving the host directory
unwritable by uid 1000 inside the container even though the named
volume above it had the chmod-777 workaround.
Symptom either way: [Errno 13] Permission denied:
'/app/data/virtual_printer/uploads', no virtual printer ever starts,
"VP doesn't work" support reports follow.
Replace the chmod-777 hack with a proper entrypoint:
- deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh runs as root, chowns /app/data and
/app/logs (and /app/data/virtual_printer when bind-mounted) to
PUID:PGID, then drops to that uid via gosu before exec'ing the
app. The chown is gated behind a top-level ownership check so
subsequent restarts skip the recursive traversal — no multi-
second startup penalty on multi-GB archive directories.
- A sentinel .bambuddy file in each data path prevents Docker from
re-syncing image directory metadata on every mount (otherwise
empty volumes have their ownership reverted from the image on
each restart, defeating the idempotency).
- When the container is started with an explicit `user:` directive
or `--user` flag the entrypoint detects it isn't root and falls
through to direct exec — preserving compatibility for users who
pin a specific uid.
Compose template changes:
- Remove `user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"` (entrypoint owns
privilege drop now).
- Add PUID / PGID env vars with the same defaults.
- Comment out the ./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer
bind mount by default, with explicit "only needed if you also
run a native install of Bambuddy on the same host and want both
to share the VP CA cert" guidance. The entrypoint chowns the
host-side dir through the bind mount the first time it sees
wrong ownership, so existing uncomented installs continue to
work and #1211 specifically gets fixed.
2026-05-05 17:22:08 +02:00
|
|
|
# Create data directories. Ownership is normalised at startup by the
|
|
|
|
|
# entrypoint (chowns to PUID:PGID and drops privileges via gosu before
|
|
|
|
|
# exec'ing the app), so we don't need a chmod 777 hack here — that was
|
|
|
|
|
# the workaround for the previous compose `user: "1000:1000"` model and
|
|
|
|
|
# only worked when the volume's perms happened to survive (named volume
|
|
|
|
|
# first-create case; bind-mount-source case bit users in #1211 / #668).
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# The sentinel file is needed so a freshly-created Docker named volume
|
|
|
|
|
# isn't "empty" from Docker's POV. On empty volumes Docker resyncs the
|
|
|
|
|
# directory metadata (incl. ownership) from the image on every mount,
|
|
|
|
|
# which would mean our entrypoint chown gets reverted on every restart
|
|
|
|
|
# and re-fired on every start (slow on multi-GB archive dirs). With a
|
|
|
|
|
# sentinel inside the volume on first mount, Docker considers the
|
|
|
|
|
# volume populated and stops resyncing, so the chown is genuinely
|
|
|
|
|
# one-shot.
|
|
|
|
|
RUN mkdir -p /app/data /app/logs && \
|
|
|
|
|
: >/app/data/.bambuddy && \
|
|
|
|
|
: >/app/logs/.bambuddy
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Entrypoint script: handles PUID/PGID + ownership normalisation +
|
|
|
|
|
# privilege drop. See deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh for the full rationale.
|
|
|
|
|
COPY deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
|
|
|
|
|
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Environment variables
|
|
|
|
|
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
|
|
|
|
|
ENV DATA_DIR=/app/data
|
2025-12-31 17:07:15 +01:00
|
|
|
ENV LOG_DIR=/app/logs
|
2026-01-20 11:57:09 +01:00
|
|
|
ENV PORT=8000
|
2026-04-10 10:46:06 +02:00
|
|
|
# Provide a local username + home for tools that call getpass.getuser() /
|
|
|
|
|
# os.path.expanduser() under arbitrary PUIDs. With `user: "1001:1001"` the
|
|
|
|
|
# stock python:3.13-slim image has no /etc/passwd entry for that UID, so
|
|
|
|
|
# pwd.getpwuid() raises and breaks libraries that do host-level user lookups
|
|
|
|
|
# (notably asyncssh, which uses the local username for ~/.ssh/config host
|
|
|
|
|
# matching during the SpoolBuddy remote-update flow). Setting LOGNAME/USER
|
|
|
|
|
# makes getpass.getuser() resolve via env vars instead of the passwd db;
|
|
|
|
|
# HOME=/app gives a writable home that is guaranteed to exist.
|
|
|
|
|
ENV HOME=/app
|
|
|
|
|
ENV USER=bambuddy
|
|
|
|
|
ENV LOGNAME=bambuddy
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2026-05-16 09:47:05 +02:00
|
|
|
# Matplotlib (imported lazily by the STL thumbnail generator) tries to create
|
|
|
|
|
# its font/style cache at $HOME/.config/matplotlib on first import. /app is
|
|
|
|
|
# root-owned and not writable by the PUID:PGID the entrypoint drops to,
|
|
|
|
|
# which trips an EPERM warning in everyone's logs and forces matplotlib
|
|
|
|
|
# to fall back to a per-restart temp dir (paying the font-scan cost on
|
|
|
|
|
# every container restart). Pinning the cache dir to /tmp/matplotlib
|
|
|
|
|
# silences the warning and keeps the cache alive for the container's
|
|
|
|
|
# lifetime. /tmp is writable by any uid, so this works regardless of PUID.
|
|
|
|
|
ENV MPLCONFIGDIR=/tmp/matplotlib
|
|
|
|
|
|
2026-03-19 11:29:59 +01:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 322
|
|
|
|
|
EXPOSE 990
|
2026-02-17 11:57:50 +01:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 3000
|
feat: multiple virtual printers with dedicated bind IPs + dual bind/detect ports (#445)
Multiple Virtual Printers:
- Each VP gets a dedicated bind IP with independent FTP, MQTT, SSDP, and Bind services
- New VirtualPrinter DB model, CRUD API (/api/virtual-printers), React UI
- VirtualPrinterList, VirtualPrinterCard, VirtualPrinterAddDialog components
- Per-instance TLS certificates (shared CA), 11 printer models, all 4 modes
- Auto-incremented serial suffixes, network interface override per VP
Dual Bind/Detect Ports (#445):
- Listen on both ports 3000 and 3002 for slicer bind/detect handshake
- Different BambuStudio/OrcaSlicer versions use different ports
- Applies to BindServer (server mode) and SlicerProxyManager (proxy mode)
- Updated Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, firewall rules in wiki
Also:
- Rewrote VP test suite for new multi-instance architecture (75 tests)
- Rewritten "How it works" section with 3-step workflow explanation
- Updated all 5 locales (en, de, ja, fr, it)
- Updated wiki and website for multi-VP + dual ports
- New multi-VP screenshot
2026-02-19 11:22:28 +01:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 3002
|
2026-03-19 11:29:59 +01:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 6000
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 8000
|
2026-02-07 15:17:19 +01:00
|
|
|
EXPOSE 8883
|
|
|
|
|
EXPOSE 50000-50100
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2026-01-20 11:57:09 +01:00
|
|
|
# Health check (uses PORT env var via shell)
|
2025-12-14 09:15:49 +01:00
|
|
|
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=10s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
|
2026-01-20 11:57:09 +01:00
|
|
|
CMD python -c "import urllib.request, os; urllib.request.urlopen(f'http://localhost:{os.environ.get(\"PORT\", \"8000\")}/health')" || exit 1
|
2025-12-14 09:15:49 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2025-12-09 17:06:54 +00:00
|
|
|
# Run the application
|
2026-01-02 12:28:32 +01:00
|
|
|
# Use standard asyncio loop (uvloop has permission issues in some Docker environments)
|
2026-07-09 15:45:57 +02:00
|
|
|
# Port is configurable via PORT (default 8000); bind address via HOST (default
|
|
|
|
|
# 0.0.0.0). Set HOST=127.0.0.1 to bind loopback only, e.g. when a reverse proxy
|
|
|
|
|
# on the same host fronts the app.
|
fix(shutdown): exec uvicorn as PID 1 in Docker, and bound the graceful-shutdown wait
Two defects, both invisible until you ask the app to stop.
Docker never shut down gracefully at all. CMD ["sh","-c","uvicorn ..."] left
the shell as PID 1 with uvicorn as its child, and dash does not forward
signals, so docker stop SIGTERMed the shell and uvicorn never heard about it.
Measured on the shipped image: the full 10s grace period, exit 137, and no
"Shutting down" line in the log. Every stop, restart and image update was a
hard kill -- no WAL checkpoint, no MQTT disconnect, no virtual-printer
teardown. `exec` makes uvicorn PID 1; the rebuilt image now stops in 1s with
exit 0 and checkpoints the WAL.
Separately, uvicorn's timeout_graceful_shutdown defaults to None -- wait
forever for in-flight requests. An MJPEG camera stream is a response that
never completes (httptools' connection shutdown() only flips keep_alive on an
in-flight cycle, it never closes the transport), so one open camera tile
pinned the process until systemd SIGKILLed at 90s. The ordering makes it
unfixable from inside the app: uvicorn fires the lifespan shutdown -- the code
that tears the streams down -- only after connections drain.
All six launchers now pass --timeout-graceful-shutdown 5: Dockerfile,
deploy/bambuddy.service, the systemd unit and launchd plist from
install/install.sh, the SpoolBuddy installer's unit, and the Windows NSSM
registration. On timeout uvicorn cancels the request tasks; the camera
generators already unwind cleanly on CancelledError.
TimeoutStopSec raised to 30s on the units and stop_grace_period: 30s added to
compose, as backstops rather than the mechanism. On Windows NSSM's default
1500ms AppStopMethodConsole was force-killing uvicorn mid-teardown; raised to
15s, with the WM_CLOSE and thread-message stages skipped (uvicorn is a console
app with neither a window nor a message loop).
2026-07-11 14:44:45 +02:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# `exec` is load-bearing, not style. Without it the shell stays as PID 1 and
|
|
|
|
|
# uvicorn runs as its child; dash does not forward signals, so `docker stop`
|
|
|
|
|
# SIGTERMs the shell and uvicorn never hears about it. Every stop then ran to
|
|
|
|
|
# the end of the grace period and died on SIGKILL (exit 137) — no WAL
|
|
|
|
|
# checkpoint, no MQTT disconnect, no virtual-printer teardown, on every restart
|
|
|
|
|
# and every image update. With `exec`, uvicorn *is* PID 1 and gets the signal.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# --timeout-graceful-shutdown caps the wait on in-flight requests. Uvicorn's
|
|
|
|
|
# default is to wait forever, and an MJPEG camera stream is a response that
|
|
|
|
|
# never completes, so a single open camera tile would otherwise pin the process
|
|
|
|
|
# past Docker's 10s grace and back into SIGKILL. On timeout uvicorn cancels the
|
|
|
|
|
# request tasks; the camera generators already unwind cleanly on CancelledError.
|
|
|
|
|
ENV UVICORN_TIMEOUT_GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN=5
|
fix(docker): normalise data-volume ownership at startup via gosu entrypoint
Two related failure modes have been biting Docker users repeatedly,
most recently in #1211:
1. Docker named volumes are created by the daemon as root:root, and
the previous `chmod 777 /app/data` Dockerfile workaround only
covered the named-volume root — so subdirs Bambuddy creates at
runtime (virtual_printer/uploads, virtual_printer/certs, etc.)
inherited wrong ownership when the container ran as 1000:1000.
2. The shipped docker-compose.yml ships
`./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer` uncommented, and
dockerd creates a missing bind-mount source on the host as root
before the container starts — leaving the host directory
unwritable by uid 1000 inside the container even though the named
volume above it had the chmod-777 workaround.
Symptom either way: [Errno 13] Permission denied:
'/app/data/virtual_printer/uploads', no virtual printer ever starts,
"VP doesn't work" support reports follow.
Replace the chmod-777 hack with a proper entrypoint:
- deploy/docker-entrypoint.sh runs as root, chowns /app/data and
/app/logs (and /app/data/virtual_printer when bind-mounted) to
PUID:PGID, then drops to that uid via gosu before exec'ing the
app. The chown is gated behind a top-level ownership check so
subsequent restarts skip the recursive traversal — no multi-
second startup penalty on multi-GB archive directories.
- A sentinel .bambuddy file in each data path prevents Docker from
re-syncing image directory metadata on every mount (otherwise
empty volumes have their ownership reverted from the image on
each restart, defeating the idempotency).
- When the container is started with an explicit `user:` directive
or `--user` flag the entrypoint detects it isn't root and falls
through to direct exec — preserving compatibility for users who
pin a specific uid.
Compose template changes:
- Remove `user: "${PUID:-1000}:${PGID:-1000}"` (entrypoint owns
privilege drop now).
- Add PUID / PGID env vars with the same defaults.
- Comment out the ./virtual_printer:/app/data/virtual_printer
bind mount by default, with explicit "only needed if you also
run a native install of Bambuddy on the same host and want both
to share the VP CA cert" guidance. The entrypoint chowns the
host-side dir through the bind mount the first time it sees
wrong ownership, so existing uncomented installs continue to
work and #1211 specifically gets fixed.
2026-05-05 17:22:08 +02:00
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ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
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fix(shutdown): exec uvicorn as PID 1 in Docker, and bound the graceful-shutdown wait
Two defects, both invisible until you ask the app to stop.
Docker never shut down gracefully at all. CMD ["sh","-c","uvicorn ..."] left
the shell as PID 1 with uvicorn as its child, and dash does not forward
signals, so docker stop SIGTERMed the shell and uvicorn never heard about it.
Measured on the shipped image: the full 10s grace period, exit 137, and no
"Shutting down" line in the log. Every stop, restart and image update was a
hard kill -- no WAL checkpoint, no MQTT disconnect, no virtual-printer
teardown. `exec` makes uvicorn PID 1; the rebuilt image now stops in 1s with
exit 0 and checkpoints the WAL.
Separately, uvicorn's timeout_graceful_shutdown defaults to None -- wait
forever for in-flight requests. An MJPEG camera stream is a response that
never completes (httptools' connection shutdown() only flips keep_alive on an
in-flight cycle, it never closes the transport), so one open camera tile
pinned the process until systemd SIGKILLed at 90s. The ordering makes it
unfixable from inside the app: uvicorn fires the lifespan shutdown -- the code
that tears the streams down -- only after connections drain.
All six launchers now pass --timeout-graceful-shutdown 5: Dockerfile,
deploy/bambuddy.service, the systemd unit and launchd plist from
install/install.sh, the SpoolBuddy installer's unit, and the Windows NSSM
registration. On timeout uvicorn cancels the request tasks; the camera
generators already unwind cleanly on CancelledError.
TimeoutStopSec raised to 30s on the units and stop_grace_period: 30s added to
compose, as backstops rather than the mechanism. On Windows NSSM's default
1500ms AppStopMethodConsole was force-killing uvicorn mid-teardown; raised to
15s, with the WM_CLOSE and thread-message stages skipped (uvicorn is a console
app with neither a window nor a message loop).
2026-07-11 14:44:45 +02:00
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CMD ["sh", "-c", "exec uvicorn backend.app.main:app --host ${HOST:-0.0.0.0} --port ${PORT:-8000} --loop asyncio --timeout-graceful-shutdown ${UVICORN_TIMEOUT_GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN}"]
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